

RIGHT TO THE CITY FOR A SAFE AND JUST WORLD: THE CASE OF BRICS



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RIGHT TO THE CITY FOR A SAFE AND JUST WORLD: THE BRICS CASE

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INDEX

INTRODUCTION Sérgio Veloso	08
LEFT IN THE CITY: A CONCEPTUAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE RIGHT TO THE CITY FOR A SAFE AND JUST SPACE FOR HUMANITY Rasigan Maharajh	19
THE DISTRICT OF CAJU: FROM ROYAL SEASIDE RESORT TO AREA OF ENVIRONMENTAL SACRIFICE Aercio de Oliveira	37
DEVELOPMENTAL PAINS, RIGHT TO THE CITY AND GREEN GROWTH AMBITIONS: MOSCOW'S ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE TODAY Alvaro Artigas	57
THE POLITICS OF URBAN SPACE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT TO THE CITY IN THE MEGACITY OF MUMBAI, INDIA Sudha Mohan	97
FROM MEGA-CITY TO GHOST TOWN: THE RIGHT TO THE CITY AND NON-RIGHT TO THE NON-CITY IN CHINESE URBAN DEVELOPMENT Sérgio Veloso and Pedro Maia	119
RIGHT TO THE CITY AND PUBLIC SPACES: INNER-CITY REVITALISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA'S CAPITAL CITY Geci Karuri-Sebina and Olga Koma	137





INTRODUCTION: RIGHT TO THE CITY FOR A SAFE AND JUST SPACE FOR HUMANITY

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
In February 2012, Oxfam released, as part of the *GROW* campaign, the discussion paper *A Safe and Just Space for Humanity*, in which it stated, “(...) we need a rapid transition to a new model of prosperity, one which delivers economic development, respects planetary boundaries, and has equity at its heart” (RAWORTH, 2012, p. 3). To achieve such goals, the document presents a set of variables, organized graphically as a doughnut (picture 1), to stimulate further debate and discussion worldwide. The doughnut presents two boundaries, one outside and the other inside it. Outside of its inside boundary are the social limits; outside are the environmental limits. Both boundaries present the limits to a sustainable space, both socially and environmentally.

The proper space for a socially and environmentally sustainable world is inside both boundaries, or, in other words, within the doughnut. That is to say that for a safe and just space, all humanity should have access to water, food, education, resilience, energy, power, and voice. Also, social inequality should be eradicated. Together, these social variables constitute the doughnut’s inside boundary. At the same time, all humanity must be protected from climate change, biodiversity loss, ozone depletion, chemical pollution, ocean acidification, and land use change, as well as have access to fresh water and sanitation. These are the environmental variables that comprise the doughnut’s outside boundary.

A SAFE AND JUST SPACE FOR HUMANITY TO DEVELOP

Source: Raworth, 2012.

Picture 01: The 11 dimensions of the social foundation are illustrative and are based on governments' priorities for Rio+20. The nine dimensions of the environmental ceiling are based on the planetary boundaries set out by Rockström et al (2009b).



In this book, the BRICS Policy Center, through the BRICS-Urbe project, intends, in partnership with Oxfam, to question whether the BRICS countries are moving towards a safe and just space through the way they are developing and transforming their cities. Due to the scale of the impacts these five countries have on the globe as a whole, we understand that if we want to figure out ways to improve conditions of life and promote sustainability, socially and environmentally, throughout the globe, the BRICS-Cities stands as proper and fundamental spaces. With approximately 40% of world's population, with three of the biggest national territories, with the most dynamic economies in the emerging world, and sustaining amazingly high rates of urban growth, it seems reasonable to argue that the achieving of a safe and just space within BRICS-Cities is key to making life within the limits of our planet safe and just.

To this end, the present book aims at articulating the doughnut idea with the notion of the *right to the city*, as created by Henri Lefebvre (1996) in the 1960s and further developed by David Harvey (2008) and social and environmental activists throughout the globe (GILBERT e DIKEÇ, 2008; BROWN e KRISTIANSEN, 2009; SCHIMID, 2012). Each chapter stands as a case study, and the whole of them encompasses the most important aspects and issues highlighted by the expression *right to the city*. However, before presenting how the book is organized, we shall, in this brief introduction, spend some words on the relevance of the urban as a proper scale for achieving a safe and just humanity and also present how we understand the notion of how the *right to the city* enhances the doughnut idea as developed by Oxfam and may be used as a key tool for moving towards a safe and just space for humanity.

THE URBAN AS THE PROPER SCALE FOR A SAFE AND JUST HUMANITY

In his studies, Henri Lefebvre (1970; 1991; 1996) highlights the procedural nature of urban spaces. Cities are more than their streets, buildings, resources, and wealth; they are socially produced spaces, and, in this sense, they are processes. By noting this procedural nature, Lefebvre (1970; 1991; 1996) stresses the importance of diverse relationships and articulations in daily urban life. The social production of space, systems

of values, interests, and discourses that give shape and organize everyday urban life is the result of relationships and disputes between various actors inhabiting the city.

This perception is important because it demonstrates that cities are open and unpredictable spaces. Their materiality, as well as their systems of values, interests and discourses, is the result of social interaction. Urban life can, thus, take many forms. The point is that none of these forms are given; they are continually produced and reproduced in daily life. For this reason, and also for their material capabilities and structures, cities are strategic sites for concentration of productive forces as well as for the accumulation, management, and distribution of resources (LEFEBVRE, 1996; HARVEY, 2008; BRENNER et AL., 2012).

Due to their social and material complexity as sites for concentration of productive forces and accumulation, management, and distribution of resources, we understand that cities are the most proper space and scale for designing public and private policies toward a safe and just world. The urban space can offer the democratization of capabilities and access to life's essentials to a greater number of people when real chances to take part in the enjoyment and management of its resources are provided.

However, a city can also do the opposite, restricting to a smaller number of its dwellers a chance to take part in the enjoyment and management of its resources, making urban spaces become less safe and just. These two possibilities shed light on the ambivalence of the urban space. At the same time that cities can be a vector for a safe and just world, they can also be obstacles to it. Also, due to its feature as a site of accumulation of productive forces and its social and material complexity, cities are under constant threat of having their social and environmental boundaries exceeded.

Because of this ambivalence, and also because the globe is increasingly being organized around urban spaces, with more and more people living in cities, cities are the most proper scale for the construction of a safe and just world. Once urban policies that assure universal rights and access to life's essentials are designed and implemented in the majority of cities across the globe, making them safe and just spaces, the chances are that the whole globe will become safe and just.

In contrast to policies designed for the whole national space, urban policies are easier to be implemented and, due to the concentration of an increasing number of people living in cities, they have a more optimized effect. This is not to say, however, that the national scale should not be considered for the designing and implementation of policies towards a just and safe world. The point made here is that the national scale alone is not enough. National politics, because they have to deal with the whole national territory, tend not to take into account the local specificities and challenges that are faced by urban policy makers on a daily basis. Other than that, ordinary people reach out to urban politics easier since the city is the actual scale of ordinary daily life while national politics is armored by its power rituals and the geographic distance between capitals.

THE RIGHT TO THE CITY AS AN AGENDA FOR A SAFE AND JUST SPACE FOR HUMANITY

The term *right to the city* was coined by Henri Lefebvre (1996) for his studies on the urban crisis in France in the 1960s. Marked by functionalist urban planning, the most important French cities experienced, at that time, the restructuring of their inner areas and the displacement of much of their population to suburbs, where single-family housing units proliferated extensively (SCHMID, 2012). For Lefebvre (1996), this was a crisis due to the homogenizing tendency of everyday life inherent to this process of forced evictions of the population to suburbs.

Designed in a moment of urban crisis, in which a comprehensive process of transformation of the urban space was being advanced through evictions and displacements, the notion of the *right to the city* stands not only as a concept to express a period of crisis but also as an alternative agenda for urban development. The central purpose of this agenda is to create an urban space in which all citizens have fully respected and guaranteed civil and human rights, as well as the right to participate actively in decision-making processes, and access to urban resources and infrastructures (LEFEBVRE, 1996; HARVEY, 2008). The *right to the city* is, by its conceptual and programmatic definition, a defense of democracy and direct citizenship as forms of the political organization of the urban space and a defense of social and environmental equity as a fundamental right for all.

The right to the city informs an urban agenda that highlights the need to perform a comprehensive urban reform. This reform, however, could only be materialized through the transparent and accountable articulation of various departments of the government, social movements and civil society organizations. It should also be projected globally as an alternative for market-oriented strategies for urban development.

In a globalized world, endowed with networks that integrate and disseminate all kinds of flow on the global scale, local problems and challenges are projected globally, thus becoming global problems and challenges. Such global/local integration makes the urban scale increasingly important to build an agenda that seeks to address issues of inequality and social and environmental imbalances in the global context. Since cities are central nodes and sites of accumulation and management in this global network (SASSEN, 2001), the stronger the right to the city grows within more cities, the stronger it flows globally. It can thus increase its global strength and projection and be able to inform the construction of inclusive cities across the planet.

An agenda for urban reform based on the *right to the city* should comprise, in our opinion, the following objectives:

1. Complete and unrestricted respect for human and civil rights;
2. Complete and unrestricted respect for environmental boundaries and commitment to sustainability;
3. Reduction of poverty and social inequality not only via increased power consumption but also via social and environmental justice;
4. Universal and effective participation in decision-making processes of urban life;
5. Freedom and unrestricted access of all citizens to the resources of the city;

6. Recognition of diversity and difference as essential and constitutive elements of urban life;
7. Transparency, efficiency, and accountability in urban administration;
8. Creation and expansion of public spaces;

THE SHAPE OF THE BOOK

The book is organized into six chapters, one theoretical and five case studies, and each of them address different aspects of the right to the city in the most important cities of the BRICS. The South-African economist, Rasigan Maharajh, introduces the theoretical chapter by highlighting the need to develop a “critical discussion about the developmental challenges of the 21st century.” Throughout three sections, he details the formulation of the right to the city as a concept, as created by Lefebvre (1996), and further developed by David Harvey (2008), and relates it to the doughnut idea developed by Oxfam (RAWORTH, 2012). The strength of his chapter lies, not only in the way he relates right to the city with the doughnut, but also to how the concept of right to the city was assimilated in different, and, sometimes, opposite ways of the original formulation by Lefebvre. In strange and dangerous ways, the right to the city was assimilated by neoliberals and converted into a deformed vehicle for neoliberal urban reform. With that in mind, he concludes his thorough chapter, stressing the need to research and develop strategies that can resist neoliberalism and its urban forms.

The first case study addresses the issue of environmental justice – or injustice – in the city of Rio de Janeiro through an analysis of the port zone of Caju. Being traversed by a series of processes of urban revitalization and transformation, studies and analysis of the current moment of Rio commonly focus on the areas of the city that are going through such processes, hence the port zone is one of the most studied and analyzed. This study, conversely, addresses the neighborhood of Caju, an area adjacent to the port zone, and, somehow, part of it, but it is not being revitalized. On the contrary, as the author, Aercio de

Oliveira from the NGO Fase, stresses, the population living in Cajú is exposed to the most drastic situation, in which all kinds of environmental and social injustices are reproduced on a daily basis. As a way out of this situation, Aercio provides us with a detailed chart of proposals, ranging from the strengthening of social participation to increases in income.

As demonstrated by the Professor of Sciences-Po Paris and expert of Russian urban development, Alvaro Artigas, Moscow has been undergoing a series of transformations in its urban structure of governance since the end of the Soviet Union. To demonstrate it, Professor Artigas examines the case of environmental governance and the existing gap between the actions and decisions of Moscow's public authorities and social participation. These gaps are materialized in a systemic lack of transparency and in the drastic reduction of public green spaces through the city.

One of the most critical questions one should ask in relation to the notion of the right to the city is, according to the Professor of Department of Civics and Politics of the University of Mumbai, Dr. Sudha Mohan, does the city belong to all, and do all citizens have an equal right to the city? With this question in mind, Professor Mohan conducts a thorough investigation of the politics of the urban space in the city of Mumbai, India, with a special focus on the case of Dharavi, one of the largest slums in Asia and in the world. Throughout this investigation, a detailed list of problems confronted and lessons learned was presented. The chapter is concluded with an equally detailed list of policy measures and recommendations to enhance the right to the city as a guideline for urban policies.

China, with its population of over a billion people, is a land of profound disparities and segregation. There are different kind of citizenships—rural and urban—as well as different kind of strategies for urban development being conducted in different parts of the country. The book's fifth chapter addresses these disparities by analyzing two opposite models of urban development. In one hand, there is the city of Chongqing, one of the fastest growing megacities in the world. In the other hand, there is Ordos, the one of the most emblematic of the so-called ghost cities. Through analyzing these two contradictory models of urban development, we intend to highlight what seems to

be obvious: strategies of urban development that do not have human beings and the improvement of their lives as their most important objects will never accomplish success.

Last but not least, South African Cities Network's coordinator, Geci Sebina, presents us with a paper covering one of the most challenging aspects of post-apartheid South Africa: the production of inclusive public spaces. As a legacy of half a century of apartheid, South African cities are currently highly privatized and spatially segregated. To confront this difficult legacy and ensure a more equal, integrated and diverse South Africa, municipal and provincial governments are conducting plans to expand and construct new public areas. In Johannesburg, the biggest and one of the most segregated South African cities, the project of corridors of freedom is conducting a major transformation on people's mobility by fostering the usage of public transportation as strategy to increase rates of social integration. On her chapter, Mrs. Sebina tackles the projects to increase and expand public spaces in South Africa's capital, Tshwane.

Since to think of BRICS is to think of an ongoing process, with its own dynamic and with an open and uncertain future, all production and analytical effort, theoretical or empirical, about BRICS, is destined to become dated or even obsolete fairly quickly. The purpose of this book, as well as other BRICS-Urbe projects and publications, is to shed light on the importance of BRICS-Cities (BOCAYUVA e VELOSO, 2011; VELOSO, 2014) as fundamental spaces for the advancement of public and private policies able to transform the whole globe into a safe and just space for mankind.

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
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
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LEFT IN THE CITY: A CONCEPTUAL CONTRIBUTION
TO THE RIGHT TO THE CITY FOR A SAFE AND JUST
SPACE FOR HUMANITY

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INTRODUCTION

“‘Change the World’ said Marx; ‘Change Life’ said Rimbaud; for us, these two tasks are identical (André Bretton)” - David Harvey (2008) translating a banner as the conclusion of a Lecture to the Third Conference of the International Forum on Urbanism: City and Water, 13 – 14 June, Taipei.

The invocation by David Harvey of the surrealist André Bretton’s combination of the political imperatives of Karl Marx with the symbolist and free-form poetry of Arthur Rimbaud¹ and represented in an artefact commemorating the tragic night when police of the state instigated a massacre of protesting student’s in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the City of Mexico in 1968 provides an appropriate vantage point to elaborate a critical discussion about the developmental challenges of the 21st Century.

In its most apparent form, the slogan is drawn from a passage in a tract of a Situationist International publication² that read as: “To transform the world and to change life are one and the same thing for the proletariat, the inseparable passwords to its suppression as a class, the dissolution of the present reign of necessity, and the finally possible accession to the reign of freedom” (1966). This polemic fulfilled its intention of confronting students with their “subservience to the ideological conditions imposed upon them by the state, family and the university system” (ibid).

1 Originally framed as “Il a peut-être des secrets pour changer la vie?” from *Délires I, Vierge Folle in Une Saison en Enfer* (1873).

2 SI (1966) *On the Poverty of Student Life: Considered in Its Economic, Political, Psychological, Sexual, and Especially Intellectual Aspects, With a Modest Proposal for Doing Away with It*, Members of the Situationist International and students of Strasbourg University, Bureau of Public Secrets, Strasbourg.

Nearly five decades later, and while much has changed, the central contradictions articulated in the late sixties remain the underpinning rationale for the crisis currently confronting humanity and threatening our survival on the planet. In the case of Mexico, the terror unleashed by the state's monopoly of violence persists and is evidenced in the 'disappearance' en masse of 43 *normalistas*³ on 26 September 2014. These students were en-route to joining an annual march in commemoration of the 1968 massacre. For Richard Roman and Edur Velasco Arregui, the "neoliberal capitalist transformation of the Mexican economy requires repression to prevent or quell resistance to the massive destruction of socio-economic rights, livelihoods, and hope for a better future" (2014).

In the case of Harvey, he has since produced six books and various articles that have increasingly deepened our collective understanding and appreciation of the dynamics of capital and its geo-spatial impacts. Thus, his latest book concentrates on exposing the seventeen central contradictions of capitalism which he divides into seven foundational elements, seven facets that are consistently 'moving' and three 'dangerous' aspects which pose a threat to the continued reproduction of the system as a whole (2014). It is especially in the latter set of three contradictions of capitalism, that this paper locates a discussion on the right to the city, the possibilities of realising a safe and just space for humanity and the contemporary conjuncture.

This brief discussion paper comprises three sections. From this introductory section, we turn to detailing the formulation of the concept of the right to the city as created by Henri Lefebvre (1966). We extend this discussion through the inclusion of the subsequent theorisations of David Harvey (2008 and 2014) and the visualisation emanating from Kate Raworth of Oxfam's provocative question of whether we can live in the 'doughnut' (2012).

3 The students were from the Escuela Normal Rural "Raúl Isidro Burgos" de Ayotzinapa. These institutions were originally established in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1920's) with the express objective of utilising use education as a fundamental tool for understanding social reality and exploring the possibility of transformation.

The third and concluding section is devoted to outlining some salient aspects defining the conjuncture. It also begins the process of testing the viability of transiting from the current trajectory of global capitalism. The emerging synthesis hopefully contributes to expanding the contextualisation for the case studies conducted in the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and their comparative analysis in a matrix.

UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND PLANETARY BOUNDARIES AT THE END OF CAPITALISM.

A decade and a half into the 21st Century, and the human population has expanded to its current scale of approximately 7.2 billion people⁴. These peoples of the world are segregated into 193 political entities that are accorded the status of being countries are recognised as such by each other and collectively form the United Nations. These national territories which are imbued with political sovereignty are the result of evolutionary and revolutionary processes. As such, they are neither rationally defined nor equitably distributed to accommodate the peoples of the world. By 2014, the UN had estimated that 54% of the world's population lived in urban settlements (UN: 2014: 1). The UN also notes that “close to half of the world's urban dwellers reside in relatively small settlements of less than 500,000 inhabitants, while only around one in eight live in the 28 mega-cities with more than 10 million inhabitants” (ibid).

As noted by the UN, “the process of urbanization historically has been associated with other important economic and social transformations, which have brought greater geographic mobility, lower fertility, longer life expectancy and population ageing. Cities are important drivers of development and poverty reduction in both urban and rural areas, as they concentrate much of the national economic activity, government, commerce and transportation, and provide crucial links with rural areas, between cities, and across international borders” (2014: 3). In recognising their contextual specificity, the demographic and economic data suggests that the pace of urbanisation

4 See <http://www.census.gov/popclock/> for an update on the estimated world population size.

and persistent patterns of combined and uneven development that characterise the contemporary world system inevitably results in crisis's, contestation, and conflict.

Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991) was a philosopher based in France who contributed to expanding the critique of political economy focussing on the built environment. As noted by Stanley Aronowitz, “It is not excessive to claim that he is the *ecophilosopher* of the 21st century, for he made the connection between the massive despoiling of the global ecosystems, the new shape of social time and social space and the struggle for the transformation of everyday life which, he claims, is the key to the project of changing life and repairing our collective relationship to nature” (2007: 133). Whilst Lefebvre was undoubtedly prolific with his research output contained in over sixty books and hundreds of articles, this chapter is primarily concerned with his notion of the ‘right to the city’ which was first articulated in Le Droit à la Ville and written in 1967 as a homage to the centennial anniversary Das Kapital (Marx: 1867).

In an obituary published by Radical Philosophy, Martin Kelly declared that “Henri Lefebvre continued to believe that an undogmatic reading of Marx and Engels provided the best framework for understanding the nature and development of society, and that an ambitious revolutionary project offered the best chance of assisting positive human development through the reverses and uncertainties of history” (1992: 63). This assessment resonates with Aronowitz’ suggestion that the main preoccupation of Lefebvre was “to discern the consequences of modernity in its late capitalist incarnation for the multiplicity of forms of social life and for (social) being itself” (2007: 134).

Lefebvre’s text on the right to the city was published in 1968, and maintains a strong and consistent link to the account by Karl Marx of the multi-decadal process whereby the industrial revolution transformed capitalism into the globally hegemonic mode of production and whose fundamental relationships were riven by class antagonisms. Thus, and following on Marx, Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ was an attempt to challenge the existing power relations and the deep roots of the capitalist system that drive urban development and the production of urban space, including social, political and economic

relations (Lamarca: 2009). Lamarca further translates this idea as implying that “the rights of the excluded and marginalised to be part of the production of the city, for their needs and aspirations, rather than exclusively those of capital as occurs in most urban development, to be met in the process” (2009: X). For Mark Purcell, “Lefebvre’s right to the city offers a much more radical, more problematic, and more open-ended vision of urban politics than the vision currently offered in the literature” (2002: 100). Purcell argues further that “The right to the city stresses the need to restructure the power relations that underlie the production of urban space, fundamentally shifting control away from capital and the state and toward urban inhabitants (2002: 101 – 102).

The primary aspect of the right to the city was the right to participation in any decision affecting the city. This would normatively involve urban inhabitants and Lefebvre emphasised those excluded due to social and economic class differentiation as depicted in “is it essential to describe at length, besides the condition of youth, students and intellectuals, armies of workers with or without white collars, people from the provinces, the colonized and semi-colonized of all sorts, all those who endure a well-organized daily life, is it here necessary to exhibit the derisory and untragic misery of the inhabitant, of the suburban dweller and of the people who stay in residential ghettos, in the mouldering centres of old cities and in the proliferations lost beyond them? One only has to open one’s eyes to understand the daily life of the one who runs from his dwelling to the station, near or far away, to the packed underground train, the office or the factory, to return the same way in the evening and come home to recuperate enough to start again the next day. The picture of this generalized misery would not go without a picture of ‘satisfactions’ which hides it and becomes the means to elude it and break free from it” (Lefebvre: 2002:). Thus for Lefebvre, the right to the city “should modify, concretize and make more practical the rights of the citizen as an urban dweller (citadin) and user of multiple services. It would affirm, on the one hand, the right of users to make known their ideas on the space and time of their activities in the urban area; it would also cover the right to the use of the centre, a privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos (for workers, immigrants, the ‘marginal’ and even for the ‘privileged’)” (Kofman and Lebas: 1996: 34, as cited in Purcell: 2002: 102).

As argued by Purcell, “The right to participation maintains that citadins should play a central role in any decision that contributes to the production of urban space. The decision could be under the auspices of the state (such as a policy decision), of capital (an investment/disinvestment decision), a multilateral institution (a WTO trade ruling), or any other entity that affects the production of space in a particular city. Moreover, the decision could be made at a range of scales. It could involve any level of the state (national, provincial, local), or corporations that operate at any scale (global, national, local)” (2002: 102). This also emphasises the notion of the ‘citadin,’ in contrast to the often liberal-constitutional definition of citizenship and thereby asserting a rejection of the “Westphalian notion that all political loyalties must be hierarchically subordinate to one’s nation-state membership” (Purcell: 2002: 103).

The second most fundamental aspect of the right to the city was in the right to appropriation - the right of urban inhabitants to physically access, utilise and produce urban space. For Purcell, “appropriation gives inhabitants the right to ‘full and complete usage’ of urban space in the course of everyday life (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 179), space must be produced in a way that makes that full and complete usage possible. It is strongly antagonistic to the “conception of urban space as private property, as a commodity to be valorised (or used to valorise other commodities) by the capitalist production process” (ibid.). Thus framed the right to appropriation “confronts capital’s ability to valorise urban space, establishing a clear priority for the use value of urban residents over the exchange value interests of capitalist firms. In addition, appropriation reworks control over urban space, resisting the current hegemony of property rights and stressing the primacy of the use-rights of inhabitants” (Purcell: 2002: 103).

The World Social Forum began discussions on a World Charter on the Right to the City at its inaugural gathering in 2001 in Porte Alegre⁵. In the version of the charter that was produced by 2005, it had begun to define The Right to the City as the equitable

5 According to Leticia Marques Osorio (2005), the original proposal was suggested by Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional (FASE) at the VI Brazilian Conference on Human Rights in 2001 and was entitled The Charter for Human Rights in the Cities.

enjoyment of the city by all its inhabitants while respecting the need of sustainability and social justice so that the primary object of achieving an adequate standard of living for all is attained. Particular attention was afforded to the more vulnerable sectors of the population, for whom the rights of liberty of action and organisation in accordance with local custom and habits were of considerable importance.

According to Vogiazides, “While Lefebvre viewed the Right to the City as independent of any institutionalised right, the World Charter presents it as encompassing a collection of already recognised human rights. These include civil and political rights, such as the right to public information and political participation, and economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to work in equitable and satisfactory conditions; social security; the right to water, food, housing; the right to health, education and culture; and respect for diversity and ethnic, racial, sexual and cultural plurality (World Charter on the Right to the City 2005, Part II and III). From this perspective, it could be argued that the World Charter does not demand radical transformation of existing urban governance, but rather the better enforcement of existing human rights (Mayer: 2009: 369)” (2012: 22).

Subsequent iterations have resulted in numerous urban planning tools, and also a plethora of declarations and manifesto’s apparently seeking to enact the right to the city. In assessing their success, Lamarca is more sanguine and declares that while “these charters and tools express many of Lefebvre’s ideals on the right to the city – such as expanded notions of substantive citizenship and promoting the use value of urban space over its exchange value, for example – all fall short on explicitly addressing the structural change implicit in the concept i.e. how the right to the city fundamentally uproots existing capitalist social relations and what this means for cities today” (ibid).

Knut Unger has also suggested that much of the recent work on the right to the city reflects “a top down agenda agreed on by some NGOs networks who already know what the rights are, but want to build a larger alliance for improved power for which they need a name and branding” (2009). In a less cynical, though more critical fashion, Marcelo Lopes de Souza has argued that for most, the right to the city has been vulgarised and recuperated as the “right

to a better, more 'human' life in the context of the capitalist city, the capitalist society and on the basis of a ('reformed' and 'improved') representative 'democracy'" (2010: 317).

In noting and acknowledging Lefebvre's influence by Marxist theory, Vogiazides argues that he had indeed "developed the Right to the City in response to urbanisation under capitalism, which led to increased social exclusion and a decline in democracy in 'post-industrial' cities" (2012: 25). By contrast, it would appear that this ostensibly progressive slogan is itself becoming recuperated as a vehicle for neo-liberal urban reform. This is often recognised in a "a more 'depoliticised' or 'reformist' approach to the Right to the City, advanced by certain civil society movements, NGOs, municipalities and international development agencies, favours 'institutionalisation' of the Right to the City: that is, its official recognition as a new collective right in international, regional and national human rights documents" (Vogiazides: 2012: 21).

Stanley Aronowitz had noted that "Lefebvre has been credited by geographer and social theorist David Harvey, among others, with re-inventing urbanism" (2007: 134). David Harvey declared that "The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization" (2008: 23). As reflected by Unger: Harvey's version of the right to the city "isn't a complex of given human rights but again a slogan of class struggles in the territories, of grass root movements trying to associate in decentralized ways in order to find methods for trans-formative anti-capitalist action. A long term orientated revolutionary movement reclaiming the monopolized surplus in the urban sphere" (2009).

Harvey redirects our attention to the relationship between capitalism and urbanism. For Harvey, Lefebvre had clearly specified that "urbanisation was central to the survival of capitalism and therefore bound to become a crucial focus of political and class struggle, but that it was obliterating step by step the distinctions between town and country through the production of integrated spaces across national territory, if not beyond"

(Harvey: 2008: 28). Harvey explains that at the core of contemporary urbanisation under capitalism are processes of displacement and what he calls 'accumulation by dispossession' (ibid: 34). It is through these mechanisms amongst others that urbanisation facilitates capitalist accumulation through providing a pathway for the "absorbing the surplus product that capitalists perpetually produce in their search for profits" (ibid: 25).

In practice, urbanisation and especially the modification of urban centres are shown to be excellent devices for resolving the 'capital-surplus absorption problem' (Harvey: 2008: 27). Harvey presents the case studies of the manner in which the city redevelopment's in France in 1853 and the USA in 1946 laid out the basic format for subsequent iterations in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa after the mid-1990s. These are framed in the classical definition of innovation which should be read as creative destruction. Whilst the creation of the new infrastructures, financing mechanisms and general aesthetics are driven by elite and wealthy interests, the burdens of the destructive effects are inordinately borne by the poor and marginalised in all the cases mentioned. The consequences of these driving forces have resulted in "divided and conflict-prone urban areas. In the past three decades, the neoliberal turn has restored class power to rich elites" (ibid: 32). Thus, the spatial forms of our cities has global characteristics that are tending to ubiquity and "increasingly consist of fortified fragments, gated communities and privatized public spaces kept under constant surveillance" (op cite).

Harvey's advocacy of a return to the right to the city, is premised on a response to its current containment as the preserve of "a small political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities more and more after their own desires" (2008: 38). The realisation of such a restricted and constrained elaboration of Lefebvre's idea has especially been the consequence of the success of neo-liberalism and its global reproduction as the hegemonic ideological framework of contemporary capitalism. Thus, arguing for an increased role of the state, may have the perverse effect of strengthening the 'visible' (sic) hand of the private sector because "Neoliberalism has also created new systems of governance that integrate state and corporate interests, and through the application of money power, it has ensured that the disbursement of the surplus through the state

apparatus favours corporate capital and the upper classes in shaping the urban process” (op cite.). Harvey concludes with an entreaty to democratise the right to the city, and “the construction of a broad social movement to enforce its will is imperative if the dispossessed are to take back the control which they have for so long been denied, and if they are to institute new modes of urbanization. Lefebvre was right to insist that the revolution has to be urban, in the broadest sense of that term, or nothing at all” (2008: 40).

The concurrency of global crisis’s alluded to by both Lefebvre and Harvey are quiet firmly rooted in the contradictions emanating from the political economy of contemporary capitalism. This mode of production had effectively transcended its historical antecedents such as feudalism and slavery to become the most expansive framework for organising the production of material life and the reproduction of humanity itself over the preceding five centuries of the Common Era. When the United Nations convened in the twentieth anniversary of the Earth Summit in 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil most of the underlying tensions surfaced as representatives of the 193 member countries were confronted by the rising inequalities between people, the unevenness of development amongst states and the collective and accumulated toll upon the environment.

It was in this context that an Oxfam⁶ discussion document titled ‘a safe and just space for humanity’ was published. It sought to present a visual framework which enjoined the literature on planetary boundaries together with emerging social boundaries. The inner core of this representation would then form a safe and just space in which humanity could thrive. Oxfam argued that “moving into this space demands far greater equity – within and between countries – in the use of natural resources, and far greater efficiency in transforming those resources to meet human needs” (2012: 1). The author of this document was Kate Raworth,

6 Originally founded as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief in 1942 and currently constituted as a confederation of 17 affiliates organisations working together in more than 90 countries that have over 10,000 staff and nearly 50,000 interns and volunteers working across the world (Oxfam: 2015: 5)

an economist who asserts her “passion for the rewriting of economics to make it a fit tool for addressing the 21st century’s social and ecological challenge” on her personal website⁷.

The outer ring or environmental ceiling represented the critical natural thresholds. This was constructed by utilising the results of an international group of 28 earth science researchers⁸ who identified and quantified the first set of nine planetary boundaries within which humanity could continue to develop and thrive for generations to come in 2009. This group had warned that transgressing these boundaries could generate abrupt or irreversible environmental changes. They therefore suggested that maintaining the boundaries would reduce the risks to human society. The nine planetary boundaries were identified as: climate change; stratospheric ozone; land use change; freshwater use; biological diversity; ocean acidification; nitrogen and phosphorus inputs to the biosphere and oceans; aerosol loading; and chemical pollution (Rockström et al: 2009).

The second or inner ring comprised a social foundation within which lay a set of unacceptable human deprivations (Oxfam: 2012: 7). Oxfam had defined the critical human deprivations hunger, illiteracy, poverty, and voicelessness. Oxfam argued that it sought as a first priority to “ensure that all people are free from such deprivations, and are empowered with the rights and resources needed to provide a social foundation for leading lives of dignity, opportunity, and fulfilment” (ibid). According to the Raworth “a first glimpse of 21st century consensus on unacceptable deprivation comes from the issues raised by governments in their Rio+20 submissions: they prioritised 11 dimensions of human deprivation, and so these form the inner ring”

7 <http://www.kateraworth.com/>

8 Johan Rockström, Will Steffen, Kevin Noone, Åsa Persson, F. Stuart III Chapin, Eric Lambin, Timothy M. Lenton, Marten Scheffer, Carl Folke, Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Björn Nykvist, Cynthia A. de Wit, Terry Hughes, Sander van der Leeuw, Henning Rodhe, Sverker Sörlin, Peter K. Snyder, Robert Costanza, Uno Svedin, Malin Falkenmark, Louise Karlberg, Robert W. Corell, Victoria J. Fabry, James Hansen, Brian Walker, Diana Liverman, Katherine Richardson, Paul Crutzen, and Jonathan Foley.

CONCLUSIONS: THE CONJUNCTURE AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF POST-CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION.

The United Nations has acknowledged that “as the world continues to urbanise, sustainable development challenges will be increasingly concentrated in cities, particularly in the lower-middle- income countries where the pace of urbanisation is fastest. Integrated policies to improve the lives of both urban and rural dwellers are needed” (2014: 1). This serves to amplify the advice of Mark Purcell who recognises that there is a “need for research and action that can devise new strategies for resisting neoliberal globalisation and for enfranchising urban inhabitants” (2002: 99).

McKinsey Global Institute estimates that by 2030 “5 billion people — 60 percent of the world’s population — will live in cities, compared with 3.6 billion today, turbocharging the world’s economic growth” (MGI: 2013).

The World Social Forum maintains that the concept of the right to the city is a composite right that “emanates from the pursuit of another possible city, a new paradigm that creates an alternative to the false but dominant neo-liberal pretences and allows for the convergence of social movements articulating a common vision of a shared habitat of human rights, social justice and environmental sustainability” (WSF: 2009: 1). As articulated by Knut Unger “any serious struggle is a struggle for local demands and institutional change at the same time. The Right to the City is neither an anarchist nor statist ideology. It can be a sphere of diagonal transformations” (2009).

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THE DISTRICT OF CAJU: FROM ROYAL SEASIDE RESORT TO AREA OF ENVIRONMENTAL SACRIFICE

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Rio de Janeiro, the city which was the seat of the Portuguese Empire and capital of the Republic, currently inscribed on the World Heritage list¹ and Brazil's second largest economy, is once again undergoing urban transformations with a major impact. Something similar took place at the beginning of the 20th century, when the mayor at the time, inspired by the *Bella Époque*, was responsible for transforming Rio into a tropical Paris. The inspirational sources today still come from ideologists overseas and the impact on the city's physical and mental structure has retained the same proportions and equivalence. The justification for change at the time was found in the urgent need to improve the city's urban environment, which was home to the country's main port: the port of entry for foreigners who arrived to do business. The catchphrase at the beginning of the 20th century was to sanitise the capital of the Republic.

Today, in the 21st century, the major sporting events and importance awarded to social and economic development, placing Rio de Janeiro among the "global cities", mould the discourse of the allegation. However, the effects of contemporary changes succeed one another in a period of our Republican history, which comprises a far-reaching legal system in urban and environmental areas but is unable to curb countless environmental violations and the right to decent housing. What is seen is an accelerated process of privatising public space, elitisation and intensive social and territorial segregation in the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro.

It is in this urban environment which the environmental and living conditions in the district of Caju are presented in this article and a number of proposals, which, if implemented, could reverse such an inhospitable social and environmental alliance. Caju is a district in the port region, which is not within the scope of the re-urbanisation project, consolidating it as one of the main zones of environmental sacrifice in the city.

Before introducing a case study on the district of Caju, where we seek to provide a detailed description of the elements which places it in this situation, we will briefly

1 UNESCO awarded the city of Rio de Janeiro with World Heritage status on 1st July, 2012.

present the ideas and objective motives which assist in leading to changes in various cities around the world and aspects of re-urbanising the port region in Rio de Janeiro.

IDEAS FOR A CITY EQUIPPED FOR BUSINESS

Since the start of the 1970s, researchers linked to “critical urbanism”, liberal thinkers, organisations and social actors engaged in the struggle for the right to the city (Lefebvre, 2001), active in urban agglomerations from various continents, have acquired empirical evidence that urban transformations had entered a new cycle. The way that they are objectively carried out in urban geography and the titles awarded to these phenomena are varied: “urban entrepreneurialism”, “corporate city”, “commodity city”, “sustainable city”, “global cities” and “commoditisation of the city”, among other labels. They all show little concern for the adjectives that they receive, resulting in alterations with significant existential, cultural, political and institutional implications for the different social strata assigned to these spaces, which have their morphology and functions altered.

Although they find different forms of urban living, in dissimilar countries and cultures, they are modifications which follow a pattern that intends to substantiate the idea that the city is both active and a means to produce and circulate merchandise (Harvey, 2005), provide services and financial transactions, creating a social environment which is sufficiently affluent in order to guarantee well-being and social cohesion. Unfortunately the history of urbanism (Hall, 2002; Marshall, 2007), places this idea under suspicion. In a factual world, when this powerful idea is put into practice, it always produces benefits for very few residents. The question is that for reasons which extrapolate economic resolve, in which the present culture increasingly slights history, ideas such as these always excite city planners, designers, public administrators and families from different social strata.

Although surrounded by the risk of committing anachronisms or making simplifications, we may infer that globalized and technologically developed capitalism, where public institutions, city governments and Nation States increasingly take on a symbiotic and inextricable relationship with economic and financial agents, preserves the logic, which

drove 19th century urban reforms in European cities, such as Paris, Berlin and London (Pereira, 2012), in the essence of urban reproduction. Workers' working and living conditions were deplorable in countries with dynamic economies during this period. With "urban reforms"², workers' families were compulsorily relocated to periphery areas of the cities, so they formed new social, spatial and economic arrangements. Immense political pressure from the working class, combined with other historic events, was required in these countries during the second half of the 19th century and first half of the 20th century, so that living conditions were modified, moving on from an ignominious environment to the welfare state, which has been in decline since the end of the 1970s.

The fact is that when the cities became a vital centre for the sale of merchandise and establishment of services, each section of urban land was submitted to the vortices of "the satanic mill" (Polanyi, 2000), whose value of use lost its importance to the value of exchange. *Mutatis mutandis*, both with the dawn of modern capitalism, when the production of merchandise and "productive labour" were fundamental for its reproduction, and in current times where financialisation prevails and land is monetizable.

However this reproduction makes use of and incorporates means which were fit for the end of the 20th century, and in a marginal position to the system of logic throughout other periods. In this case, we see importance allocated to advertising, the "spetacularisation" of events in any sphere of urban life; assumption of ethnic characteristics and of identity; sexual orientation; traditional cultural displays subsisting in areas that are the target for urban transformations; technological innovation at the service of a functional and environmentally sustainable city; operations carried out on the financial market to raise monetary resources for urban requalification; institutional arrangements, such as public-private partnerships and so many other measures, which form a set of practices, discourse and structures of thought that aim to bestow rationality and legitimacy on this "new urbanisation".

2 The urban transformations carried out in Paris by the mayor, Baron Haussmann, during the second half of the 19th century became a reference point for other European cities, including Rio de Janeiro, at the start of the 20th century.

In the midst of this is the financialisation which is unprecedented in the history of capitalism and cannot be ignored, connected to the technical and scientific support which accelerates the flow of information, whose spatial constraints are reduced not only for the circulation of information but also for merchandise, in an era of containerisation (Harvey, 2005). All the legal guarantees, awarded by domestic governments and established in agreements between States and multilateral agencies, present us with qualitatively challenging urban transformations.

They are mechanisms which only increase the opacity of social relations and diverging interests established in geographic urban space, complicating the exercise of analogies with past environments. The force of these resolves and concrete benefits for a segment of society, merely increase dissention and controversies with regards to the way cities are produced.

In a time when culturalism, the policy of recognition, the insatiable desire to aestheticize the world and other analogous ideological positions increase in scope, discursive constructions and actions of this line gain density in cities which are the target for renovation. Historic milestones and immaterial values established by social groups or even in the city as a whole become preferential means to encourage the search for a consensus and social cohesion for a specific urbanistic project. Equivalent importance is awarded to natural amenities which assist in leveraging the tourism and entertainment industries. They are important issues which adorn this new onset of capital in cities, and gives meaning to the idea of “urban entrepreneurialism” (Harvey, 2005). However, with so many objective and subjective ways of transforming cities, the discourse of environmental sustainability takes on a salvationist meaning, with the possibility of assisting in reproducing capital within this new production cycle for cities.

When the Brundtland Report was released for public discussion in 1987 (Acsehrad, 2001), the theme of sustainability started to occupy space at various levels of existence and human production. Thus, the idea of producing cities, which took into account the importance of well-being for present and future generations, became the new agenda for planners,

multilateral agencies, governments and investors. Clearly, while faced with so many conflicting interests, sustainability became a polysemic concept and the target for a wide range of appropriations and disputes. The issue is that, from then on, effective measures associated to sustainability are always present for any investment in or modification to space, independent of the content or ideology which structures this concept.

However, the measures implemented in the name of environmental sustainability generally produce dual cities and principally those which are historically marked by social, economic and political inequality and have significant environmental liabilities. Unfortunately, this social, environmental and economic configuration is stamped on the metropolises of Latin America. The discourse of environmental sustainability and pressing need to produce sustainable cities sidestep and do not confront the structural problems of capitalist production. As the system generates asymmetries in wealth and income among people (Piketty, 2014), it also produces dysfunctionalities and environmental liabilities which are unequally distributed throughout urban space. It is a phenomenon which generates impact on the lives of thousands of people, usually with low levels of political and economic power, placed in an inclement environment with serious environmental injustices (Acsehrad, 2009). Environmental liabilities, wealth and income are unequally distributed in the space. Everything which preserves a part of the city in an unhealthy or perilous environment and does not represent an obstacle for its smooth operation is destined for or allocated to districts and regions of the metropolis where the largest number of deprived families is concentrated.

Every year we observe inconsistencies in environmental sustainability, whether due to extreme climatic events or the way that industrial waste is disposed of, according to principles which universally guarantee human well-being and the standard of urban development that identifies cities as something monetizable (Sanches, 2001), following the logic of urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 2005). We note that the forms of promoting “environmental sustainability” accompany the selectivity of investments allocated to cities, producing an elitisation of urban space and social and territorial segregation.

The investments follow the dynamics of flexible capitalism, interested exclusively in their rapid reproduction. On the other hand, the time required for a sustainable city for all people, independent of their income and wealth, colour of their skin, place where they live, level of education and sexual orientation, should be sufficient to include dialogue between the different stakeholders, incorporate different learning and knowledge and other elements which guarantee a dignified life.

TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE PORT AREA OF RIO DE JANEIRO

Events which enhance the credibility of the conceptual framework that guides critical urbanism and the mobilisation of social groups polarised by the agenda of the ideology of the right to the city have been easily identified in the city of Rio de Janeiro since 2010. An apparent paradox emerges in a dual and dysfunctional urban context: affluence in the city has created miserly conditions for thousands of families who live in shantytowns³, the central region and deprived periphery areas. We encounter urban development which is still unable to contain or eliminate profound asymmetries of incomes and access to goods and public services. Thus, there has only been a modest decrease in violations of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights.

Rio de Janeiro is the central city in the Metropolitan Region in the State of Rio de Janeiro (RMRJ)⁴ and has received expressive financial resources directed towards

3 According to 2010 data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 20% of the population in the city of Rio de Janeiro lives in shantytowns. A considerable sector of this population is included within the housing deficit of 220,774 residential units.

4 In accordance with Law No 105 of 2002, the region is formed by the municipalities of Belford-Roxo, Duque de Caxias, Guapimirim, Itaboraí, Itaguaí, Japeri, Magé, Mangaratiba, Mesquita, Nilópolis, Niterói, Nova Iguaçu, Paracambi, Queimados, Rio de Janeiro, São Gonçalo, São João de Meriti, Seropédica and Tanguá. The total population of RMRJ is 11,864,527 inhabitants. The central city of RMRJ is Rio de Janeiro, the state capital, with 6.32 million inhabitants.

urban regeneration and logistical restructuring, as is the case of the Port of Rio de Janeiro⁵. Its economic force⁶ also benefits from income attained from the production and sale of commodities such as ore, oil and gas. Associated with so many investments, essentially from the government, is expenditure for the 2016 Olympic Games.

The city's public administration follows the guidelines and recommendations pronounced by ideologists who present strategies⁷ to civil servants from different parts of the world, to create an environment favourable for developing "Global Cities". With support

5 According to a Federation of Industries in the State of Rio de Janeiro (*Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro – FIRJAN*) document *A necessidade de adequação da acessibilidade ao Porto do Rio de Janeiro* (The Need to Adjust Accessibility to the Port of Rio de Janeiro) produced in October 2011 "... In 2010 the port registered a 11% growth in total turnover, exceeding 10.3 million tonnes (5.1 million tonnes in exports and 5.2 million tonnes in imports). Business activities attained the level of USD 16.3 billion, resulting in an average value of USD 1.577/tonne (USD 1.333/tonne for exports and USD 1.820/tonne for imports). The average value of cargo moved in the port of Rio de Janeiro was 226.5% above the national average of USD 483/tonne. In relation to moving general cargo, which comprises products of higher added value, Rio de Janeiro registered the 4th highest turnover in 2010." This document indicates the projected investments for the Port of Rio de Janeiro in the order of BRL 1.2 billion between 2011 and 2015.

6 According to survey carried out by IBGE in 2011, Rio de Janeiro has the second highest GDP in Brazil and is the only one of the ten richest federal units to increase its GDP in the period analysed. The oil and gas industry is most responsible for this economic setting. Eighty percent of oil production in the country and a little over half of all the pre-salt reserves identified on the Brazilian coast are located in Rio de Janeiro.

7 See (Vainer, 2000). Included in this publication is the text *Os liberais também fazem planejamento Urbano?* (Do Liberals also perform urban planning?), which accurately details the participation and influence of "Catalan planners" in the preparation of the Strategic Plan for the City of Rio de Janeiro during the period 22nd November, 1993 and 11th September, 1995, when the plan was ratified.

from state and federal governments, Rio de Janeiro began its march towards urban transformation, placing it on the list of global cities. This march has generated considerable impact on the lives of thousands of people, not only those who live in Rio de Janeiro but also those who reside in cities located in the vicinity of the Rio de Janeiro capital⁸.

The main project presented to the world as an indubitable example of public administration's efforts to place Rio de Janeiro among the global cities, is taking place in the port region. Changes are underway in a 5 million square kilometre perimeter which houses approximately 32,000 inhabitants⁹ through a Public-Private Partnership, the Urban Operation Consortium (OUC), qualifying it for a wide range of uses, and involving estimated investments in the order of BRL 8 billion, partially leveraged by public resources¹⁰. According to government propaganda, the aim is to transform the region into a residential area, with jobs, services and leisure facilities, and for a central region which follows the international standard of cities – compact, dense, with a diverse range of uses and environmentally sustainable.

8 Approximately two million workers enter and leave the central city of the State of Rio de Janeiro every day, where the highest number of jobs in all the RMRJ is concentrated.

9 All of this extensive area was bathed by the water in Guanabara Bay, and following regeneration of the port and urban transformations in the city centre, carried out at the start of the 20th century, acquired the morphology it holds today. The area is divided in the following way: 6% belongs to the State of Rio de Janeiro, 6% to the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, 63% to the Federal government and 25% is private property.

10 The Rio Port Urban Operation Consortium basically comprises increasing construction potential in the region. Thus, the municipal public authority issued Additional Constructive Potential Certificates (CEPACs), which were acquired in full by the Government Severance Indemnity Fund (Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Serviço - FGTS) for BRL 3.5 billion. This value guaranteed the start of a section of the urban infrastructure project in the port region.

This Urban Operation Consortium highlights some points which are constitutive to this new urbanism in any place that it is developed: (1) the creation of *ad hoc* laws which weaken legislation prepared under the umbrella of urban ideology that had the main purpose of assuring that the city primarily served public interests; (2) an inextricable relationship between agencies and public resources with private financial and economic agents; (3) the public sector's unaccountability for services in the port region. This comprised a consortium formed by companies which are executing infrastructure projects, performing services such as waste management, maintaining public lighting and ordering mobility on public roads, among other activities, which were previously carried out by public administration; (4) selective distribution of public resources, giving priority to a segment of the city to serve interests which are overwhelmingly private and (5) an elitisation process in the region, where low-income residents are removed by the public authorities or leave due to their inability to bear prohibitive housing costs¹¹ is consequently developed

The materiality of damaging consequences takes place in districts within the port region, as is the case of Caju¹². This is the name given to one of the oldest districts in the city located on the banks of Guanabara Bay and which was the main seaside resort until the end of the 19th century.

11 Real estate market research carried out in December 2014 indicated that the city of Rio de Janeiro had the most expensive m² in the country at BRL \$10,847.00, which produces an increase in housing rental prices as a consequence.

12 Caju is one of the districts where FASE-Rio has carried out advisory activities to mobilise popular organisations in the district, such as Grupo Carcará, which fights for economic, social, cultural and environmental rights.

URBAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS IN CAJU¹³

From the end of the 19th century, the district of Caju¹⁴ started to undergo a process of endless change. From the beginning of the last century until now, unfortunately it has transformed into one of the areas closest to the city centre which provides the best example of the perverse aspects of these urban modifications.

From its status as the main seaside resort in the city, which gained the title of Royal Baths in 1808, when the Portuguese Empire was transferred to Brazil, serving as a base for Emperor Dom João VI's hydrotherapy - the Emperor built a bathhouse to facilitate his access into the sea – the location of a fishing colony and residential area where the first districts in the central region of the city were consolidated, started to be a large area of environmental sacrifice, adjoining the Urban Operation Consortium in the port region.

The main reference point for those who pass by Caju every day, when crossing Avenida Brasil, is the cemeteries which operate at the entrance to the district. Very few people are aware that behind them is a district with a little over 20,000 residents and that it was formerly pleasant, being the main reference point for enjoyable moments for

13 Information on living conditions in the district of Caju was obtained during activities held with residents and social agents from organisations that are present in the district. Workshops were held with residents throughout 2014 in order to identify the main problems in Caju. Visits were made to the places where the main environmental liabilities are found and workshops were held in the district with women to tackle incidences of institutional violence. This information was fundamental for constructing this text, as the database on the district of Caju made available by public institutions hampered the disaggregation of indicators which corroborated with information from residents and impressions gained from the *in loco* visits which were made.

14 The following sub-districts form the district of Caju: Quinta do Caju, Ladeira dos Funcionários, Parque São Sebastião, Parque Nossa Senhora da Penha, Parque Alegria, Parque da Boa Esperança, Parque Conquista and Vila Clemente Ferreira.

wealthy families in Rio de Janeiro. For some time residents of Caju have lived alongside five cemeteries which produce a large amount of atmospheric pollution; container storage areas, with the circulation of lorries connected to the transportation of containers which are offloaded from sea-going vessels – the lorries cause accidents with pedestrians; noise pollution produced by constant manoeuvres and atmospheric pollution due to the emission of pollutant gases from the unregulated exhaust pipes on these vehicles; the unhealthy odour caused by the Alegria Waste Treatment Station and untreated waste which remains on the banks of Guanabara Bay, and a landfill site located in the district. In addition to the above-mentioned unhealthy structures, is the daily operation of factories which release solid particles into the atmosphere, as is the case of the concrete factories which use cement and a lime processing factory. These place Caju among the most polluted districts in the city.

The circulation of people mingles with lorries transporting containers. They are residents, qualified and informal workers, breathing in unhealthy air, where the seriousness of respiratory and cardiovascular problems caused by so much pollution is not known on account of the lack of published disaggregate data. It is common to hear from residents that a neighbour was sick due to air pollution or had an accident while walking in the streets or trying to cross the road within the district. The environmental inequities (Acselrad, 2008) in the district of Caju are extremely serious and only reinforce criticism of this form of producing cities.

Amid this high level of environmental liability are problems connected to the land and real estate economy in the district. Due to its location beside the port, Caju has been the preferred residential district for a large number of professionals who work in the naval and offshore oil and logistics industries. On account of the characteristics of their work, many rent properties for temporary periods, when they are not offshore. This has increased the demand for property rentals and rental prices and boosted sales in the district. Land and real estate phenomena are delivered to the mercy of the market, which has made it difficult for longstanding residents to remain in Caju. Those who do not wish to leave or do not have other alternatives for decent housing, have started to occupy empty land, with the construction of precarious housing.

For example, a settlement process is currently underway close to the cement factory and hundreds of families are occupying the installations of the former São Sebastião Hospital of Infectious Diseases and surrounding area¹⁵. Families are exposed to an unhealthy atmosphere formed by medical waste which was not removed following the hospital's closure. There is housing with an extremely precarious building standard within the district. A large number of people live in shacks built from scrap wood, cardboard and plastic sheeting, etc. There is a lack of water in the district and reconnection may take several days when there is an interruption in the energy supply. The district where three hospitals previously provided services (São Sebastião, Anchieta and Nossa Senhora do Socorro), now has only one health unit that has difficulties in responding to demand.

The most dramatic issue in this situation is that the port area, based on the perimeter of the district of Caju, has received investments to expand its capacity for receiving containers, according to planning by Companhia Docas, the company responsible for managing the port of Rio de Janeiro¹⁶. The documents produced by economic agents and business associations and the schedule for developments coordinated by the Port Region Urban Development Company of Rio do Janeiro (*Companhia de Desenvolvimento Urbano da Região do Porto do Rio de Janeiro*), the state-owned company responsible for the Urban Operation Consortium (OUC) project in the port region, do not include investments for improving housing conditions in the district of Caju. According to expansion projects for the port region, the medium and long-term trend is for conditions to become even more inhospitable.

The social, economic and environmental conditions in Caju pose the following question: How can one of the richest cities in the country, with the second highest GDP, according to recent indicators from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a high Municipal

15 There are two settlements, Vila dos Sonhos and Terra Abençoada, inside the deactivated hospital building and in the adjacent area.

16 See the Development and Zoning Plan for the Port of Rio de Janeiro (http://www.portosrio.gov.br/downloads/pdz_rio_23.pdf) – September, 2009.

Human Development Index (MHDI), with so much investment of resources in the port area, have people living under conditions of absolute environmental injustice? The most serious element is that the district of Caju is not the only case which objectively demonstrates the impossibility of “urban entrepreneurialism” universally assuring rights and well-being. Caju and so many other districts and suburbs dispersed throughout our cities and metropolitan regions are the result of urban production, in which asymmetries and dysfunctionalities are conditions immanent to the system of accumulating income and wealth, especially in Brazil.

We should not forget the indelible mark of centuries of slavery which still echoes in a number of our institutions, our sociability which values hierarchical positions and a culture which still awards very little importance to knowledge and endogenous demonstrations. These aspects add form to an inauspicious inheritance which hinders the full effectiveness of a culture of rights.

PROPOSALS FOR THE DISTRICT

Before presenting proposals to lessen or reverse dramatic violations, such as those which take place in the district of Caju, some of the characteristics of the Brazilian urban legal system should be presented. Inspired by the legal principles from the Romano-Germanic tradition, we have extensive legislation that assures countless rights and mechanisms to guarantee its application. The expression: “For friends, everything; for enemies, the law”¹⁷ was coined at the start of the Republican period. This expression helps us to characterise the use of our legal systems. Many of our laws are ignored or applied selectively, as per the above-quoted maxim. Regrettably our urban and environmental legislation fits extremely well into this characterisation.

Legislation known as the “City Statute” was created from regulating the chapter that deals with urban policy in the Constitution, enacted in 1988. This Federal Law No 10.257 of 2001,

¹⁷ There is controversy regarding the author of this phrase. Some attribute it to the then president of the Republic, Getúlio Vargas, and others to Benedito Valadares Ribeiro, when he was in the Senate during the 1960s.

which took more than a decade to be regulated, resulted from a long process of pressure and discussion from various social agents, non-governmental organisations, academic and research institutions. Much of its content incorporates demands and concepts by political actors, which guide their practices from the ideology of the “Right to the City” – the basic principles which structure the law are the Right to the City and Citizenship, Democratic Management of the City and the Social Function of the City and Property (Grazia, 2003); it determines the preparation of a Report on Impact on the District and Environment before implementing any urban project, as environmental legislation spans various dimensions of urban dynamics. In the case of the district of Caju, even without carrying out a precise analysis, it can be confirmed that, in addition to violating various points of article 225 of the Federal Constitution, a range of environmental legislation is neglected every day¹⁸.

Therefore, when analysing our legal system, its level of forward-thinking with respect to social and urban issues can be confirmed. However, with this process of transformations, which focuses much more on capital than social reproduction, this legislation is poached. Public agents and the State are the main transgressors of the law, either by omission or deliberately, in response to pressure from economic and financial agents. The existence of an inconsistency between the law and its application is easily identified, although a number of rights are partially guaranteed. Less affluent people, who are usually the victims of violations and have difficulties in gaining access to the legal system. The

18 Law 6.766/79 – Legislates in relation to the Division of Urban Land; Law 6.803/80 – Legislates in relation to basic guidelines for industrial zones in critical areas of pollution; Law 6.938/81 – Legislates in relation to National Policy for the Environment, purposes and mechanisms for its formulation and application; Law 7.661/88 – Institutes the National Coast Management Plan; Law 9.433/97 Legislates in relation to the National policy for Water Resources and institutes the National Water Resources Management System; Law 9.605/98 – Legislates in relation to penal and administrative sanctions that derive from conduct and activities which damage the environment; Law 9.966/00 - Prevention, Control and Inspection of Pollution Caused by Releasing Oil and other Harmful or Dangerous Substances; Law 11.445/07 – Establishes national guidelines for basic sanitation; Law 12.305/10 – Institutes the National Policy for Solid Waste.

professional members of staff at the institutions which provide assistance to the public (the Public Prosecution Service and Public Defender’s Office, for example) operate in a precarious manner.

It is within this context that a number of proposals which may alter the precarious urban and environmental conditions in the district of Caju are presented. We reiterate that many of them can be implemented purely by enforcing the laws.

TOPIC:	PROPOSALS:
SOCIAL PARTICIPATION:	Constitute a space for participation, with representation by a range of agents who live in or carry out economic activities in the district of Caju. This space for participation would be the main sphere for exchanging information, proposals and discussions to execute initiatives and procedures, which focus on improving urban and environmental quality of the district.
HOUSING & URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE	Inventory of the land situation for the district of Caju (identify the segments of land which are public or private).
	Identify the families and people within the housing shortfall and implement a relocation programme for these families in neighbouring areas, with the creation of social housing.
	Carry out a survey on the social and economic conditions of the families who are located in the housing shortfall band, so that they have access to social protection programmes and policies.
	Prepare a Participative Re-urbanisation Plan for the District of Caju, which considers the consequences of expanding port activities (urban infrastructure – environmental sanitation ¹ , pavements, street signs, provision of equipment and public services).

	Implement an Urban Mobility Plan in the district of Caju, which is able to organise the circulation of vehicles that transport cargo from the port.
INCOME GENERATION	Institute a selective collection programme in the whole district and apply reverse logistics for companies.
	Encourage the creation of cooperatives or recycling associations and implement programmes to train the workers inserted in the selective collection supply chain.
IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS IN THE DISTRICT	Incinerate solid waste using clean technologies for an urban environment.
	Deactivate the landfill site which exists in the district.
	Eliminate the pollution in Guanabara Bay and revitalise the fishing colony in the district of Caju.
	Revive the green areas in the district and start a tree-planting campaign.
	Revise, suspend and perhaps cancel environmental licences which have already been approved, with the population's proven exposure to negative and disproportional social and environmental impact.
INFORMATION AND MONITORING ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS	Carry out studies and projects which are related to preserving the environment and recovering the environmental damage caused by activities related to toxic products (Note: this initiative should include participation by residents and non-governmental organisations specialised in identifying these liabilities).
	Institute a network of organisations, research institutions and civil society advisory bodies, in line with the interests of residents who have their rights violated, in order to monitor the waste produced by companies which operate in the district of Caju.
	Mechanisms which regularly post information regarding health and hazardous conditions in the district.
	Regularly report the illnesses and reasons for residents' deaths in the district of Caju.

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(Footnotes)

1 The components of environmental sanitation are sewage treatment, the provision of drinking water, a final destination for solid waste, sweeping public streets, pruning trees and drainage.



DEVELOPMENTAL PAINS, RIGHT TO THE CITY AND GREEN GROWTH AMBITIONS: MOSCOW'S ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE TODAY

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INTRODUCTION

The City of Moscow has been an epitome of social, economic and political change at the scale of a metropolis for the last two decades. Historically the center of the powerful Soviet Union, it played an important role as a hub for economic and productive exchange, as well as a nodal point of political control. Its development was a key priority for Soviet leadership and was closely related to shifts in the political stance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). With the end of the USSR in 1991, the unstable features of the post-soviet transition settled in, and a decade of struggles between the Kremlin and the federation subjects erupted. This led to an erratic policy of carrots and sticks by the Yeltsin government where the territorial template of the Russian Federation was subsumed in the needs of political contingency. This template for political governance prevented the exacerbation of tensions within the Federation, albeit at the price of the emergence of powerful clienteles and a system of patronage that ultimately benefited local bosses in charge of ruling the destinies of the Russian Federation's subjects.

This particular logic was nowhere to be seen with more intensity than in the case of the city of Moscow, in part due to its unique constitutional status¹. The capital city of the new Russian Federation, was granted an unprecedented autonomy to pursue its development, in agreement with the power dynamics of the transition. Moscow became thus the scene of two contradictory dynamics. On the one hand, little was done to address the issues that were inherited from the time of the Soviet Union, regarding the overall quality of human habitat, utilities provision, and the status of environmental protection, much forgotten during Soviet years. On the other hand, City Hall, under the steering of powerful local boss Yuri Luzhkov, allowed for a substantial overhaul of the city according to free-market principles. These were given full rein in agreement with the city's roaring ambitions in the 1990s. This combination of inaction and passive legitimation under the strain of a chaotic social and economic transformations led to an erratic development of the city that took several dimensions that went beyond immediately visible territorial recomposition. The

1 As it possesses, in agreement with the 1993 Constitution, a status of federation subject in the form of an oblast.

less visible irruption of an all-powerful real estate development sector, in the hand of government cronies, and most importantly, to the obliteration of environmental concerns led to an unequal and segregated development that ultimately privatized the city for specific segments of the population. The arrival of Vladimir Putin to power in 1999 progressively strengthened the Kremlin's overseeing of local politics and the capital city development: left undisturbed for almost two decades the incumbent was ultimately replaced at the head of the city by government allies and signified the Kremlin's return to territorial affairs.

The question of Moscow citizen's participation to city decision-making processes, whereas individual or aggregated, must be addressed in careful consideration of this eventful pathway. As such, the institutional framework in the making throughout the 1990s until today has been built over a web of clienteles and patronage ; while it coopted formal social organizations validated by the Kremlin and local authorities, it also marginalized to a large extent many grassroots movements that bore specific demands to the system. The consolidation of this type of networked capitalism raises thus the question of the responsiveness of local government -and by way of consequence of city politics- to citizen's demands. The process of urbanization² that was put into place in the Russian capital has sequestered the production and utilization of capitalistic surplus at the scale of the city to a selected group of actors, while consistently depriving peripheral social players of common goods previously enjoyed. However, increasing dissatisfaction with this evolution has led to social unrest in the face of specific infrastructural projects, and has forced the authorities to agree to some level of formalization of communication channels with Muscovites and to set specific arenas of exchange with interested actors.

The issue of environmental protection and sustainability is thus closely related to the right to the city issue, and lies at the very heart of this tension. As rapid developmental considerations match specific interests related to the real estate sector, new metropolization

2 « Urbanization, we may conclude, has played a crucial role in the absorption of capital surpluses, at ever increasing geographical scales, but at the price of burgeoning processes of creative destruction that have dispossessed the masses of any right to the city whatsoever. »Harvey, D. 2008 *The Right to the City*, 'New Left Review', 53, Sept/Oct 2008

dynamics reinforce exclusionary urbanization paths. Nowhere has this tension been more visible than in the case of Moscow's green belt that had historically served as a natural border of the city with the *podmoskovye* -or periurban area- as well as a vital lung to the city. This much appreciated reservoir of lush green forest has become in the last five years a battleground raising important social as well as political economic distributional concerns. This issue can be decomposed into two different -albeit not entirely unrelated- dynamics. On the one hand, the issue of social segregation has surfaced as a result of deteriorating habitat conditions for inhabitants that lie at the borders of the city: beyond traditional NIMBY strategies however, emerges the issue of a demand for better living standards that would match those of city center dwellers³. On the other hand we find a highly typical distributional conflict out to the tragedy of the commons⁴, namely the privatization of a public resource shared by the population in the surroundings of this area -and beyond- to the benefit of the few. Here the destruction of a sizeable share of green spaces to the benefit of connecting highways introduce a discriminatory principle by which motorized citizens of the center get the upper hand in relation to enduring citizens of the periphery, that see their quality of living steadily decline.

As we can see from this introduction, the lack of a sustainable development in Moscow stems from this conundrum, whereby ever-expanding metropolitan spaces and production networks get the upper hand over social movements and organizations that seek to democratize and exert a greater overseeing over the utilization of common resources, whether natural or infrastructural. In order to understand how this dynamic is currently unfolding in the case of Moscow, we decided to address the issue of sustainable development of the city in three sections. In the first one, we will address the evolution of Moscow as a post-socialist city with a unique developmental pathway: here a rapid

3 Moscow recently ranked as Europe's 9th most expensive city after Geneva and Bern

4 See Garrett Harding and Elinor Ostrom extensive work on the notion of common goods and their social uses in the face of ongoing exclusionary dynamics of privatization present in both the industrial and emergent world.

liberalization under a « hyper-mayoral » template led to constrained cronyism, lack of transparency and a limited recourse to technical and entrepreneurial expertise. In the second section, we will more specifically assess how this particular institutional, economic and spatial framework defined the environmental protection and sustainability issue in political terms and determined the extent to which environmental governance could evolve in the light of these concerns. By exploring the case study of the mobilizations aimed at preserving Moscow's Green Belt from the infrastructural development of the city, we will illustrate the related social dynamics of these important transformations.

1) THE SETTING: A CITY BETWEEN DEVELOPMENTAL GROWTH PAINS AND POST-SOCIALIST CONTRADICTIONS.

Any attempt to characterize Moscow's transformation over the last twenty years must take into account its specific developmental pathway as a post-socialist city, which combines a rapid economic growth with segregating dynamics and specific governance features. The importance of Moscow today, as the largest city in the post-soviet space, has been mostly the consequence of the consolidation of the largest and most dynamic market in the region in terms of corporate expansion and investment. Home to 11 million people, this modern metropolis hosts the 7th largest number of global retail firms which places the Russian capital among major world economic capitals⁵. This impressive record, while it accounts for Moscow's rank both in the developed and emergent world, is overshadowed by a rather deficient provision of urban services, that ranks the metro region poorly in relation to other financial European centers in terms of congestion, health and security. These changes while visible, are still very much at work in spite of more than two decades of reforms, and the velocity of transformations in the social structures of the city have not necessarily matched those of the physical and infrastructural layout. No doubt, this dystopian evolution accounts for the rather reduced number of academic research being carried out in relation to this city. Another reason however is to be found in the eventful economic and political transition

5 "Top 20 Cities for Retail," CB Richard Ellis, 2011; "European Cities Monitor," Cushman & Wakefield, 2011.

that received most of the scholar's attention in the West, as these were connected to the viability of social reforms that would lead the country into the way of convergence with a foundational liberal democratic ideal at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Moscow's expansion during Soviet times was the direct consequence of the city as the capital of the Soviet Russian Federation Socialist Republic and as the nodal hub of coordination of the socialist area of production. This unique position accounted for a concentration of important economic activities. Moscow was the largest metropolitan city in the European communist world but followed a developmental pattern not uncommon to other Russian cities in terms of its spatial structure. The main industrial zones, transport corridors, and residential areas were created in the pre-revolutionary times only to evolve through expansions of the urban periphery. The city benefited from the location of crucial cutting-edge industries, such as the military and significant suburban infrastructure programs were implemented, driven by functional needs in the 1970s or by the Olympic Games in the 1980s. International forces did not play historically a relevant role, due to specific political constraints and the context of the Cold war. Moscow's development was historically constrained by a lack of city planning until 1971, where the « Master Plan for the Development of the City of Moscow » was implemented between the City Council (*Mossovet*) and the City Party Committee (*Gorkom*), in agreement with the dual-power organization that prevailed through Soviet times⁶. The 1971 Moscow Master Plan recommended clearer zoning and regional transportation links while it set standards for

6 This Masterplan that intervened after previous failed attempts in the 1950s and the 1960s included important provisions pertaining to the annexation of suburban territories and intended to cover a 20 year period for Moscow's development. Also « The master plan specified some of the capital facilities needed (...) it put forth three main innovations in spatial control : parsing the city into eight « planning zones » around zonal sub centers, compacting manufacturing and warehousing into sixty-seven « production zones » and implanting the « stepped » approach to service delivery that had gained acceptance in Russian planning theory » in COLTON, T.J. *Moscow : Governing the Socialist Metropolis*, Oxford University Press, p.458

public green space⁷. While this document was a decisive step forward in the way Soviet authorities had traditionally thought of the capital city, housing and utilities provision remained in short supply by the early 1980s. National trends that could not be reverted by the perestroika period led to a long lasting Economic stagnation, corruption, and heavy-handed rule and fueled frustration and anomy in a disenchanting soviet society.

The decision to enact a shock therapy prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, led to intense market reforms, which exacerbated the post-Soviet economic crisis but resulted into differentiated transformation dynamics⁸. The two successive presidential terms of Boris Yeltsin encouraged unprecedented mobility of individuals within and beyond Moscow's borders, as well as they set new market relations and the development of a booming construction sector. People gained property rights to their homes, but poor and hasty regulatory frameworks led to important redistribution dynamics that ultimately saw a quick and unparalleled accumulation of resources in the hand of a new emergent capitalist class. The decision to appoint Yuri Luzhkov (1992- 2010) as mayor of Moscow in 1992, confirmed Boris Yeltsin choice of a business and urban development model to be implemented for the capital city, where there was an implicit trade off between political loyalty on one side, and crony capitalist designs on the other. Inevitably, this encouraged short-sighted predatory business practices that fueled both economic instability and ultimately, the 1998 financial crisis. In order to gain control over Moscow, particularly its wealth and resources, Yuri Luzhkov created a powerful political machine assisted by his control over Soviet-era assets during the post-communist transition; strong private sector connections, in particular *real-estaters*, and a tacit alliance with the federal presidency. The "supermayoralism" that

7 Greenery was cross through the city in continuous pathways, as explained in a planning document from 1967: "Parks, gardens, and public areas should form a single, unified system which interconnects internally as well as with the green belt in the suburban zones."

8 Thus "[t]he political change took only a few weeks and the core institutional transformations of economic system were accomplished within a few years, however, the change of settlement structures will take many years or decades" (Sýkora, 1999: 79).

resulted of this particular configuration, combined both a weak representative local council and a network of neighborhood leaders, which were subordinate to “a very powerful mayoral apparatus [run by] a very unified Luzhkov team.”⁹ These hierarchical features as well as Moscow’s political autonomy fueled mayor Luzhkov political status and wealth: in this sense the political economic features of «Moscow, Inc.»¹⁰ led to a narrow involvement in commercial business as well as it open civic projects to direct private business participation into all sorts of development schemes. The existing literature as well as existing reports point to Moscow City Hall’s “opaque budget process”. This issue was neglected by the Federation however, because of the city’s tactical and practical interest to the Kremlin as many public agencies subordinated to the federal government are located in Moscow.

This transformational period was driven by the chaotic interplay of new market forces that nourished an office boom, and improved specific utilities -such as telecoms- both instrumental to the development of new economic activities. Inasmuch real-estate speculation remained unchecked and was very much the by-product of Moscow’s growing international linkages¹¹ and the consolidation of a high-end consumer center and CBD, the city evolved into a segregating entity. Therefore, rental prices were unchecked and poorer social strata were systematically driven to the city’s periphery. Under Mayor Yuri Luzhkov strong personal leadership, the city secured an unprecedented autonomy¹², power and

9 See Jensen Donald N., ‘The Boss: How Yuri Luzhkov Runs Moscow’, *Demokratizatsiya*, 2000, 8 (1), 83–122

10 Which Jensen described as “almost as much a corporation as it is a political entity”. *Ibid.*

11 Kolossov, V. Vendina, O. and O’Loughlin, J. “Moscow as an Emergent World City: International Links, Business Developments, and the Entrepreneurial City,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2002, available at www.colorado.edu/ibs/pec/john/pub/infocity/Infocity.pdf.

12 In examining the office of the mayor of Moscow, it is possible to understand “not only who governs Moscow, but how Moscow is ruled—and, by implication ... how Russia is ruled,” observed Donald N.

resources from the federal government at the time of the drafting of the 1993 Constitution, which enshrined center-regions relationships. While keeping the upper hand in relation to the city council, Luzhkov managed to transform a socialist city into a world capital¹³. This political boss consolidated governance networks where upstream decisions would be enforced through patronage and cooptation of important local and national groups.

Thus the transition from the Soviet to the post-Soviet period manifested itself in the increasing production of segregated space both in the urban core and suburban areas outside of the beltway as to accommodate both the leisure and infrastructural needs of the new Russian business and governmental elite. This unshaken support of business activities by local and national authorities remained unchanged for almost two decades and triggered a period of active and deep urban restructuring. Like in many other post-socialist cities, several former urban elements and activities were swept away and substituted by commercial activities ones such as retail but also finance, services, and telecommunications, whereby foreign companies encountered a relatively suitable environment to thrive. The development of the office real estate market started in the 1990s remains a major urban spatial structure transformation, with the formation of the Central Business District. In some urban areas, the emergence of new economic sectors and the development of the real estate market have led to intense competition for space, initiating a reorganization of the constituent land use patterns. These processes are especially active in Moscow : throughout most of the 1990 the capital city not only restored its position as the main hub of financial and commodity flows in the country but developed modern financial, informational, administrative, and business infrastructure networks.

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13 Pagonis T. and Thornley, A. “Urban Development Projects in Moscow: Market/State Relations in the New Russia,” *European Planning Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 6, 2000, pp. 751–66

The most sought after properties in Moscow are located inside the Garden Ring (*Sadovoje Koltso*), a boulevard enclosing the center of the capital with elite residences and rents that dramatically exceed the one in other areas of the city. Moreover, this area retained the headquarters of the largest Russian and foreign companies, as well as many financial institutions and business centers. By the end of the 1990s, Moscow had become a second tier world city (Bater, 2004) and participated fully to global economic networks as and by the year 2001, two thirds of all Russian employees in these sectors were located in Moscow (Treyvish, 2003).

In the light of these changes, the main policy goal of the new city administration was to attain competitive levels for business infrastructure as intended in the 1999 General Plan for Moscow. The plan was responsible for a period of rapid real estate development that ultimately overlooked the quality-of-life concerns of the local population, evolving into two contradictory pathways of urban development for Moscow and the surrounding region. Finally in 2010, under Sergei Sobyenin tenure as mayor of the city, efforts were made as to merge the city with the region as part of a new Greater Moscow. This expansion, finally decided in 2012 incorporated important new districts such as Rublyovo-Arkhangelskoye and Skolkovo, where a major international finance center and a high profile innovation center are respectively planned¹⁴. It has also made Moscow, by the same token, one of the physically largest cities in the world.

Inasmuch as the city maintains some autonomy from the federal government, both entities work together to provide resources and services for one another, much to the detriment of the districts specific concerns this symbiotic interrelation has been present since the establishment of the Russian Federation by the 1993 Constitution and throughout most of the Luzhkov years. In exchange for regular financial transfers from the center, the city managed to grow and become a huge contributor to the national budget, while it

14 “IT Ghetto? Russian Minister Proposes Special Luxury City District for IT Workers,” RT, 2013, available at <http://rt.com/news/it-specialists-district-moscow-047/>.

provides at the same time services to the central government¹⁵. Sergei Sobyenin arrival to power if anything confirmed the mutual dependency of Moscow and the Federal Government on one another, while at the same granting new avenues for cooperation. The new mayor relies upon strong financial connections with the natural monopolies (Gazprom, Rosneft) as well as close political relations with the Kremlin. This might have important consequences for future infrastructural and utilities development; it is unlikely however that it will substantially alter the struggle over wealth and resources at the scale of the city, let alone the complex urban governance of a metropolis like Moscow. The eruption of new challenges, including ethnic riots, political protests, and a terrorist bombing at Domodedovo Airport¹⁶, will in this sense test the resilience of existing institutional arrangements and their capacity to adapt to new demands.

MOSCOW'S SPATIAL SEGREGATION DRIVEN BY A COMPLEX INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY SETTING

The rate of the post-socialist urban changes in Moscow were mostly driven by the important social-economic recomposition that took place in the last two decades. From high-density, monocentric settlements, dominated by high-rise public housing and communal modes of transportation, the former Soviet capital evolved into a sprawling, multi-nodal metropolitan area with consistent levels of privatization of housing, services, transportation, and public space. Privatization has become “the leitmotiv of post-socialist urban change” (Bodnar, 2001) and leads to this day a surge in construction and the development of new vital arteries that shape the city destinies beyond its immediate functional goals. This evolution, as impressive as it is, has not however overcome the fundamental layout of the city nor has it challenged the strategic value of specific sections of the urban territory as it has

15 See The Battle for Moscow's Billions: Power and Money in the Russian Capital under Mayor Sergei Sobyenin By Ross Oermann. As the capital of the country, Moscow maintains “complex, largely positive interaction with the federal government,” according to Jensen.

16 Moscow bombing: Carnage at Russia's Domodedovo airport <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12268662>

been the case for the periphery. If the Soviet government conceived the outskirts of the city as the location of massive industrial zones (such as the ZIL automotive industry) or large estates that would compensate for chronic housing shortages, the periphery subsided as an important focus of attention of urban developer under the Yeltsin and Putin years. The dynamics of post-socialist change thus led to the development of luxury residences for the wealthy – *kotedzh* in Russian – as a rather emblematic feature of Russia's unequal development since 1991 but not exclusively. Other developments carried out a more functional value and were the result of a deliberate political design of that combined the construction of shopping centers and economic clusters in the suburban outskirts.

For a very long time, Moscow had no possibility to alter its administrative territory: while the city expanded its territory several times, by the end of the 1980s, it had reached the limits of its possible territorial growth as set by the boundaries of the surrounding Moscow Region. The pressure brought by new activities that required vital space developed rapidly within the city in the 1990s and 2000s and price speculation over land prices, both the result of a high demand for land and a restricted supply, was only partially addressed by directing a certain amount of new residential, office, and retail development to the suburbs beyond the city boundaries. This in turn widen the gap between real estate prices and exacerbated spatial differences between the center and the periphery, and between the western and the eastern parts of Moscow. The best example of this dynamic has been the steady increase in the price of land in the Moscow Oblast, especially for properties located close to the green belt of the capital, which followed closely one of the above mentioned dynamics of territorial expansion. The area within the administrative boundaries of Moscow measured a little over 100,000 hectares, but after the territorial expansion that was implemented on July 1st 2012 the Russian capital increased its area 2.5 times. This expansion, mostly directed southwest into the Moscow Oblast represented a substantial increase in territory from about 1,000 square kilometers (390 sq mi) up to 2,511 square kilometers (970 sq mi) as well as the number of 233,000 people.

Moscow has a complex multi-level structure that is not uncommon of cities of the same size. First, at the macro-regional level Moscow's relations participate of important economic flows that we have already stressed and are typical of a world-city system

(Taylor and Hoyler, 2000). Second, at the national scale, Moscow is both the federal capital and a subject of the Russian Federation –although it retains, for the reasons previously indicated here, a central importance for the federal authorities of the Kremlin. Moscow’s agglomeration over-reaches the capital’s city limits at the regional scale, and it deals with issues pertaining both to socio-technical as well as city-suburb relations functional needs, such as regional transportation, industrial re-location, and sustainability ones in the light of agricultural and forest zones to urban uses. The city level still is in the quest of a development model for the post-transition period, in part as the result of its vast and heterogeneous territorial units that are engaged into these issues at the local scale¹⁷. The spatial distribution of activities within has become a subject of intense reorganization, which has directly impacted the quality of life of urban dwellers. This multifaceted nature of spatial restructuring has deeply affected the access to housing, jobs, and services. These re-appropriations of urban space and new mobility patterns have had an enormous impact on the use environmental assets such as land, water, and air.

This process of recomposition of urban space and flows has however been very much determined by the peculiar status of private ownership of land in Russia not successfully resolved to this days, afflicted by a lack transparency due to deficient and contradictory legislation and an erratic reform process¹⁸. Urban land markets throughout Russia have been shaped by the policies of the local governments based on their specific interpretations of the existing laws. As for Moscow, the urban land market operates through a system of land leasing based on the administration of short, medium, and long-term leases set by the municipal government. In the development of the land market there remains however a blurry legal definition of property rights over public land. The Law on Definitions of Public Ownership of Land sets a formal distinction

17 The city accounts for 124 municipal districts (*rayoni*) , local governments that do not only possess their elected assemblies, but also their own budgets.

18 For example, by the 1990s, as pertaining to the privatization of enterprises, titles to real estate and to land were registered separately.

between land owned by the federal government, the federation subjects, and the municipalities but in reality, conflicting definitions and procedures that are present in the small print have made the implementation of this law a formidable feat¹⁹.

The issue of land ownership has led to the consolidation of legal uncertainty, in spite of private land ownership being recognized in the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation. In spite of the Land Code of October 2001 having provided a significant reform, particularly because of the federal sanctions and encouragement that it gives to the creation of private ownership rights in land, the constitutional principles and federal legislation still await their full scale implementation²⁰. Private accession to housing in Moscow has therefore been restricted by the extremely high land prices, the large number of parcels where ownership is still contested between the federal government and the city, and the political decision of Moscow government in favor of land leasing over transfer of land ownership in private hands. This has hindered the possibility of city planning and a reasoned development of the city, beyond a quantitative expansion very much sought after by Moscow's City Government.

This particular setting has been instrumental in the deployment of market forces beyond the traditional areas of the city, and accounts for a rapid catching up of the Russian capital with western patterns of spatial structure development. Most visible changes have taken place in the image of the city and in its land use patterns pertaining to the development of a Central Business District²¹. Along with the extension of the CBD boundaries, new

19 The Land Law, on the other hand, passes control over state-owned land within municipal boundaries to the local authorities.

20 Article 9 of the Constitution establishes the principle of private ownership of land but does not, however, stipulate the procedure for the transfer of land (which had historically been owned by the state) into private ownership.

21 A good example of this is Moskva City, Located four kilometers west of the Kremlin, this special designated zone has become the most ambitious development of the city. Here a territory of 800

business zones have appeared in the areas adjacent to the center that require connection corridors to office centers that have been constructed in the suburban periphery.

While many of these changes have not been utterly unforeseeable, nor excessively disruptive from a spatial point of view, in the light of the resolute turn towards a market economy enacted by the Federal and local authorities, there is a wide consensus regarding a steady deterioration of living standards over the last two decades of reforms in aggregated terms. In this respect, the economic and social costs of Moscow's rapid changes are never better illustrated than in the country's sinking demographic: the steady rise of mortality and declining fertility has turned Moscow into the BRICS' capital with the eldest population²². Illegal immigration has been driven by the capital's economic dynamism and has resulted into important inflows of labor from former Central Asian Soviet Republics. This has however created tensions in the labor and housing markets, pointed out by xenophobic episodes while it has at the same time created enclaves of poor laborers in the capital city. On the other hand, social polarization has advanced significantly due to and ill-prepared market expansion whose urban translation has been the creation of "gated communities" and has led a substantial share of Muscovites to live in long-neglected housing developments. These polarization dynamics have not been necessarily reverted as controversial national decisions keep on perpetuating social contrasts in creating differentiated systems of education and health care for different strata of society²³.

hectares is spreading a mixture of buildings over an area of 800 hectares for business and residential uses on the Krasno-Presnenskaja Embankment.

22 The decrease has been compensated only by labor migration from mostly Soviet republics as well as from other Russian regions, and Global South countries. However, recent moves by the Kremlin to cap immigration, very much driven by geopolitical considerations, is taking its toll and threatens the fragile stabilization that was achieved towards the end of the 2000s.

23 As recently shown in the demonstrations against Russia's new law on health care reform at the end of November in the city of Moscow. See Moscow's Deputy Mayor Attempts to Allay Panic Over Health Care Reforms in Moscow Times, 29/10/14

We can see that Russia's organization of political power at a national and regional level explain much of the problems faced Moscow's agglomeration today: an overcrowded mega-city with a super-centralized government system that favors a concentration of best employment opportunities and financial flows in the capital to the detriment of other cities in the Federation. This in return has led to a rampant ever-growing large-scale housing construction on the new territories without a delocalization of economic activities beyond the central district, which will further aggravate the problem of daily commuting. Discussions about Moscow's economic future are therefore subsumed to those of the economic model pursued by the Kremlin authorities, where economic forces are pretty much left unchecked at the territorial scale and citizen's concerns are overshadowed by an extractive development model.

2) THE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE AS A PARADIGM OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION TO THE MOSCOW'S GOVERNANCE

The relation existing between chaotic and unchecked development dynamics and the emergence of environmental issues can be better appraised in the light of Russia and Moscow's disappointing environmental record. As of today, and according to governmental sources²⁴, more than one half of Russia's urban population (58 percent on average, 100 for Moscow) is afflicted by polluted air and every year the list of cities with significant air pollution increases. In many cities the environment is still afflicted by large industrial enterprises of the former USSR period but new sources of environmental desecration such as ever growing urban garbage dumps, forest logging and motorization have already taken over²⁵.

24 See *Gosudarstvennyj Doklad «O Sostoyanii i Ob Ochrane Okruzhayushhej Sredy Rossijskoj Federacii V 2013 Godu»*, Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, Moscow, 2013

25 The natural resources ministry estimates that vehicle emissions in 2010 were the cause of more than 40 percent of total air pollutants. Ibid p.14

In spite of a rather accurate diagnostic at a federal level, the governance of environmental issues of Russia's capital has led to controversial steps that point to both national and regional inconsistencies. For example, the city of Moscow's territory will increase by almost 150 percent because of the annexation of the Moscow region's lands to the south of the capital as of July 1 2012, based on an executive order by the Kremlin. The main driver for creating a "Greater Moscow" has been the desire to improve Moscow's worrying congestion levels and to transfer some governmental facilities out of the CBD. Yet urban-planning specialists and ecologists have pointed out from the onset the delicate environmental situation of the territory to be annexed in terms of hazardous waste and garbage coexisting with ever receding hydric resources, already present at the scale of the capital city. We will see in this section the other risks associated with this expansion, pertaining to the city's "green belt" forests growing around Moscow that are located in the new territory.

We can understand this dynamic only in the light of what has been a rather poor democratic governance of Moscow's urban development during the last two decades, where public authorities have retreated from urban planning. The chaotic patterns of post-socialist urban development and the resistance to adopt a comprehensive planning²⁶ favored a development where private investors and developers began to reshape the urban landscapes in a haphazard manner and governments where confronted to a *fait accompli*. The combination of the authority's disengagement and unchecked high-profit, risk-seeking real-estate developer speculation led to profound structural transformations. Thus the city moved from a monocentric model to polycentric metropolitan spatial structures, ever sprawling urban areas, to intensely commercial CBDs that replaced traditionally dense city centers under socialist rule. The post-socialist transition period provided evidence that the way urban space is organized has ultimately a strong impact not only on issues related to resource allocation and quality of life, but in the overall sustainability of cities as a socio-technical systems and globalization's business hubs as

26 In part due to the strong central government control featured it entailed, reminiscent of the communist period.

well²⁷. This is an important consideration in the light an increasing competition fostered by the Russian capital authorities in order to position the city as a world economic hub.

These patterns of urban space appropriation have led to important hurdles in the way of formulating a blueprint for sustainable development in Russian and at the scale of the Moscow region. In a way, the majority of urban changes taking place since the early 1990s have moved post-socialist cities in the opposite direction of sustainable development standards with the new commercial activities leading to a differentiated stress on the city center and the suburban periphery (Tosics, 2004). In the latter case, unchecked residential developments have obliterated the landscape, blurring the long established borders of the city. These trends have not been however all that straightforward. For one thing, many of the remaining urban areas that have been less appealing for real estate investors attention, in particular socialist housing estates, have led to the establishment of « a discontinuous ring around the inner city »²⁸. Also, unutilized industrial zones covering up to a third of the territory of the socialist Moscow became large patches of dead urban tissue in spite of their reconversion potential²⁹. These concomitant trends have opened up several questions as to the future of Moscow's urban development and the sustainable reconversion of this areas, while they have, paradoxically, substantiated local strategies of resistance to these changes.

Regardless, the important realignments of social-technical systems³⁰ have led to

27 Irrespective of the fact that urban form has been often described in social theory as a passive element of social existence (Dingsdale, 1999: 65)

28 Stanilov, K. *Post Socialist City*, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007.

29 The case of the ZIL car and truck factory - *Avtomobilnoe Moskovskoe Obshchestvo - Zavod Imeni Likhachova*-

30 The socialist cities were structured with little regard to the logic of market forces and the spatial

increasing social demands for better living standards in a much-ostracized periphery, as well as a sustainable approach to land preservation in the case of Moscow. This has been exemplified in the case of the Khimki Forest, where the inconsistencies of Moscow's authoritative urban planning and the *benign neglect* of the periphery converged into an infrastructural and real-state development project that threatened this important green patch of the metropolitan area. The mobilization around this particular issue reveals much about the politicization strategies of local actors that pushed this local struggle beyond its immediate local contours to soon acquire a metropolitan and even national dimension, albeit with limited results. In order to understand this dynamic, we will explore in this section the environmental record of the city and this particular development as a consequence of the regulatory and an institutional framework previously described.

A SUSTAINABILITY RECORD DEFINED BY GROWING SPATIAL DISPARITIES, UNEQUAL ACCESS TO URBAN SERVICES AND RECEDING GREEN SPACES

Moscow's sustainability record is closely related to urban spatial restructuring dynamics characterized by a transfer of opportunities from the public to the private realm that resulted of the political economic transformation of the Russian Federation in the 1990s. The increase of individual choices and standards of habitation contributed to the steady decline of communal living structures (*kommunalka*) and mirrored the closure of community facilities, such garden plots, but also playgrounds and open spaces obliterated by the development of multi-standard services. In the light of this asymmetrical development, there has been a consistent decline of standards in the periphery, whereby housing expansion and an insufficient provision of public services have been walking hand in hand with more constraining access to green areas.

Back in Soviet times, access to green areas and neighboring forests and countryside played a very important role for Moscow city dwellers. Access to secondary residences

transformation of the post-socialist urban areas in accord with the principles of market efficiency has required significant adjustments in the spatial arrangement of urban activities (Kessides, 2000)

(*dacha*) located in the periphery served the purpose of compensating for strenuous urban conditions as well as an important mean of social bonding for families and communities. Along with this symbolic dimension green areas served a very concrete purpose for domestic economics of Soviet families: growing produce on Soviet-era cooperative garden plots became thus an important way of supplementing their diets (French, 1995: 90). Finally, and spite of the USSR appalling environmental record, nature and wilderness preservation played an important role as a vector of the regime's propaganda and citizen's indoctrination, in the form of public interest works on weekends.

The distribution, uses and regulation pertaining to green areas remained unchanged for most of the perestroika years (1985-1991) and until the end of the USSR in 1991, but this major event led to public green spaces to come under increasing threat of development. Between 1991 and 2001, nearly 22% of the green belt within 30 km of Moscow was used for new construction — most often in the form of private housing in gated communities³¹ (Blinnikov et al, 2006). The recession of green areas has certainly contributed to a steady degradation of leaving standards for those Muscovites without access to privatized facilities, but has equally had an impact on air quality standards, that have experienced a steady degradation over the last two decades. This has been the result among other minor factors, of green spaces on the periphery have receded to the benefit of new real-estate developments and important infrastructure works connecting the city socio-technical center with outer city production sites.

Other issues related to this development are worth mentioning here. Air quality and the overall evolution of Moscow's environmental issues have been closely interrelated to the difficult transport situation in the city where cars account in 2014 for 90% of air pollution in Moscow, which is significant in the light of the meager 10% contribution by industry.

31 Blinnikov, M., Shanin, A., Sobolev, N., Volkova L. (2006), Gated Communities of the Moscow Green Belt: Newly Segregated Landscapes and the Suburban Russian Environment, In: GeoJournal, Volume 66, Issue 1-2, Springer, pp. 65-81. Available at: <http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10708-006-9017-0.pdf>.

Moscow is an ever-growing megalopolis afflicted like many other BRICS urban centers of overpopulation. Almost 40% of jobs are located downtown, a situation that in spite of being partially covered by a rather efficient transport system contributes to increasing mobility and motorization levels as well as higher stress on transportation systems³². This issue has gained in prominence during the last years. The Moscow Government has launched after Sergei Sobyenin accession to the mayoral office in 2010³³, one of the largest programs for the development of public transport: as of 2014, 12 km of Metro lines have been put into operation in 2013 alongside 72 km of new roads that have been built in 2013³⁴. This major transportation overhaul consecrates an important share of investments to direct main roads whose purpose is to connect peripheral areas and to allegedly prevent the aggravation of a segregated city³⁵. Moscow's plans have considered the development of 147 freight hubs as well, which place the development of logistics through distribution centers as an equally important issue for Moscow's authorities. The combined approach retained by Moscow's government, while they will certainly improve the efficiency of economic and technical systems of the city is not devoid of inconsistencies when it comes to assess its environmental impact. Thus, the development of this new connecting pathways will not necessarily alter the hyper centralization of the Russian capital, as City Hall intends to foster even further investments in this area; moreover, the impact of this major infrastructure works will be mostly endured by periphery -garden ring-inhabitants, thus reinforcing in the process previously enunciated segregation dynamics.

32 City of Moscow 2013.

33 See *Zakon goroda Moskvyy ot 5 maa 2010 goda N°17 «O General'nom plane goroda Moskvyy»*. [Moscow City Law dated May 5, 2010 N° 17 "On the General Plan of Moscow"].

34 This record must also acknowledge 5 motor highways that have been rebuilt by Moscow's government.

35 "In building roads and developing transport, the city government aligns the social attractiveness of all areas of the city and prevents the creation of enclaves", declared the Mayor of Moscow.

Another issue that adds to Moscow's environmental record and is related to the issue of green spaces preservation has been waste management: as the Russian capital produces 22 million tons of solid waste per year which bears important consequences for forest preservation and fresh water sources sustenance. Waste management has had to deal with increasing levels of bulk waste, residential solid waste, industrial and construction site waste and increasing stress on water treatment facilities. The issue of storage and disposal beyond the two waste facilities managed by the city government—in the Solnechnogorsk district and the Dmitrov district outside Moscow—have raised the issue of landfill sites proliferating in the periphery (Moscow Region) as a way of compensating for processing loads soon to reach their capacity. However, the lack of an adequate regulatory framework for the development of these activities and an opaque management of this utility by Moscow's public authorities have prevented a sustainable approach to this problem, and limited the capacity of city dwellers from Moscow and the Moscow region to address their woes to the local and oblast authorities.

The combination of these previously mentioned trends and related issues reveal a rather complex scenario for the Russian capital in strict environmental terms. As the city growth pace accelerates and the periphery reaches satellite cities, spatial segregation deepens, the stress on urban utilities accentuates and the overall carbon imprint of the city deteriorates. In the face of a growing city density (8900 inhabitants/squared km) emission sources multiply while incentives mobilized by local authorities fail to curb this dynamic. A striking example lies in the limited capacity of city authorities to force automobile owners to comply with emission standards, an issue closely related to the subsistence of soviet car mounting chains for the two decades after the fall of the USSR. Even though industrial sources are not as important in terms of aggregate emissions levels, if compared to the automotive contribution to GHG emissions, they however have a definitive impact on the overall air quality of Muscovites, by reducing atmosphere transparency (reduction of solar light and mist)³⁶.

36 As a result of industrial emissions, dust and azote oxydes levels, along with deforestation by fire, have contributed to recurrent episodes of summer particle storms during the last years in Moscow.

A quick look at the environmental evolution of the city points out to the dissemination of several dynamics that follow closely similar Western developments, namely urban development trends, but with a shortage of regulatory provisions that would ensure an effective environmental provision. As such, this issue has remained a relative low-key one, due in part to the lack of interest in the media, for its most-part government controlled, but also as a result of limited channels of expression under the present government-society interaction template. Other possible causes have pointed out to explanations of a more structural kind, where environmental concerns, as long as they do not have an impact on citizens' everyday concerns will unlikely lead to aggregated forms of mobilization. The segregation dynamics at work in the Russian capital, which we have abundantly raised in this chapter first section has prevented this aggregation dynamics by secluding wealthier residents in niches that allow them to live in environmentally safer places. Thus these concerns have evolved on each one of these extremes through private rather than collective action channels, where society actually compels the authorities to pay more attention to environmental issues. The desecration brought by an ever-rising construction density has taken a severe toll on the environment that has asymmetrically impacted the population, both in social and spatial terms. As we will see in the next section, the specific consequences of the high-speed motorway from *Leninsky Prospekt* over the Khimki forest have exposed this differentiated pattern of environmental awareness while pointing out the specific shortcomings of the urban development of the city.

RIGHT TO THE FOREST, RIGHT TO THE CITY: MOSCOW'S GARDEN RING AND THE KHMINKI FOREST

The impact of environmental standards degradation on Muscovite's has fostered mild mobilizations that have highlighted the necessity of environmental preservation. These mobilizations have for the most part sought to expose the authorities' shortcomings in relation to existing metropolitan developmental plans and formal sustainability goals. Even though development plans of the city and specific infrastructure works contemplate compensatory measures and green areas development such as the promotion of parks, gardens and greenbelt recreation sites

over the construction of new houses, the conservation of the existing woodland around the city has suffered from systematic transgressions. This situation has led to ever receding green areas over most of the post-communist period.

The legal and institutional framework regarding forests reflects this contradictory evolution derived of the post-communist period with a sharp mismatch between political discourse and formal rule/rights and actual living conditions of the population. While there used to be a network of forestry establishments under which all the forests inside the Moscow ring road were managed by the city government and funded from the city budget, the introduction of the new Forestry Code in 2007, reallocated these areas over to the Federal Agency for Forestry. Recent accounts from the Federal Agency for Supervision of Natural Resources have pointed out however to unauthorized tree logging, land acquisition and construction projects that do not comply with the new code. The tragic events of Moscow's wildfires in 2010³⁷ demonstrated the extent to which these contradictories dispositions had consequences beyond strictly related spatial issues, but also, how the corresponding agencies were not prepared for possible natural disasters. The Federal Agency for Forestry was re-subordinated to the Russian government and is undergoing reforms. The issue of forestry management shortcomings has undoubtedly revealed the fragile status of suburbia in the Russian capital and green surrounding areas. Among the calls for reform of this much criticized forestry code, a consistent demand has insisted on the necessity for forests need to be managed by Moscow and the region because their specific status as the Russian capital's green lungs³⁸.

37 A combination of the smoke from the fires, producing heavy smog blanketing large urban regions and the record-breaking heat wave put stress on the Russian healthcare system. Munich Re estimated that in all, 56,000 people died from the effects of the smog and the heat wave and damages were estimated to have reached \$15 billion across 28 subjects of the federation.

38 Anton Kulbachevsky, the new head of the Moscow government department for natural resources and the protection of the environment, <http://sputniknews.com/interviews/20101118/161774156.html>

The decision to extend the M10 highway cutting through the Khimki forest epitomizes well the inconsistencies of forestry management in the RF as pertaining to urban spaces, as it clearly appears from previously mentioned dynamics. The decision by the Russian government to carry out this project have been in this respect emblematic of governance shortcomings as well as of poorly coordinated institutional frameworks regulating the metabolism of the city. It also reveals much of the capacity of individual or collective social actors to exert an impact on the local decision making process, in the light of informal mechanisms of coordination that override these decision-making inconsistencies.

The mobilizations against the M10 and the preservation of Khimki

The context of the mobilizations has to take into account the typical urban development of Khimki territory as a historical company town that specialized on military-related production and consequently benefited of large sites from a municipal standing point with a series of welfare services provided to the worker-residents of the Soviet period. The reconversion of these typically Soviet urban entities proved in the case of Khimki - as for many other company towns- a difficult endeavor, inasmuch as alternatives uses and development for industrial lands would have demanded a governance capacity combining both expertise and a planning horizon. These portions of the city appear instead as constraints on the alternative use of land and along with major communications infrastructure (roads and rail) in the way of massive housing and office developments. As a result of this dynamic, these developments have moved to other sections of the city and have significantly the fragmentation of this city.

Khimki territory is inter-penetrated by the territory of the City of Moscow, which has imposed several obstacles to the consolidation of the territory and has led to several hurdles in the way of urban planning. These spatial constraints were reinforced by a lack of cooperation between the Moscow mayor Luzhkov over almost two decades and the Moscow oblast. In the absence of interregional planning the city's evolution followed closely short term profit designs that led to a further erosion of Khimki infrastructural integrity

to the profit of Moscow's housing needs³⁹. Several major residential developments⁴⁰ on the Moscow city land that interpenetrates Khimki territory. The municipality is powerless to prevent this development, despite its impact on the planning of the Khimki municipal territory and the implications on utility provision networks provided from the municipality⁴¹.

It is in this context of fragmentation and increasing territorial segregation that the Moscow region signed an agreement in December 2009 on the construction of the toll highway between Moscow - St. Petersburg that would cut through the Moscow Region. Then was signed an agreement on the financing, construction and operation of this highway in the area by the "Northwest Concession Company » for the 15 to 58 km segment, ratified by the Russian Federal Agency . In February 2010, the stretch of this toll highway Moscow - St. Petersburg project through the Khimki forest was officially validated by an environmental impact assessment. The project foresaw the construction of the road through the forest with substantial width cuts. But the decision to build a toll road through that involved partially felling the Khimki forest located close to Moscow led to an important social reaction that federated environmental groups with the concerned population. In 2007 a group of activists led by Yevgenia Chirikova was formed under the title "Movement to Defend the Khimki Forest" to oppose the construction of the Moscow to St. Petersburg federal highway. However, in late April 2010, the Supreme Court upheld the construction of the toll highway Moscow- St. Petersburg through the Khimki forest. Mainly due to the active position as defenders during the throughout the initial period of the formulation and preliminary works of the project, and in the light of the public debate that unfolded after an important social network and media campaign, President Dmitry Medvedev

39 s The new general plan for Khimki, which came into force in 2009, and related land- use zoning documentation leave considerable strips of the territory in the middle ground uncovered.

40 q Inteko, a development company closely affiliated with the Moscow government

41 (Deputy Mayor for Building, Architecture and Land Use, Khimki Administration, Khimki, 30 October 2008).

(2008-2012) ordered the government to suspend construction and hold further public and expert's discussions on the project. The period that followed saw an alteration of the initial design, which did not lead however to a revision of the soundness of the project in itself. The territory to be cleared in the Khimki forest was however downsized from 140 to 100 hectares, and the construction groups that spearheaded this project promised compensatory measures such as noise protection shields alongside the highway in the forest district and a larger compensation fund for environmental preservation (\$100 million to \$135 million)⁴². It has to be noted that from the onset, this highway extension cutting through the Khimki region would had to comply design with "green" building standards such as sound road equipment and protective devices against dust, energy-efficient lighting⁴³. These provisions were frequently pointed out as inconsistent with the cut off of the secular Khimki forest that by July 2011 had been deprived already of the equivalent of "two football fields".

The authorities, in turn, promised to fully compensate for any deforestation that the project would carry out, while it ordered that the road proceed in December 2011 after months of examination. But members of the defense movement were not appeased and insisted on the validity of other options for the construction of this road.

According to the original plan, the construction of the road was to begin in May 2011. The first part of a new highway between Moscow and St. Petersburg, that remained the most controversial route portion had a length of 43 km and was finally inaugurated in December 2014. This section running between the suburbs of the Russian capital and Sheremetyevo International Airport will be tested for the time before a final opening in July, 2015. Furthering, the whole operational road with a total length of 684 km is to

42 These groups, among which the French construction company Vinci, exerted visible and repeated pressures on the Russian government for it to resume the construction of this major infrastructure development of the capital. See *Moscou: une autoroute contestée est inaugurée*[Moscow: a contested motorway is inaugurated] , Le Figaro, 23/12/2014.

43 This green design contemplates as well data collection systems and the treatment of rainwater.

be completed by 2018. The project estimated cost was \$8 billion, while the investment-recovery period, has been estimated to 17 years according to the initial studies⁴⁴.

Vanishing forests, highways and real-state ambitions: who mobilizes for the city and for which reasons?

In the face of an issue combining both federal and regional interests, pertaining to the connectivity of the city, but also regional and local interests related to real-state development schemes, the scope for mobilization has been sensibly narrowed down. In spite of the visible failure of the Movement to Save the Khimki forest to counter the original design of the project, this organization conducted a review of the country's environmental issues, which included eleven alternate routes for the road planned to go through the Khimki forest. This revealed a relevant operational capacity of environmental groups operating at the scale of the city and the existence of alternative sources of expertise production at the scale of the city. On the one hand, the success of mobilizations has been very much dependent on the time and energy that citizens will spend protecting their right to the city. The matter of expertise, while usually disregarded in post-communist analysis of social mobilizations, bears to this respect a crucial role, as activists that are able to interact on a "technical" base with local administrators have been able to push forward their demands with local administrators, and to engage into more complex regulatory matters (i.e. drafting of legal documents). The irruption of social mobilizations into what had been an atone capacity of the citizenship to voice its views over the period after fall of the USSR, can in this sense be explained by a steady rise of the financial well-being of the urban population during the Putin years. Better living conditions for urban dwellers of the Russian capital has allowed mobilizations to move from strictly curtailed issues to longer lasting ones, that run beyond one single generation.

⁴⁴ s Under the project, the cost of travel on the first section of the highway Moscow - St. Petersburg will be about 150 rubles (3 rubles 62 kopecks per kilometer) Fees motorists who plan to gather at the fourth kilometer of the Moscow Ring Road in the Khimki region.

The example of the collective that mobilized against the destruction of part of Moscow's greenbelt has to be analyzed in the light of these rapid social-economic changes. The goals of this social movement were originally intended to raise awareness of the potential destruction of a major forest area and part of Moscow's greenbelt that lies in the eastern part of Khimki. This issue was originally driven by media reports of illegal felling of trees in Khimki forest⁴⁵ – which was a protected area – and other violations which accompanied construction of the Moscow-St Petersburg highway. The controversial project, backed by the Russian transport ministry, involved cutting a 3km-wide section through the Khimki forest, but concerns soon extended beyond the sole construction of the highway and pointed to the new development opportunities that this project de facto entailed. The group successfully contributed to raise the concerns about the destruction of the Khimki Forest beyond the local level, which led to a direct intervention by Russia's President Dimitri Medvedev in 2010 in order to temporarily suspend the construction of the highway. While this last decision was in the end reverted, it nonetheless points out to the capacity that organized grassroots movements have to alter the formulation of infrastructure development plans. –albeit modestly if compared with their Western counterparts.

An important question therefore lies in the social identity of these groups, their motivations, their political resources and the repertoire of mobilization. City dwellers in Moscow –but across Russia too– have been mobilizing for their environmental rights, from loose ad hoc strategies, to more complex ones, that involve filing lawsuits, organizing public hearings, dealing with social networks, as well as demonstration strategies and media awareness raising. While these mobilizations have concerned younger urban and educated strata of the population for the most part, other categories such as the elderly and pensioners have not been absent. These local environmental mobilizations did benefit until recently from larger and longer-established environmental non-governmental organizations such as Greenpeace and WWF Russia too. This assistance has not been however, in spite of government claims,

45 Khimki Pravda, We think people at the very top were involved in this affair and that stolen money is hidden in Cyprus offshore banks," Yevgenia Chirikova, an environmental activist in Khimki, told the BBC.

a decisive factor of success in terms of the organization nor in terms of the outcomes.

Most of these more or less structured mobilizations have pointed to essential elements or urban ecology: such as clean transport, a focus on air and water quality, the protection of green areas and the active promotion of sustainable consumption at the scale of the city. The rising numbers in environmental activism in Russia has led to a diversification of mobilization mechanisms, where ICTs have played a fundamental role of coordination that has been instrumental in compensating the shortcomings of associational politics under the present political template. The issue of sustainable cities and green growth, where inclusiveness would be paired with city and region development has been recently raised by specialized urban think tanks like the Open Urban Lab. This network has encouraged the build-up of an urban expertise by resorting to a multi-disciplinary pool of concerned with Russian cities development, and seeking to enlarge participation practices within city planning, working with regional administrations and business.

It is in the light of these recomposition regarding environmental mobilizations that we can better characterize the Khimki mobilizations and we provided a brief comparative typology built on a comparative analysis with other mobilized social groups.

Table 1- Environmental and Forest Preservation Mobilization groups in Russia: an overview.

Location	Thematic Span	Foundation	Main actors mobilized	Repertoire	Social Actors identity	Outcome
Khimki Forest	-Protection of the Khimki forest from infrastructure and real-estate logging	2007	(Navalny, A just Russia Mironov)	-Public Campaign -Media Campaign -Protests	-Grassroot Movement -National opposition movement	-Temporary Suspension of highway construction in 2010 - Alterations brought to the original design -Dissemination of expertise to other regions of Russia (Voronezh)
Tuapse District Forest Reserve (Krasnodar)	-Protection of Forest Preservation areas.	2012	Ecological Watch for Northern Caucasus -Yabloko Party -Solidarity Movement	-Media Campaign -Public inspection -Nation-wide petitions for liberation.	-Grassroot Movement -Opposition party/ movement	-Conviction of main leaders in 2014 -Demands unattended

Pskov	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Preservation of Forests and eco-systems -Recycling 	2010	EKA Green Russian Movement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Public awareness campaigns -Media Campaigning -Coordination initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Grassroot -Intergovernmental organization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Formulation of a Federal program "More Oxygen" -Constitution of a network of 45 organizations across Russia. -National Forest Planting day
Moscow forest protection and garbage disposal.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Remove trash from forests and lake shores -Projects from community recycling to environmental education 	2004	Musora Bolshe Net ("No more Rubbish")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Public Campaign -Media Awareness -Public interventions and collection -Greening actions, trees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Environmental and Social network Volunteer initiative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Constitution of a large awareness network in 90 cities across Russia.

Data: EKA, INION, Vedomosti

The precedent table shows to some extent how environmental related mobilizations in Russian cities have gravitated along an axis where short term strategies that combine sometimes radical, confrontational action coexist with community and civil society activism fostering bottom-up initiatives whose aim is to compensate or substitute failing state regulation.

The first group that would resort to what is commonly known in NSM literature as *issue groups* are aimed at either contesting infrastructure or real-estate development. This group would oppose infrastructure or real-estate developments, or stand in the way of the destruction of green areas. While their action can be more visible in terms of media exposition, these groups traditionally rely on few leaders to spearheaded collective action and have a limited availability of resources they can mobilize in the pursuance of their goal. Social networks and the internet have overall served as powerful means of dissemination of these groups woes, although visibility in websites such as *Vkontakte* and Facebook have resulted into a variety of threats by opposing groups/authorities, including physical violence or legal prosecution (See Table 1).

The second group of environmental movements consists of community and civil society activists trying to put bottom-up initiatives whose intent is to compensate for a failing state regulation, inasmuch as environmental concerns are absent of the policy agenda of the Russian government and there are very few effective mechanisms of coordination over these issues with the public authorities, both at a federal and regional level. Most of these groups, among which we find EKA (Table 1) began as volunteer networks in areas such as separating garbage collection, recycling, forest protection, and promoting eco-friendly agriculture and a green lifestyle. Many such groups gather annually in Moscow at the *Delaï Sam* (Do it yourself) Summit in order to disseminate practices and strategies, which has led activists float from one environmental focus area to another over the years.

The very constraints of the system in terms of barriers to collective action have led to a series of consequences that have affected not only the composition of these movements but also the likelihood of success of these citizens' mobilizations with

very specific Russian features. The successful initiatives to restrict the operational field of NGOs in Russia, combined with an increasingly hermetic mechanism of approval of major infrastructural works at the scale of the Federation have both seriously curtailed both the operations and maneuvering capabilities of these movements, networks and organizations that seek to protect the living conditions of urban dwellers and to preserve green areas within urban city regions.

On the one hand, the Kremlin has severely constrained the right of association within NGOs since 2005, imposing red-tape provisions, mandatory registration of foreign NGOs and the prohibition of Russian NGOs sponsoring, which de facto has weakened human rights and environmental groups more than any other organizations⁴⁶. The Kremlin has resorted moreover, to finance friendly NGOs by the allocation of resources through the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation (*Obshchestvenni Palat*) as well as through regional budgets: the weight of public financing in this wide network of NGOs raises serious concerns as to the capacity of environmental groups in Moscow and other cities of Russia to breach the glass ceiling of representation. While it is true that ministerial authorities have established regular channels of communication to report environmental violations in their neighborhoods⁴⁷ and some local conflicts have led to ad hoc meetings—such as the fight over the wood-processing facility in Ufa, and opponents to nickel and copper mining in Voronezh, the fact remains that the State Duma has also recently

46 As of April 2006, and after a lengthy legislative process, the Kremlin endorsed a bill that envisioned compulsory registration for NGOs followed by the submission of information about their performance and the filing of fiscal reports for scrutiny by a registration agency. This bill, however, introduced a new requirement—foreign NGOs would have to notify the Federal Registration Service of their incoming funds and the way these funds were spent. The bill also imposed penalties and sanctions—up to filing a suit to shut an NGO down—for failing to submit this information.

47 According to the webpage of the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, the ministry carries out regular consultations with individual citizens, environmental initiatives and activists.

initiated a number of legal acts potentially hindering the rights of local activists and opportunities for wider public participation in city and regional development.

On the other hand, the low quality –and absence altogether– of environmental impact assessments in territorial planning and infrastructure development has consistently narrowed down the capacity of these groups to voice their concerns through formal channels. As it exists, the scope of the Russian territorial planning system “is largely restricted to the siting of investment projects (...) the main aim of territorial planning became to foster construction and the realization of megaprojects”⁴⁸. The last development regarding these procedures took place in December 2014, where members of parliament tried to pass a draft law cancelling public hearing procedures for a number of infrastructure construction projects, among which those of Russia’s capital. Other bills went through their first reading in parliament: they have consistently sought to narrow down the number of situations in which public hearings can be held. While they have encountered a fierce opposition by environmental lawyers, as this legislation would contradict the Russian Constitution, they reveal a clear governmental stance against any check from society on this matters.

CONCLUSION: LOCAL ENDEAVORS VS. STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS: AN IRREPRESSIBLE CONUNDRUM?

The organization of the political power in today’s Russia relies on a system where patronage relationships have become the leitmotiv of public action at the local level. The Khimki M10 case study exemplifies well the strong dependence of local political leaders on the distributional capability of the regional governors that are located in the upper echelons, in particular regarding fiscal revenues. This very dynamic precludes any long-term planning capabilities, as even rich municipalities such as Khimki are very much dependent on to the Moscow oblast government whims to get things done. The narrow interests

48 See Integrating ecological concerns into Russia’s territorial planning, Leibniz Institute of Ecological Urban and Regional Development (IOER), Sankt Petersburg, 2013, p.3.

of the Khimki administration and Moscow government have however at times allowed to secure long planned projects at the local level, such as flagship sports investments. It remains to be seen however, whether the Khimki administration and the Moscow Oblast can go beyond what appear to be so far cosmetic provisions pertaining to major infrastructural interventions that cut through the territory and are driven by competitively concerns from the Kremlin. As it has appear in this article, the issue of environmental standards and environmental impact assessment roles are quite revealing in this sense.

It thus results, that ‘the districts of the enlarged Moscow territory have relatively little influence on local economic development, because major economic actors operate at the level of the governor’ (Rudolph and Brade’s 2005, 139). Khimki is in this sense no exception to the rule. Both the economic importance of this urban territory as well as its strategic location in the way of important connectivity works for the city have fostered mass residential projects and speculative retail developments . The developments within the district thus reveal much of urban governance in Russia today and the importance of short-term economic development dynamics that override any possible design intended to transform this territory into a strategic platform in relation to the city of Moscow.

Can Moscow citizens challenge the established order of things in today’s Russian cities? As it appears, the disaggregated social networks of the post-communist period have failed to embed stakeholders at the local level that would have an interest in the economic development of places like Khimki and would have scattered their strategies instead across different administrative levels. This “nested” relationships between business and government officials, favored by the centralized allocation of fiscal resources has deprived the local level of government of its role of mediator between the regional ambitions and citizens’ interests, but more importantly, “between private and collective interests in the accumulation process (Scott and Roweis 1977). Such a configuration raises several potential issues that cast a rather bleak perspective on citizen’s participation at the scale of the city. On the one hand, given that participation channels retain only a formal capacity at a local and national level that cannot offset informal decision-making

patronage networks, collective action will be discouraged and organizational constraints will be elevated. This has several consequences regarding the right to the city. Firstly, mobilizations will tend to concentrate on specific issues of the NIMBY kind that have the more chances to federate a critical mass of citizens at a specific territorial scale, as proven by the M10 mobilizations. This would prove particularly effective in the way of pointing out to “nested” relationships as isolated contested issues that do not pertain to the overall system organization, while preserving its capacity of altering the original formulation of the issue. However, such a configuration curtails significantly the chances of aggregation of these social issues into larger ones where the inconsistencies of the system regarding local economic and sustainability orientations could be really addressed.

Beyond this limitations, and given Russia’s turn towards a less competitive authoritarian regime in the recent years, there is the possibility of a radicalization of social demands that could leave to outbursts of violence, following the degradations that intervened in July 2012 on the M10 construction site. The lack of a formal political response to these demands, and the intimidation strategies carried out by local and regional bosses have led to a judicial turn of events, which irrespective of its chances of success, will set the playing field for future mobilizations to come.

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
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THE POLITICS OF URBAN SPACE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT TO THE CITY IN THE MEGACITY OF MUMBAI, INDIA

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BACKGROUND/CONTEXT

Cities are centers of individual opportunity and development and also sites of economic disparity and political inequality. The city gains salience because urban areas and population increase has been tremendous. There is a belief now in India that it does not live in villages alone but also in cities! The country's current urban population is almost equal to the combined urban population of United States, UK and France, i.e. 31.16% of total population of 1.21 billion, according to the latest census. (2011). For the first time since independence, in India the absolute increase in population is more in urban areas than in rural areas. This certainly has made cities and urban spaces more significant than they hitherto have been.



Debates regarding the role of urban space in shaping social inequality have thus re-emerged with the transformations in the urban landscapes. It has also heightened in the context of the ever challenging forces of globalisation and neoliberal development paradigms. Urban space has become a crucial agent in the shaping of urban difference and social hierarchies through material and symbolic techniques of division and exclusion, ranging from the privatization of public spaces to spatialised narratives of inequality (Mohan 2013).

Locating the discourse of urban space within the context of the Right to the City, (RTC), it is critical to ask this question, 'Citizens belong to the city, but does the city belong to all and do all citizens have an equal right to the city? The concept of the *right to the city* has been debated at five international meetings organized by UNESCO, UN-HABITAT and NGOs, at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris (2005, 2006), Barcelona (2005), Vancouver (2006) and Porto Alegre (2008). The significance of the City per se along with the rights 'in' as well as the rights 'to' city has been the highlight of several forums. This argument gains further momentum as the 21st will be an urban century making the city the fulcrum of changes and challenges.


Urbanisation in India is not only a demographic process whereby an increasing proportion of population of country lives in urban areas but is far more complex than that. It can be perceived in three inter-related features, viz., demographic phenomena;

structural change in society and as a behavioural process. From the tables that follow is it is very clear how the global urban trend is visible in urban India as well demonstrating clearly the increasing urbanisation and growing urban centres in India.

Urban settlements 1981-2011



The growing urban footprint



Source: Census of India 2011

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: JUXTAPOSING THE POLITICS OF URBAN SPACE AND RTC

Increasing urbanisation and urban population has directly resulted in the shrinkage of urban spaces across cities and has also highlighted the need to look at space from not a demographic but social and political perspective. For years the public spaces of cities have been the subject of debate, from concerns about privatization of space (Loukaitou-Sideris, 1993; Harvey 1989) to the contested nature of public space (Zukin, 1995) and the various ways in which public space can be designed and developed (Carr et al, 1992; Tibbalds, 1992). As different groups give different meanings to space, it becomes a multilayered place, reflecting the way places are socially constructed (Knox, 1995). Cities are also threatened by social polarization and segregation. As the state's sphere of control has undergone transformation over the past three decades, the production, utilisation and appropriation of urban space has resulted in dual, hierarchal and unequal city spaces.

Jennifer Robinson (2002) shows how the field of urban studies is constituted through a duality: global cities versus megacities. Global cities are conceptualized as First World command nodes of a global system of informational capitalism, “models” for the rest of the world (Robinson, 2002, pp. 547–548). In contrast, megacities, located primarily in the Third World, are conceptualized in terms of crisis—“big but not powerful” (Robinson 2002:540). There is no attempt to subscribe to the 3 world formula of the cold war period but to understand how though demographically large and significant, in cities of the South, the emphases of unplanned informal spaces continue to be contentious.

Space therefore serves as both the locus and the focus of many recent debates on “the right to the city,” generating questions about which publics and which spaces fall under this ambiguous rubric. Scholars have highlighted the contentious practices involved in the gendering, unplanned, unplannable and informal spaces of commodification and exclusionary practices of/in public space. Thus, the notion of the right to public spaces in the City is linked to the right to the city as they are intrinsically interlinked. (Harvey, 2003, 2007 and 2008; Purcell, 2003, Roy A 2005).

The notion of the “Right to the City,” developed by Henri Lefebvre in 1968 argued about how power relations which underlie urban space, transferring control from

capital and the state over to urban inhabitants. The 'right to the city' has regained the attention of scholars looking for a framework to address the growing disillusionment and disenfranchisement of urban inhabitants in the context of contemporary neoliberal policy making in the megacity of Mumbai in India. (Lefebvre 2009; Friedman, 1988).

Urban inclusion is also increasingly influenced and often constrained by intertwined processes of globalisation, state articulation, polarisation and diversification of population and political practices. Housing, educational, health, and environmental inequalities, segregation, unemployment, lack of political participation and the inability to deal with different forms of participation are all phenomena of urban exclusion. While traditional concepts and practices of urban inclusion centred on institutions and top-down decision-making are inadequate to tackle this complexity, social inclusion/exclusion gets inscribed and becomes visible in the organisation and construction of space. (Roy 2003, Pearlman 2003). In fact, 60 percent of the city population of Mumbai lives in the Slums. They are excluded from many of the facets of urban life. (Mohan, 2009) Urban Space has thus assumed critical significance in the Megacities of Mumbai in the increasingly complex liberalizing and globalizing era.

Thus, 'Megacity' has become shorthand for the human condition of the global South and is the 'subaltern' of urban studies. (Roy 2011) It has moved beyond the definition provided by the UN that stated that any city with a population of 10 million or more is be deemed a megacity. As an urban space, the megcity is the site of continuous contestations over who belongs in the city and to whom the city belongs as most of the reform agenda bypasses these sections. For example let us take the term 'reform' and 'privatisation' that are used to explain the changing nature of cities especially in the developing world. Both these words are misleading because according to the dictionary the term reform connotes improvement and transformation and consists of changes and improvements to a law, social system, or institution. A reform is an instance of such a change or improvement. However, in the case of the reforms in India and more specifically in Mumbai it certainly signifies a change from earlier practices and a shift towards State withdrawal from the urban development sector. It marks a change to make megacities more livable for those who can afford these cities.

Second, even to speak of the privatization of cities in a neoliberal era is to presume their prior public nature where most services were handled equitably in the public domain. The poor and the powerless have been in the margins of socially, politically, economically and spatially in that even prior to the neoliberal era, they did not figure in the development discourse. Though everything was done in the 'name of the urban poor' actual benefits barely accrued to them. The book (Kundu 1993) by the same title presented an enormously detailed investigation into the provision of shelter, water, sanitation and sewerage, health care, and food grains by the state to the urban poor of India presenting programmes and specific schemes of the Indian government and concluded that a system has not yet been designed to meet the minimum needs of the poor and that such a system is vulnerable to manipulation by vested interests.


Third, people living in informal settlements (slums and squatters) even in other parts of the developing countries as has been pointed out in studies (Ravallion 2007 and Nicholas You 2007) often feel a sense of dislocation from the surrounding formal city and must struggle not only with the daily realities of their living environment, reflected in the lack of access to basic urban services, but also with insecurity of tenure, ambiguous citizenship status, unemployment, high crime rates and a lack of participation or power in the decision making processes that affect their lives. Davis (2007) argued in one of the most telling tales of informal housing in several megacities of Asia and Africa that the exponential growth of slums is no accident but the result of a corrupt leadership, institutional failure, and IMF-imposed Structural Adjustment Programs leading to a massive transfer of wealth from poor to rich.

This combination of social and spatial isolation is therefore a powerful instrument of exclusion. In a recent volume on Mumbai, Bhowmik provocative title 'Politics of Urban Space: 'Citizens' versus the Urban Working Class' is about urban poverty in the context of the changing position of labour in the city, highlights the issue of the marginalised stating that the 'slums are an integral part of urban areas and contribute significantly to their economy both through their labour market and contributions and informal production activities. (Bhowmik 2011: 83).

Mumbai has engaged in 'postmodern urban planning' (Banerjee-Guha 2002) it has moved away from urban development that sought to create a balance of basic service distribution and towards mega projects like IT parks and shopping malls. The city spaces are also glamorised or demonised. The areas dominated by members of the high classes are often depicted as safer spaces and those inhabited by the poor are presented in a negative light: they are shown as areas of criminals, grime, filth, dirt and life-threatening. The images which are created often arise from realities. These images determine the socio-economic processes and reinforce the economic consequences keeping their residents in vicious circle of poverty as investors do not want to go there and the government hardly others to perform any improvement. (Shaban 2009).

URBAN SPACE AND RIGHT TO THE CITY IN MUMBAI: A CASE STUDY OF DHARAVI

INDIA'S TOP 30 CENTRES WITH THE LARGEST POPULATIONS LIVING IN SLUMS



City populations are in 100,000s: the scale is logarithmic; data source is Census 2011.

Maharashtra is the second largest state in India both in terms of population and geographical area (3.08 lakh sq. km.). The State is highly urbanised with 45.2 percent people residing in urban areas. Mumbai, the capital of Maharashtra and the financial capital of India, houses the headquarters of most of the major corporate & financial institutions. India's main stock exchanges and capital market and commodity exchanges are located in Mumbai.

Mumbai is a city of contrasts. It projects the best global face of India to the world and yet embodies the worst forms of human squalor. However, it must be mentioned that the presence of Dharavi amidst the 'city' exemplifies the fact that urban spaces are far too complex. In fact, Dharavi is the symbol, synergy but also symptomatic of urban inequality in the city. Even the official website of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority points out that 'Slums have constituted an integral part of Mumbai's cityscape for several decades. With its potential to provide employment to a vast multitude, the city attracts a large number of people. Many of them stay in slum colonies for the lack of a better alternative.'

Dharavi is one of the largest slums in Asia and a mega slum of this megacity. It is part of the approximately 6 million other inhabitants of Mumbai who also live in informal settlements or areas characterized as 'slums. (mcgm.gov.in). This urban space is a 240-hectare slum situated in central Mumbai and home to approximately 1 million people over 80 neighbourhoods with densities ranging from 18,000 people per square kilometre to upwards of 300,000. (sra.gov.in: 2014). It adjoins some of the most lucrative areas like the Bandra - Kurla Complex, (BKC), currently the leading business district in Mumbai), Sion, Mahim and Bandra among others. This once isolated and neglected settlement on the outskirts of Mumbai has now developed into a city unto itself, a city within a city with the residents are as ethnically and culturally diverse as India itself. (Sharma 2000). The Mumbai Human Development Report 2010 suggests that slums occupy only 6% of the total land accommodating nearly 9 million people. The adjoining areas are expensive and valued real estate spaces such as Bandra-Kurla Complex (BKC). While the proximity to various railways stations, arterial roads and the highway makes this location attractive the obstacles are the asymmetric information and financial power of the residents vis a vis the developers and state government.

National Geographic Magazine (May, 2007) described Dharavi as “unique among slums.” It went on to add, “a neighbourhood smack in the heart of Mumbai, it retains the emotional and historical pull of a sub-continental Harlem—a square-mile center of all things, geographically, psychologically, spiritually.

A unique feature of Dharavi is that unlike other parts of Mumbai; most of the residence live and work in this area itself. This coveted urban space therefore provides both habitat and employment to a majority of people living, i.e. they live and work in the same urban space. Eviction, demolition and slum clearance: evictions form part of a calculated plan to recapture valuable land for real-estate development. Since the beginning of the 21st century, major Indian cities have officially launched at an unprecedented scale massive eviction drives amidst a national commitment to a ‘slum-free’ urban India. “(Nijman 2008) Clearing, cleansing and beautification of urban areas in a part of the neo-liberal strategy of the governments across India, propelled and attracted by capital and foreign direct investments under globalisation. An estimated 300,000–450,000 people were evicted in Mumbai between October 2004 and January 2005, with 200,000 more facing displacement (Bhide, 2009).

SLUM ACCORDING THE GOVERTMENT	SLUM CENSUS 2011.
Government of India report (2010, p. 7), revised its 2001 Census definition of a slum to ‘a compact settlement of at least 20 households with a collection of poorly built tenements, mostly of temporary nature, crowded together usually with inadequate sanitary and drinking water facilities in unhygienic conditions’.	Slum has been defined as residential areas where dwellings are unfit for human habitation by reasons of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of street, lack of ventilation, light, or sanitation facilities or any or any combination of these factors which are detrimental to the safety and health.

Applying these definition of Slum to Dharavi, it is clear that Dharavi is a Slum, but in reality this precious ‘slum’ represents a crucial space for ‘poverty capital’ and its subaltern entrepreneurialism (Echanove and Srivastava, 2009; Roy, 2011).

Neoliberal reforms since the early 1990s have changed the ways and means of perceiving slums and slum settlements. Market-driven policies are clearly visible in the matters relating to slum and slum dwellers. Hence the term slum redevelopment is employed to are rehabilitate slum dwellers so that the slum ‘spaces’ can be freed for private developers for redevelopment. It is within this context that this particular paper wishes to locate the case study of Dharavi’s Redevelopment Project (DRP).

DRP was earmarked as one of the best urban opportunities of the millennium to revamp urban space. The following shows urban slum policy trajectory in the city of Mumbai.

SLUM POLICIES RELATING TO DHARAVI AND DHARAVI REDEVELOPMENT PLAN (DRP) IN MUMBAI 1950 to 2004	
1950	The state government initiated programmes of slum clearance.
1970	In 1971, however, it replaced clearance with the Slum Improvement Programme. The improvement projects focused on the provision of basic amenities and infrastructure.
1980	The state government, with the World Bank’s support, introduced two important housing initiatives: a sites and services programme and a Slum Upgrading Programme (SUP) based on a policy of in situ upgrading through tenure legalisation. 1985 Prime Minister’s Grant Project (PMGP), and Slum Redevelopment Scheme (SRD)

1990	1995 - Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS)
2000	The slum dweller whose name appeared in the voter's list as of January 1, 2000 and who was the actual occupant of the hutment was eligible for rehabilitation. Each family was to be allotted a self-contained house of 225 sq. ft. carpeted area free of cost.
2004	2004 – Dharavi Redevelopment Project (DRP) promised to transform the settlement into a cultural, business and knowledge hub. Mehta created MM Project Consultants Pvt., a private entity contracted by the state to support the planning for the DRP.

THE DRP: CONCEPTION AND CURRENT CONDITION

Conceived in 1995 by Mukesh Mehta of Mumbai-based M M Consultants, DRP was supposed to offer the so-called 'win-win' slum solution. The slum dwellers were promised a 225-sq ft (21-sq m) flats free of cost in high-rise buildings and freed up land was to be sold. Developers were to take up the maintenance of buildings for the first 15 years. Of Dharavi's 223 ha, 144 was up for redevelopment. (sra.gov.in)

Even, the Government/official institution, the state government's Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) according to sources believed that the builders would make a total of Rs 14,004 crore (2210 USD) from the sale component of the developed property, which worked out to a profit of Rs 4,754 crore (758 USD). But experts claim this is a gross underestimation. Chandrasekhar Prabhu's (former chairperson, MHADA), calculations showed that builders would make Rs 21,000 crore (3315 million USD!).

There has been little progress in the Dharavi Redevelopment Project (DRP) since it was started in 2004. All major political parties in Dharavi are now trying to outdo each other by making promises about faster redevelopment, bigger houses, and improved public amenities, commercial and industrial units. (Hindustan Times, October 11, 2014).

Under DRP, the whole area is divided in to five sectors. Of these, sector 5 is given to MHADA, for redevelopment, where one building is currently under construction. However, in the other four sectors, the work has not progressed, as after cancelling all the global tenders, the government has still not decided how to go about with the redevelopment. Voters are not happy merely with promises of bigger houses and have started demanding illegal construction such as mezzanine floors be legalised. (DRP 2014).

Weinstein Liza (2014) explains how the Slum Upgradation Programmes SRA was exploited by the mafia and led to poor multi-storeyed structures on the outer periphery. The tragedy was, the State Government and the civic authorities did not have the financial resources or the political will and were ready to condone illegal structures and compromise with the “free enterprise” generated by the mafia at no cost to them. “Embedded politics, institutional fragmentation and popular mobilisations have erected barriers to potentially destructive development schemes and kept residents in a precarious state of stability.” (Weinstein 2014).

The following time line briefly highlights the trajectory of DRP in the Megacity of Mumbai

DRP TIME LINE	
FEBRUARY 4, 2004	Dharavi Redevelopment project planned by the state government.
JUNE 1 , 2007	Global tenders for expression of interest invited for the Dharavi project. 19 consortiums selected after due process.

MARCH 2009	Due to the global slowdown, 5 bidders walk out of the process citing lack of clarity and delay in implementation. The tally of bidders comes down to 14
JULY 7, 2009	Experts committee debunks Dharavi project, passes adverse remarks against its project consultant Mukesh Mehta. Called the scheme a 'sophisticated land grab'.
OCTOBER 16, 2009	Of the 14 bidders only 7 submit the "Memorandum of Understanding"(MOU) they have signed with their foreign partners. This ensures that only 7 remain in the fray.
FEBRUARY 2, 2010	A sub-committee of secretaries recommend that sector-wise redevelopment of Dharavi takes place
MAY 21, 2011	State gives green signal to MHADA to revamp sector 5.
JANUARY 3, 2012	Chief Minister Prithviraj Chavan announces the first phase of the revamp project where he said that MHADA will start sector 5 revamp.
December 24 2014	The DRP is pending since a decade owing to prolonged indecision, local protests, policy uncertainties, differences with planning architect and a slackened realty market leading to previously interested bidders opting out .

PROBLEMS CONFRONTED AND LESSONS LEARNT (?)

- Almost a decade after the Dharavi Redevelopment Project (DRP) was announced that Mumbai would soon be slum free, the promises have yet to be realized. C

- Caught between neo liberal and global development imperatives, along with local protests over the right to occupy and more importantly a claim over to the city they have lived and worked in for over a century, the government has put the project more or less on hold as it works to reconcile these competing objectives.
- Another ironical feature that is visible is a fact that some of Mumbai's most ultra-luxurious towers (with swimming pools in apartments) have come up on slum lands even as slum families are rehabilitated and pushed in a small corner of the plot in dinghy buildings. The late S S Tinaikar, in his report submitted to the state government in 2001, had described the slum scheme as "of the builders, for the builders and by the builders." (Bharucha 2014). This is exactly the kind of fear that most dwellers of Dharavi also have.
- A dangerous trend is the rivalry between groups of builders to muscle in into the slum plot. Many times, it is alleged, some developers hire local goons to arm twist slum dwellers into giving their consent for the project. Mumbai's Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) rules mandate that any developer who succeeds in procuring the consent of 70% of the slum residents gets to redevelop the property. Under the cross-subsidy scheme, the developer has to re-house eligible slum families in new buildings free of cost. As incentive, the developer can exploit a portion of the plot to build luxury towers for sale in the open market.
- Dharavi is not really a slum. It is a business district where every household has some business. Any project that does not address the issue of livelihoods is bound to fail. Livelihood is also a crucial parameter that seems to have been sidelined by both the developer and the government. (Jamwal 2007).
- The project has been accused of faulty selective survey wherein DP refers to only 99 hectares of land whereas Dharavi has approximately 241 hectares.
- Development needs of certain sections of the communities residing and

working in Dharavi were not factored in, e.g., the potters and tanners.

- As on 23rd December, 2014, (Times of India), the Anti-Corruption Bureau has sought home department's permission to conduct an open probe against 2 CEOs of SRA, during the period 2001 to 2007 accusing them of malpractices and illegality in allotments in the project. Hence the reality of realty is too glaring.

POLICY MEASURES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The government has always addressed the issue of housing by suggesting schemes. However, what and whom does it actually promote is worth scrutinising, i.e. people, real-estate interests, or major construction companies? The real test of any redevelopment plan will be measured by the positive changes that it brings about in social and environmental conditions.
2. Governments must recognize *Slum dwellers first as citizens with legitimate rights and then as city builders who are part of the productive urban economy*. Hence, instead of treating them as mute subjects or spectators of urban development, it is imperative to factor their voices, needs and demands in the project. There is recognition of the needs of the slum dwellers in the planning process, for the first time in the Mumbai Development Plan, 2014-34.
3. This certainly calls for a move from a need based to a *right-based approach* especially at a time when there is a nexus to appropriate not make the city. The principle of cross-subsidization, Incentives and Floor Space Index (FSI) offered to developers and builders to redevelop slums have been more oriented towards these sections rather than housing for slum dwellers.
4. Imperative to *Name and Shame* those responsible by terminating their contracts if found corrupt, callous, using intimidation tactics to bulldoze not just the area but also dwellers into accepting their unreasonable conditions.

5. *Ensure transparency* and break the unholy nexus that is ever present between the local politicians, bureaucrats, police, slum lords and the builders who function as a lobby. Towards this endeavour, periodic *Slum-Auditing* would inform both the government and the intended beneficiaries about the progress or pitfalls of any project.
6. Government must recognise *Right to stay and work*, that was also stated by the High Court way back in 1985 as the *right to life and livelihood of the urban poor* slum dwellers are interlinked. Thus done their struggles will not be reduced to merely an act of negotiating space in the city.
7. It is critical to also realize that *Slum communities work in clusters with interrelated activities, work and systems*. In other words they possess shared ownership and mutual trust. Policies must taken this relationship model operating in slums and work around it.
8. Recognise *Slum resident's resilience* which suggests that they have the capacity to survive, withstand, respond, adapt and grow despite stresses and strain. This capital is crucial for meaningful partnerships to make the project a success.
9. Government must *develop transit housing* to deal with displacements and reconstruction that are related to redevelopment projects. The top down government approach should be deployed along with bottom up initiatives.
10. Ensure *Institutional coordination and integrated* planning for clarity of policy followed by ease in implementation by identifying the responsibilities and roles played by different actors involved as 'brown field' project requires everyone's support.
11. Constructive *engagement with Civil Society Organisation*, especially the Community based groups in order to synchronise and strengthen the partnerships. Bring together all the expertise, stakeholders, researchers and research institutes to exchange information and ideas.

12. Draw up a *clear cut time frame for the completion of the project* by making it mandatory to complete it with due diligence. But it is also wise to include, invite for inputs from the different stake holder prior to the commencement of the project rather than have a knee jerk response to it after it starts.
13. Ensure *continuity of the project and avoid disjuncture between electoral politics and development*, taking into account that intentional planning may also have its unintended consequences.
14. Emphasising upon distributive and spatial justice with a view that every individual has a rightful claim to the city as a political project with access to adequate and secure habitats, livelihoods and basic services. (Sudha Mohan 2013).
15. Inclusive governance becomes an imperative as a framework wherein the changing policies need to reflect the right of the majority that make up any city structure. In fact, unless the vast majority have a 'right to the city', governance in all its glory would have failed. (Mohan 2013).

The right to the city concerns not only access to the urban commons, public utilities, public spaces and to the common property resources that currently constitute the city, it also entails a political project to open up new public and political spaces to all, no matter what a person's or a social group's economic power or As Marcuse (2009: 185) rightly pointed out that by "exposing, proposing and politicizing the key issues can move us closer to implementing this right".

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
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FROM MEGA-CITY TO GHOST TOWN: THE RIGHT TO THE CITY AND NON- RIGHT TO THE NON-CITY IN CHINESE URBAN DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

It is nothing new that China has been maintaining high urbanization rates in recent years and that their impressive process of economic growth is due to this phenomenon, among other factors. According to the Chinese National Statistics Agency¹, 53.73% of the Chinese population now lives in cities. Additionally, in line with UN-Habitat data, China now has 8 cities with more than 10 million inhabitants and hundreds of cities with a population of more than one million (UN-HABITAT, 2013).

However, what attracts our attention within this extensive urbanization process is not merely the constant appearance of new mega-cities with millions of inhabitants – providing new and enormous challenges for the whole globe, as the environmental consequences of this rapid growth are not restricted to city limits or even Chinese territory – but the contrast between these major centers, with an increasingly larger, booming and dynamic economy and the appearance of *ghost towns* (ALASTAIR, 2012; HONG, 2014).

We will address two symbolic and contrasting cases in this chapter: the municipality of Chongqing, which sustains the highest economic and population growth of all the Chinese cities and the town of Ordos, which is the most emblematic and commonly discussed *ghost town*. The argument that we will present is that while the case of Chongqing could be understood as an effort by the Chinese State to make the city a right for an increasingly larger segment of its population, using a strategy called *third hand* (HUANG, 2011; LAFARGUETTE, 2011), the case of Ordos could be interpreted as a type of *non-right to the non-city*, in which the logic of urban space as a space for rights is subjugated to that of speculation, as a mechanism for attracting capital and economic growth.

The chapter is structured in the following manner. In the first part, we will hold a brief discussion on the right to the city and speculation, using the logic of the neoliberal agenda

¹ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201402/t20140224_515103.html (last access on January 12, 2015).

to attract capital, as contrasting urban development models. In the second part, we will demonstrate a brief case study, comparing the experiences of urban development in the Chinese cities of Chongqing and Ordos. Finally, we will seek to reinforce the contrasting factors between the case of Chongqing and Ordos, which are extremely clear: the fundamental importance of coexistence and balance between measures which guarantee urban space as a space for rights and those which provide increased capital flows as a form of economic growth and strengthening a market environment accessible to all.

THE RIGHT TO THE CITY AND SPECULATION AS URBAN DEVELOPMENT MODELS

As a dynamic space of accumulation and mobility, cities are crossed by multiple interests, desires and objectives, which fuel agendas and demarcate various forms of social and spatial interaction and linkages. As two bodies do not occupy the same space for physical reasons, conflicting and antagonistic interaction may cause disputes for use of that space, with results that are directly related to the strength, resources and capacities of the actors involved. Expressed in another form, the use of urban space, land, property and housing is due to the dense and dynamic nature of the city, the object of disputes and crossed by relations of strength and power.

Within the logic of the right to the city, land use is a fundamental element to consolidate the city as a space for rights and citizenship, regulated by the constant search for social equality. Therefore, adequate housing conditions for all the urban population are characterized as one of the most fundamental points which emerge from the idea of the right to the city.

However, given the current predominance of neoliberal belief as the hegemonic logic for development and urban transformation processes (HARVEY, 2005; HACKWORTH, 2007), public housing policies are increasingly regulated by the idea of resilience – which, unlike the idea of the right to the city, sets off from the principle that housing is not necessarily a collective right, which should be guaranteed by public powers but, instead,

an individual achievement – and through speculation mechanisms, meaning that urban space is entirely understood as an appropriate space for profit but not for rights.

Two of these are the results of this sum of resilience and speculation. On one hand is strengthening asymmetries of power between national and transnational corporations, investors and contractors, which see urban space as an extensive market suitable for profitable activities and ordinary people, crossed by the interests of major corporations and who do not necessarily own the same resources, in order to assert their interests or even defend themselves.

On the other hand, is the reinforcement of gentrification processes, which are linked to creating pockets of wealth amid poverty, or those to revitalize deprived and underdeveloped areas, based, however, not on improving living conditions for the people who traditionally occupy this space but in replacing them with others, with a greater purchasing power. One of the principal and generalized consequences of gentrification is an increase in cases of removal, eviction and displacement and the creation of new pockets of poverty and substandard conditions in other areas of the city. (HACKWORTH, 2007; HARVEY, 2008; BRENNER et al., 2012).

With regards to the BRICS countries, urban development and transformation processes of a neoliberal nature were fundamental for the economic growth levels attained in the first ten years of this century, opening the way for the synergy which allowed for proximity and coordination between these five countries. As we try to show through the *BRICS-cities* category of analysis (BOCAYUVA; VELOSO, 2011; VELOSO; JOBIM, 2013; VELOSO, 2014), the recent economic growth of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa was made possible by strengthening the neoliberal agenda of attracting capital to develop and transform urban space, with the primordial objective of making the city an appropriate space for local and global capital flows, transforming it into a platform for economic growth, among other factors.

However, the development model regulated by the logic of attracting capital, which is still predominant in BRICS countries, is not the only one to play a central role

in urban development strategies in *BRICS-cities*. In various forms and generally speaking, harnessed to strategies to resist progress on the agenda to attract capital, but also present on State agendas, although usually as a periphery item, the idea of the right to the city fuels counter-agendas for urban development.

The BRICS-Urbe project at the BRICS Policy Center has been seeking to underline a not necessarily balanced coexistence of these two conflicting models, mainly with regards to the State's performance as an agent fundamental for the development of cities through the *BRICS-cities* category. In the wake of State development, which crosses the BRICS countries as a paradigm common to all five countries, the State is consolidated as a fundamental agent to develop its cities, although strongly interspersed with the neoliberal logic of seeking capital flows.

While still seeking to further an understanding of the coexistence of these two urban development models and the State's role as a development agent, we will provide a brief comparative analysis of two emblematic cases of Chinese urban development in the next section: the Chongqing mega-city and the ghost town of Ordos, in order to further our understanding of how the *right to the city* and attracting capital can cause contrasting city models, with regards to housing as public policy. On one hand, we have a mega-city of 30 million inhabitants crossed by a housing policy, directly controlled by the Chinese State, concerned with promoting social housing, while it is equally interspersed with policies to attract capital and strengthen its population's entrepreneurial capacity. On the other hand, we have a ghost town, which is practically uninhabited, crossed by land price speculation policies, in order to increase the Gross Domestic Product.

FROM CHONGQING TO ORDOS: FROM MEGA-CITY TO GHOST TOWN

With approximately 3,000 years of history, the city of Chongqing, the former capital of the ancestral kingdom of the Ba people, was destroyed and reconstructed on numerous occasions throughout its three millennium of existence. In its more recent history, following the fall of Nanking, during the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Chongqing was elevated

to the position of the provisional capital of China (HAN; WANG, 2001). In 1997, Chongqing became one of four municipalities directly controlled by the central Chinese government, which represents a landmark in the growth and economic development process, both of the city and the country as a whole. In contrast to the other three municipalities (Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing), which are close to the country's east coast, the city of Chongqing stands out for being an enclave situated in the western region, far inland, and at a strategic point on the Yangtze River. Therefore, Chongqing is an important instrument for China's development strategies, as it leads the strength and vigor of its economy to the west, which has historically maintained development rates lower than those of the developed east coast.

A number of authors, such as Huang (2011) and Lafarguette (2011), call the Chongqing development model *third hand*, being a form of development in which the State assumes control of companies in debt and in a vulnerable fiscal situation and prepares them to be more competitive and profitable in a market environment. The State later makes use of their profits to promote social equity and develop the urban infrastructure, mainly connected to housing. According to Huang, *third hand* is an approach between Adam Smith's (1983) *invisible hand* and total State predominance and control to run the economy:

The third hand (...) is used to distinguish Chongqing's approach from Adam Smith's "invisible hand" and the state's "visible hand". Smith's invisible hand is predicated on private ownership, division of labor, and competition, holding that the market is self-regulating and will achieve the optimal allocation of resources. As for the second hand, we can conceptualize it as different varieties of state interventions in the market economy, including supervision and regulation of the market, macroeconomic adjustments, and provisions of public services and social welfare. (...). Chongqing's "third hand" is different and, while coexisting with the other two hands, also represents a fundamental challenge to them (HUANG, 2011, p. 578).

The Chinese State is able to raise resources to promote the social and infrastructural development² of the Chongqing region using this approach through agrarian reform, the large-scale construction of social housing and mass distribution of urban *hukou*³ (LAFARGUETTE, 2011; GOMI, 2013).

The aim of agrarian reform is to increase the productivity of rural areas, while also responsible for migratory flows to urban areas. This is made possible by a credit system called *Dipiao*, through which urban entrepreneurs and investors acquire permission to invest in the cities, while also guaranteeing an increase in rural productivity (GREEN, 2010; LAFARGUETTE, 2011). One of the first measures imposed following the conversion of Chongqing into a municipality directly controlled by the central government was the creation of a minimum quota of cultivable land for every rural residence. The small farmer, obliged to increase his property's productivity, is prompted to sell part of his land to major entrepreneurs with investment plans for urban zones. In turn, entrepreneurs are constrained from buying and retaining portions of productive rural land, to be able to invest in the city. The result of this system is the sustainable migration of rural dwellers to urban centers, increased rural productivity and the creation of a cheap labor force to be used by major urban entrepreneurs.

Aligned with agrarian reform, and the displacement of the rural population to the urban zones of Chongqing, is the construction and provision of social housing. Under complete

2 The Chinese government invested an average of 30 billion yuan per year in Chongqing to develop an urban mobility infrastructure network, using the profit from State-controlled companies during the period 2006-2011. According to data from Huang (2011), as a result there were 2,000 kilometers of expressways, 5,000 kilometers of raised expressways, 20 bridges and 150 kilometers of metro and Light Rail in 2011.

3 According to the report *National Migrant Workers in 2012*, the total number of workers who migrated to urban centers was 260 million in 2012, a 3.9% increase in relation to the previous year. These workers represent 19% of the total national population.

control by the central government, and included in the Chongqing 1996-2020 Development Plan, it is predicted that a total of 40 million square meters of social housing will be built between the period 2010 and 2020, to be distributed among the migrant population, through a rental process which is equally controlled by the central government. According to Lafarguette (2011), on average, the rental price of these houses is 40% lower than the market price practiced in other regions of the country. According to the Development Plan, the houses are allocated to people with an income up to 2,000 yuan or a maximum of 3,000 yuan per month for couples, which is equivalent to approximately USD 320 and USD 485. By maintaining direct control of the construction and distribution of social housing, the Chinese government seeks to cancel out any possibility of real estate speculation.

In turn, reform of the *hukou* system, which grants permission for internal migration processes and segregates rural and urban citizens, bestowing specific rights and benefits to each type, is the central element of the development strategy for the municipality of Chongqing (LAFARGUETTE, 2011; GOMI, 2013). According to Gomi (2013), the aim of this reform is to increase the rate of urban citizens to 60% by 2020, being the final year for the current Development Plan. Based on the logic of specific citizenship, the *hukou* system refers to a perception of the city as a privileged space for rights and benefits. On receiving permission to live in the cities, citizens have the right to benefits offered exclusively in the cities, such as social security, a health system, education and housing.

There are a further two central aspects to the Chongqing development strategy: attracting international capital and creating a market environment favorable to small businesses in which every citizen may use his entrepreneurial capacity to provide for himself. With regards to attracting international capital, Chongqing's approach is not dissimilar to others for urban development in China or other BRICS countries. According to Huang (2011), the logic of attracting international capital is based on the search for companies able to leverage development through manufacturing activities of high added and technological value, called *dragon head enterprises* (HUANG, 2011, p. 571). Among the most prominent in Chongqing are Hewlett Packard, the largest producer of portable computers in the world; Foxconn from Taiwan, which manufactures components for Apple

devices; BASF, a German chemical products company and the Chang'an Automobile Company, a Chinese car company connected to the American automaker, Ford.

According to the *2013 Chongqing Statistical Yearbook*⁴, Chongqing increased its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 12.4% in 2013, a lower growth than the 13.6% registered in 2012 but also higher than 7.5% of national Chinese GDP growth in 2013. The population of the whole municipality, including both rural and urban zones, also came to the impressive total of 30 million, with 9 million concentrated in the central zone of Chongqing in 2013. It is estimated that an average of 1,300 people migrate to the urban zones on a daily basis, which is equivalent to a growth of approximately 400,000 new people living in urban zones in the municipality of Chongqing every year.

This migratory flow means that a sufficient number of workers are available for the dragon head enterprises at a cost which is much lower than in Western countries with a more developed economy. However, the population level is higher than the large companies are able to assimilate. As a way of stopping this gap between the number of jobs and workers available, the central government encourages its citizens to use their entrepreneurial capacity to provide for themselves. A market environment was created for this, in which small businesses are encouraged and assisted.

Unlike Western countries, which regulate small businesses through hygiene standards, taxation and regulatory agencies, everyone in Chongqing can simply and literally set up a stall and sell food to order. There are no hygiene controls or regulatory agencies to demand invoices for a product or check if what is being sold conforms to specific standards. In an economy with an average income of approximately 24,000 yuan per year, which is in the order of USD 3,000, this type of free enterprise becomes a vital element, as it means that the service sector is cheap and accessible to a population with a low average income.

4 <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Fast-Facts/CHONGQING-MUNICIPALITY/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BPV2.htm> (last access on January 12, 2015)

Although crossed by the central Chinese government's authoritarianism, creating a setting of inevitable urbanization, the case of Chongqing could be interpreted as an expansion of the *right to the city* through direct mediation and agency by the State. Ultimately, expansion of the urban *hukou* system indicates that more citizens are receiving benefits, such as social security, health care, housing and education. According to Chinese logic, these benefits are coupled with a type of urban lifestyle. Clearly, it should be confirmed that this expansion of rights is intrinsically linked to a strategy to increase domestic consumption capacity and the transformation of urban space into an attractive place for capital flows, a fact that also forms part of an urban lifestyle.

It seems reasonable to argue that the Chongqing model combines agendas for the *right to the city*, by attracting capital and domestic consumption in which the State, as a mediator and agent of an imposed development and urban growth process, ensures access to basic and fundamental rights to an increasing number of people, while seeking to attract international capital and reinforcing consumption. Therefore, the *third hand* model, does not appear to completely abandon the logic of Adam Smith's (1983) *first hand*. Quite the reverse, it makes straightforward use of this logic by making possible and facilitating a small business environment which is practically unregulated, without restrictive standards, and high capital flows by attracting major transnational corporations, known as *dragon head enterprises*.

However, the problem with what appears to be an interesting model for development and urban growth is that the case of Chongqing is an exception in a country crossed by the logic of exclusion and segregationism. Although the *hukou* system emphasizes the city as a space for rights, it sets off from a segregationist premise, in which the universality of rights is applied to a limited number of people who *receive* the right to live in cities.

Generally speaking, and including the Chongqing model, the urban development strategies in China are principally aimed at increasing urban GDP through property reform and land price processes. In the specific case of Chongqing, the model was able to general economic growth, while simultaneously strengthening the double

logic of the city as a space for rights, capital flow and entrepreneurialism, as the search for economic growth is balanced by a policy to promote social housing.

However, the same could not be said for other urban development models in China. According to a World Bank report on Chinese urbanization, although the Chinese model is able to produce dynamic and thriving mega-cities, there is an extremely contrasting counterpart:

The existing urbanization model has relied heavily on land conversion and land financing, and on production-based derivative taxation, which has caused urban sprawl and, on occasion, *ghost towns* and wasteful development of industrial parks and real estate (WORLD BANK, 2014, p. 371) (our italics).

Compared with the case of Chongqing, the phenomenon of *ghost cities* attracts attention due to a specific factor: these cities have a consolidated infrastructure with highways, hospitals, commercial centers, libraries, schools, universities and even metro systems in some cases, but a large number of buildings are empty or incomplete, as there simply are not enough people to occupy them. This is a paradox as China is the most populated country in the world.

The most emblematic case of these *ghost towns* could be the town of Ordos⁵, located in the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia, which has a modest and surprising population for Chinese standards of 30,000 people and, according to estimates, a total of 70% of its buildings are either empty or unfinished (CAIXIN, 2012). According to Hong (2014), Ordos, which was one of the richest coal regions in the whole of China, is a classic case of an economy based on a non-renewable resource which did not know how to reorganize when its coal reserves were exhausted:

⁵ According to Hong (2014), apart from Ordos, Qingshuihe, Bayannur, Erenhot, Xinyang, Hebi, Yingkou, Changzhou, Dantu, Shiyan and Chenggong are other Chinese towns which could be awarded the title of *ghost towns*.

The overreliance on its mining industry when it could have diversified its local economy and developed the manufacturing and service industries to create more job opportunities is a contributing factor. Limited employment opportunities outside the coal mining industry and poor public services have discouraged migration to Ordos. Ordos experienced fast economic growth in the past due to the strong domestic demand for coal. As Ordos holds one-sixth of the nation's coal reserves, China's rapid industrialization process had boosted Ordos' coal mining industry and helped to create a local economic boom before 2011. Ordos was even ranked one of the richest cities in China in terms of per capita GRP (gross regional product) then (HONG, 2014, p. 34).

However, there are other factors which are equally or even more decisive to explain the case of Ordos than the end of its coal reserves. According to Hong (2014), it is especially important to understand the role of local government and the search for growth in GDP through speculation, investments in urban infrastructure and increased land values:

To the local governments, the acceleration of the urbanization process means more investment in infrastructure and housing construction. Prompted by the state's urbanization push, the local authorities have rushed to invest in building new cities and towns. The state's reliance on the development of the real estate sector to boost economic growth inevitably leads to excessive housing supply. According to IMF's (International Monetary Fund) estimations in 2013, real estate investment made up 12.5% of GDP in China in 2012. In China, the overemphasis on urban infrastructure investment comes at the expense of basic social services provision (e.g. health care and education), job opportunities and decent living conditions. (...) Land-centered urbanization is rooted in local GDPism, which in turn results in aggressive developmentalism and excessive investment among local governments as officials' promotion is linked to local GDP growth. Key local government officials such as mayors have strong incentives to boost GDP growth figures during their tenure in the given locality. GDPism is deeply rooted in their mentality. City building and massive infrastructure constructions are important means to achieving this. So is investment in real estate projects (HONG, 2014, p. 35-36).

In contrast to Chongqing, Ordos is not a municipality which is directly controlled by the central government and its economic development model is not ruled by *third hand* logic (HUANG, 2011; LAFARGUETTE, 2011) and, to the contrary, is directly linked to the ambitions and limitations of local government. As they do not directly count on intervention from central government, local governments, imprisoned by the search for growth in GDP via infrastructure investments, have been obliged to make use of public and private bank loans, meaning that the level of public debt in these locations is higher than the national average. According to a World Bank report (2014):

Local government debt has become a key issue. To attract investment and jobs, local governments have heavily invested in infrastructure. Despite strict limits on local government borrowing in the Budget Law, local governments have used urban development and infrastructure corporations (UDICs) and local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) to raise financing for infrastructure development. According to the 2013 audit by the National Audit Office, at end-June 2013, local governments' direct debt amounted to RMB 10.89 trillion, local government guarantees RMB 2.67 trillion, and other local government contingent debt RMB 4.34 trillion. If only explicit debt is taken into account, China's general government debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of 2012 was 36.7 percent, very modest by comparison with OECD countries. If all contingent debts are included, the debt-to-GDP ratio would be 53.5 percent, still modest by international comparison, more so if one considers that China's government also owns considerable assets, such as state-owned enterprises. While the level of debt stock is manageable, the growth of local government debts, at a yearly rate of around 20 percent in 2010–13, is a major concern, and some subnational governments may be overindebted (WORLD BANK, 2014, p. 9).

However a central question on the phenomenon of *ghost towns* remains unanswered: why are they empty? The rapid expansion of the Chinese economy meant that the urban population's average income increased considerably, increasing the demand for consumer goods and residential or commercial property, meaning that the price of land and property rose higher than national average income (WORLD BANK, 2014). Therefore, a number of

authors point to the existence of a real estate bubble which limits access to an over-valued real estate market by a large percentage of the Chinese population (YAO, LUO; WANG, 2014).

In the case of Ordos and other *ghost towns*, the GDP growth strategy was directly linked to increased land values, meaning that the real estate market was invaded by major entrepreneurs and property prices rose even higher, when compared to major centers, such as Beijing or Shanghai. Infrastructure was constructed in the hope that the town was sold, producing income to cover investments made by private initiative and pay off local government debts. The fact that the majority of the people did not have resources to enter such an overvalued market was seemingly not taken into consideration.

In contrast to the interesting case of Chongqing, which although crossed by the central Chinese government's authoritarianism, is a clear attempt to expand the city as a space for rights, while simultaneously strengthening the liberal logic of resilience and attracting capital, the case of *ghost towns* could be understood as a type of *non-right to the non-city*. Given the predominance of the logic of GDP growth through infrastructure investments, the idea of the city is reduced to its infrastructural framework or, that is, to its collection of buildings, streets, avenues and equipment.

In the logic of the *right to the city*, infrastructure is a consequence of these relations, its form being a direct reflection of the everyday routine of these relationships. In the case of *ghost towns*, the city is a mere instrument for economic growth and is a *non-city*, as it lacks more fundamental substance so that the cities are in fact cities. There is a lack of human beings in *ghost towns*. More than an emblem for an unsuccessful urban development strategy, which showed it was incapable of balance, even precariously, the necessary logic for the right to the city with policies, which promote the expansion of capital flows, Chinese *ghost towns* are a symbol of forgetting that cities are essentially human spaces and that they essentially depend on the presence of people, so they can be cities.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The contrast between the interesting experience of Chongqing and failure of Ordos demonstrates that conversion of the city into an instrument for economic growth strategies could lead to distinct paths. We would like to argue that what informs each of these paths is the dosage and balance between the neoliberal logic of the search for capital flows and right to the city. In the case of Chongqing, although the city, which is directly controlled by central government, has been used and converted into a space for the circulation of capital, by strengthening the domestic market and attracting major foreign companies and the logic of rights as a vector for Chinese economic growth – although it is bereft of its universal character in the specific case of China and its *hukou* system and crossed by segregationism between urban and rural cities – was not abandoned but, to the contrary, was expanded. The *third way* model (LAFARGUETTE, 2011; HUANG, 2011) underlines the State's role as a provider of minimum protection networks for its citizens, while it informs strategic areas in which the State can step back or be reduced, opening the way for activities which are closer to Adam Smith's (1983) *invisible hand*. Resilience and rights, the State and market share the same space in Chongqing.

To the contrary, in the case of Ordos there is total abandonment of the logic of rights. The city is reduced to a collection of buildings and avenues which remain empty, abandoned and devoid of people. In this case, the mere orchestration of urban space as a vector for economic growth through infrastructure investments was not accompanied by a policy which assured any type of access to housing by citizens, being one of the most basic rights of urban life.

Therefore, we end this text by arguing that the universal reason for rights should not be renounced for the benefit of spiraling and unsustainable growth of Gross Domestic Product. Although crossed by the neoliberal logic of circulating capital, the city, on account of its inherently human nature, cannot be devoid of mechanisms and public policies which guarantee it as a space for rights, running the risk that it lacks the principal element which means that cities are cities and people.

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RIGHT TO THE CITY AND PUBLIC SPACES:
INNER-CITY REVITALISATION
IN SOUTH AFRICA'S CAPITAL CITY

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INTRODUCTION

The notion of the *right to the city* aims at the development of an alternative agenda of urban development to more effectively tackle the problems of urban inequality and precariousness. Integrating the *right to the city* in policy agendas requires a range of considerations, among which is the creation and expansion of public space which is the subject of this paper.

Evelyn Ruppert (2006) presents a strong case for “the role of the city as a place for the advancement of multiculturalism, socio-cultural integration and cohesion” and discusses the crucial “use values or public interests of space in a democracy” (p.12). She also, however, argues that regulatory regimes (including practices such as laws, regulations, urban design, surveillance and policing) have been reconfiguring liberties and rights to space in ways that are either ensuring or denying the possibilities for the achievement or sustaining of vibrant, democratic public spaces (p.5).

In exploring how this issue is playing out in real contexts, the case of the Tshwane Inner City Revitalisation programme in South Africa is considered. The City of Tshwane (formerly known as Pretoria), South Africa’s capital city, adopted a large-scale Inner City Revitalisation (ICR) strategy in 2013 towards its vision of becoming “The African Capital City of Excellence.” To achieve this vision, the city indicates an intent to “fundamentally adapt, shape and improve the inner city” through a package of strategic regenerative interventions in the city that seek to address identified challenges. Among these, is an indication that “the Inner City needs sufficient public spaces (soft and hard) in keeping with its desired image as a world-class capital city.” While the ICR strategy includes specific mentions to the creation of public spaces (e.g. the creation of “people’s squares” within administrative precincts), the experiences of urban regeneration in South African cities has sometimes tended to render public spaces inaccessible – pristine but empty, as aptly described by Mitchell: “a controlled and orderly retreat where a properly behaved public might experience the spectacle of the city” (Mitchell, 2003, 51).

As such, it is relevant and important to consider the City's current plans from a right to the city perspective. Through the case of the City of Tshwane Inner City Revitalisation strategy, the paper seeks to understand and critically assess how Tshwane's approach to its ICR programme relates to the conceptualisation of "right to the city" internationally and in South Africa as a basis for drawing lessons and policy recommendations.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC SPACE AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

Henry Lefebvre coined the concept of the 'right to the city' in his 1968 book *Le Droit à la ville*. The context within which the book emerged is one where there was a radical shift towards more neo-liberal policies.). In this landmark book, Lefebvre describes that this new 'right to the city' is one where the urban realm is transformed and renewed such that the users of the urban space, through their right to the city, would participate through how they perceive of and use the space, importantly so that each can freely provide for themselves. The city centre, according to Lefebvre, should provide spaces where social interaction and creativity could best be displayed, and all citizens should thus have a 'right to the city' through participative planning. Another influential book to emerge in the same era was Jane Jacobs' 1961 *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, which critiqued modern planning at the time. Jacobs advocated for cities and spaces that celebrated and encouraged diversity.

It is important to reflect upon the context during which these ideas were emerging. The political landscape of the north in the 1960s was characterised by a number of exciting and radical events that continue still today. In America, there was the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Movement and the strong rise of Feminism. The birth control pill was approved, a man landed on the moon, JFK, Malcolm X, and Martin Luther King Jr. were assassinated, while Che Guevara was executed. Many African countries gained independence, and Nelson Mandela was sentenced to prison. The political climate of the time was one where the state was 'enemy' and there was a revolutionary quest for breaking away from the confines of state rule.

As the political landscape was most volatile, so too the economic landscape was going through a metamorphosis. The US economy was recovering from a recession, which facilitated the strong emergence of Keynesian ideas as a basis for economic policy. Many economies worldwide were experiencing an economic lag and high unemployment rates. Keynesian economic policies eventually caught on with the rest of the Western industrialized countries.

Socially, the 60s were also characterised by rebellion, especially among the youth, who were defying the traditional conservative norm that was characteristic of the time. This so-called “counterculture” led to a social revolution in the West manifesting in the commonly-known Hippie movement.

The description above provides a short glimpse of the context within which the concept “the right to the city” emerged. The era was marked by vibrant, fundamental and thought-provoking ideals whose effects are resurfacing increasingly today.

THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM

Neoliberalism emerged as a response to structural crisis of the 1970s where there were massive unemployment rates throughout the western regions as many countries were in debt, and the Keynesian economic policies had failed. The term “neoliberal” refers to the revival of liberalism (as a counter to welfarism), and most specifically to economic liberalisation which proposes that the state ought to loosen its control of the economy, and leave it to ‘the market’, or private entities and individuals through deregulation and open markets (Thorsen and Lie, 2009). Governments, it was argued, had to relinquish their control of the economy. They had to reduce their expenditure on public services, reduce their regulation of anything deemed to reduce profit-making, and had to privatize most state-owned enterprises. Neoliberalism meant that the market economy was now controlled by the private sector, and the public sector would play a supportive role

Despite numerous critiques of the approach in recent years, neoliberalism is argued to have contributed to the growth of Britain (which under Thatcherism was

growing faster than the other major European economies by the mid-1980s) and the United States, and has contributed to the global growth of powerful corporations. However this was all coupled with increasing inequality. In developing countries in Latin America, neoliberal reforms did not work as envisioned. This was even worse-so for the fated structural adjustment programmes prescribed to Africa which delivered indebtedness rather than the promised economic growth.

Various scholars have argued that the rise and takeover of neoliberalism disenfranchised the urban populace. This marginalisation was the direct outcome of political and economic policies that have increasingly prioritised the privatisation of space. The city became a place where “physical displacement of low-income households, non-profit uses and low-profit firms, expressed directly in evictions or indirectly through the market” (Boer & de Vries, 2009, p.18). The role of government in this context became to restructure urban spaces in the interest of the private sector. One of the major advocacies to address this trend has been the notion of the ‘right to the city’.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Urban governance refers to the social, economic and political forces of urban development. During the welfarist state, urban governance was seen as the role that national governments played in managing ‘production and reproduction of social infrastructure’. (Brenner, 2004) Urban growth was influenced from the national government state level.

When the welfarist state was deemed a failure (due to prolonged periods of economic decline in the 70s), governments were viewed as the cause. With the emergence of neoliberalism, governance was then to be left to “powerful social forces to promote the reorganisation of inherited local and/or regional state structure” (Brenner, 2004: 457).

The concept of New Public Management (NPM) emerged in the early 1990s in describing the administrative reform agendas within OECD countries (Hood, 1991). In a nutshell, NPM is a concept describing the process of reformed public services

whose provision has been aligned with ideas (values and systems) adopted from the commercial or corporate sector. The ideas are then modelled resulting in a new form of public management, often which adopts notions of clientalism and efficiency which are defined quite differently from many interpretations of public democratic rights and liberties. This new form of management emerged as a neoliberal-technocratic view when many governments were transitioning into a new political reform.

Governments were being driven towards greater efficiency and accountability, rather than being motivated by social values such as equity and participatory governance. NPM came to be seen across all spheres of government as being applicable to different contexts, alluring due to its “neutral” framework for solving the management problems of those serving the public. Problems concerning fiscal constraints for the new local government could seemingly be resolved through the NPM, with its ability to account financially and rationally. The role of government also moved away from direct service provision to managing service provision through contractual arrangements with private providers. So where NPMs have succeeded, they have supposedly enabled government to be more “customer oriented, efficient, transparent and performance driven.” (Hague, 2007)

However, NPM can also have unintended consequences. NPM highlights the need for social values to permeate through the way spaces are managed (Gruening 2001 and Vabø, 2009). Arguments against NPM have suggested that efficiency cannot be achieved through NPM, as NPM policies are usually technocratic about the targets they want to meet. For example, an NPM policy will clearly state definitive uses of a particular space without regard of the context of the area. Through its neutral stance, NPM is unable to distinguish between abstract categories, nor their purposes. NPM policies therefore tend to fail when implemented within varied contexts (Gruening 2001, and Vabø, 2009). Outsourcing has also not proven to be completely beneficial for governments, but has rather been expensive.

Public administration scholars have observed NPMs over the years and already began to conclude by around 2005 that the concept was simply not working (Vabø, 2009). The experiences of NPM have generally not quite delivered the perceived promises, but have

rather isolated citizens by treating them as customers, stripping them of their participative rights. NPM can eventually lead to significant de-democratisation whereby the bureaucrat masquerades as the entrepreneur, however with more power but less responsibility.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

Within the context of South Africa, having emerged out of two forms of oppression (i.e., British colonial rule, and then Apartheid under the Afrikaner Nationalist Party) in 1994, the liberation government sought to assert administrative policies that would display progress towards self-actualization and dignity. This was manifested through the ideal of being a “developmental state”; one that is able to manage the balance between economic growth and social development. Such a state would seek to be ethical, efficient, effective, and maintain dignity among its citizenry. Theorists suggest that South Africa saw “development management” as providing the remedy to the failed state management of the pre-liberation era (Chipkin & Lipietz, 2012).

Additionally, citizens’ needs would be attended to through participation and accountability of the government (Karuri-Sebina et al, 2009). The government adopted the initiative “*Batho Pele* - Putting People First” – which espoused a set of principles that were adopted nationally as a political and administrative framework for the better delivery of goods and services to the public. These principles included among others the notions of access, transparency, redress, and value for money. This commitment intended to reflect a major shift from apartheid-led bureaucracy, and towards a new form of public service which aimed to be “developmental” in familiar NPM terms (Karuri-Sebina et al, 2009; Fakir, 2007).

NEW URBAN POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SPACES

Lefebvre’s notion of the ‘right to the city’ was largely idealistic, not offering clear solutions as to how this ‘right’ could be realised (Purcell, 2002). Purcell suggests that realising this right is practically possible, and could be the gateway to a new urban politics: the “*urban politics of the inhabitant*’.”

“The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what kind of social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic values we desire. The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city” – David Harvey, 2008

The ‘right to the city’ concept has been used to frame various perspectives on urban politics. Plyushteva (2009) argues that the city is a discursive construct interpreted collectively and individually, and inhabitants perceive of the urban form in whatever ways they want and impose upon it their powers. Purcell (2003) discusses this ‘right’ as one where the inhabitant’s role in the city needs to be rescued from the aggressive expansion of capitalism that threatens the citizens’ anonymity. This anonymity is threatened by neo-liberal policies and the increasing control of certain individuals or corporates over urban spaces. These powerful players would exploit their privileges and assert their power over the shape of the city, resulting in the oppression, isolation and marginalisation of urban dwellers. One of the ways to give the power back to the citizen is through participative processes. Fernandes (2007) interprets the ‘right to the city’ in terms of urban dwellers getting to enjoy all aspects of city life (i.e., services), as well as fully participate in the direct management of it.

The ‘*right to the city*’, as elaborated by Plyushteva, can be claimed by citizens through “inserting their bodies into non-accidental urban locations.” This refers to the use of **urban public spaces**, such as public squares, where citizens gather to protest and in some cases overthrow the government. A prominent contemporary example is that of Egypt’s Tahrir Square and Tunisia’s Central Bourguiba Avenue. These public spaces and their central locality were vital to the so-called “Arab Spring” uprisings in Africa and the Middle East.

Relating to these uses of public space, Jansen (2001) referred to the phenomenon of “re-territorialising the city”. Urban space may be used as a place where socio-political justices could be demanded. The ‘right to the city’ in this sense “emerged as instrumental in their confrontation with the nationwide regime; like an unforeseen consequence in this citizenship struggle, it materialised to remind urban dwellers that, while their use of streets and squares had long been explicitly and implicitly limited by the regime to getting from A to B, urban public spaces were political arenas as much as they were pavement and asphalt” (Plyushteva, 2009, p.9).

The increasing privatisation of urban public spaces (through the construction of malls, or restricting access to public parks and places through user charges) propelled by

NPM approaches may therefore serve to limit the ‘right to the city’ in very concrete ways. The use of urban public spaces becomes subject to limited use for certain ‘socially approved’ activities. If one goes beyond this ‘socially accepted norm’, they can be fined or even jailed. In some instances, the use of public urban spaces for specialised activities is only available to those who can afford to pay for it.

“This is a fundamental aspect of the Right to the City platform, and an important argument for its existence – the right to alter the urban public space, and the need to argue that public space is not meant to be ‘normal’, static and untouchable, but that its intrinsic nature is to be dynamic, changeable according to inhabitants’ needs and, within reason, full of surprises” (Plyushteva, 2002, p.11).

PUBLIC SPACES

Urban public spaces are areas within the public realm (in neighbourhoods, downtown areas, parks, commons, etc.) which are open to the range of publics and their various uses. This refers to people from various ethnic, social, economic and even generational backgrounds (which mixing of such groups through serendipitous encounters contributes to building social cohesion). There is therefore an expectation that urban public spaces should facilitate a range of users and uses.

The importance of public spaces within an urban context is paramount, even more so their ability to be accessed and enjoyed by all users regardless of class, race, gender, age or income. Diverse public spaces are important for cities that are vibrant and aspire to be inclusive. Some of the best public spaces known are the ones that allow for serendipitous encounters, spark deliberate discussions and are generally not constrained. These spaces are the arenas within which diverse encounters take place, which otherwise would not (Rogers, 1998; Mitchell, 2003 and Nemeth, 2009). Therefore, one can argue that in order for a space to be considered public, it has to meet certain criteria that do not lead to any group’s isolation.

Even with the vast range of possible uses, there are generic qualities considered to characterise “great” places – such as them being welcoming, well maintained, unique, enabling multiple activities, comfort and safety, pleasant surprises, being visually appealing, and so forth (Mitchell, 1995; Goheen, 1998). Studies supporting Cape Town’s dignified public spaces programme also had respondents identify the general offerings “expected” of public spaces, i.e.: Recreation and sports; “Places for the soul” (referring to individual uses such as passive recreation, “watching the world go by”, “peace and quiet”, contemplation); Transport interchanges; Clustered public facilities; and Economic hubs (Cape Town Quality Public Space Survey).

PRIVATISATION OF PUBLIC SPACE: PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, PRIVATE MANAGEMENT

The privatisation of public assets signifies the introduction and extension of neoliberal principles within the public sphere. However given that urban public spaces have been characterised according to their accessibility by diverse people for diverse uses, their spontaneity, their lack of restriction, etc., it is predictable that there can be some tensions arising in the context of their privatisation

The privatisation of public spaces occurs when private capital is used to construct such spaces or through their management. This privatisation is thus effected through the production, design, management and uses of the public spaces (Mitchell, 1995; Murray, 2009 and Loukaitou-Sideris, 1993).

Local governments have increasingly sought to leverage the private sector to create and provide public spaces. This leveraging of the private sector is necessitated by the constrained revenue bases of local governments who have multiple mandates to fulfil, as well as by the administrative restructuring of many governments towards NPM with its push towards achieving efficiency and accountability. The way in which a city is perceived and managed evolves into the city and its spaces being seen as opportunities for investment or capitalisation (Mitchell, 2003 and Nemeth, 2009). So when cities want to transform through ‘urban regeneration’ initiatives or the like, public-private partnerships have been a common approach or aspiration.

As explained by Smithsimon (2008), these spaces are provided and maintained, and should be publicly accessible, through the agreement with a local government such spaces must adhere to be legally accessed by the public. However, the manner in which they are designed and subsequently managed is often left to the private firm, who as a result may dictate *how* the space is used. This has dynamic has led to some significant unintended outcomes. For one, the managers of these spaces have tended to prioritise security concerns over social interaction. The ways in which the spaces are designed, or a security guard is employed to monitor the space, or the use of technology is used to constantly keep an eye on users, have led to the marginalisation of “undesired people”. Design has also been used to ‘plan people out’, essentially designing spaces to simply keep or manage out unwanted people through filtering, being uninviting, fortressing, focusing on consumption activities, control, and various forms of surveillance (Nemeth, 2009). There has also been a tendency to restrict certain uses, such as public protests. This brings into question how democratic spaces are, and it is obvious that such spaces do not allow for democratic expression.

The imbalances between the public agenda and the private interest have led to various challenges and contestations. For one, some spaces are completely ignored. If some public spaces are seen as being non-viable in economic terms (i.e., unprofitable), then those spaces are sometimes ignored or deemed unimportant (Mitchell, 1995; Murray, 2009 and Loukaitou-Sideris, 1993). In their effort to target that clientele which is most likely to consume the services the private organisations have to offer, there is also a tendency to ignoring context and designing spaces they import externally-derived design approaches and values. So “In order to serve the purposes of the developer, design most often aspires to create settings for an exclusive class of user. Chic architecture, stylish, highly ornamental and elegant materials intend to attract, impress and at the same time promote the feeling of affluence. Design treats space as a commodity to be consumed” (Murray, 2009 and Loukaitou-Sideris, 1993). The targeting of course also requires that there are strict management controls to exclude “undesirable” populations and uses. And if the local government doesn’t like these changes? Well, while the local governments may have power related to development and project approvals, they tend to be on the back foot at the threat of capital flight. If the private organisation does not

get their way, then they can easily ‘take their money elsewhere’; the ‘elsewhere’ typically being another local government that is in competition with the former municipality. In many instances, private organisations also have had some form of political power or access where they can influence the outcome of a decision to fall within their favour.

Just as the notion of ‘public space’ calls for spaces that cater to a collective, visible citizenry, so too spaces that do not allow for such cannot be deemed public. Spaces cannot be public if their design, management or maintenance requires the marginalisation or exclusion of certain types of citizenries (Mitchell, 2003; Nemeth, 2009; and Valentine, 1996). While these private-public spaces often appear to offer the best of public and private spaces (seemingly public use with high standards of design and cleanliness), on closer scrutiny these spaces are in fact highly regulated and inaccessible to a large populace that does not ‘fit’ the image of the space. These approaches to the design and management of public spaces have rendered them private.

‘RIGHT TO THE CITY’ THROUGH THE PUBLIC SPACE

Referencing the works of Habermas, Lefebvre, and Howell, among others, Ruppert (2006) emphasizes the significance of public space in the practice of politics – in the instance of public protests and demonstrations for example. For marginal groups, public social areas can also help to foster inclusion by serving as a resource for achieving equal participation as access to other means may often be restricted. In addition to contributing to defining and contesting the public, public space is also important to the construction of group identities as previously discussed. However, “If public space is where difference is encountered then it must be structured in a manner that enables difference to be expressed and where particular conducts and uses are not privileged above and beyond those of others” (ibid, p. 18).

“In sum, space is not a passive container; rather, it is a powerful part of a number of social and political activities involved in the making of the public, activities that involve making claims, achieving visibility and recognition, influencing public opinion, establishing legitimacy, contesting the conception of the public, renegotiating

social and political rights and group identity formation. These could be said to be the use values or public interests of space in a democracy.” (ibid, p.11-12)

The ‘right to the city’ comes from being able to ‘claim’ the public space or ‘to be seen’ within the space. This then becomes a way in which people can legitimise their ‘right’ to belong. This ‘right to be’ is the foundation of inclusive democracy. Dictating who can use a space and who cannot can present a significant barrier to appropriate power / democratic relations. Issues of public disorder and criminality within public spaces have been used to legitimize calls for such spaces to be regulated and monitored. However, there are some assertions stating that disorder and criminality within public spaces could equally be eradicated through designing spaces that call for non-motorized transport, congregation, or activities that effectively populate spaces. It is therefore important to recognise that the way public space is produced and managed has an important influence on who gets the right to use it, and how the users of the space will engage with it.

Neo-liberal policies have been blamed for disenfranchising the poor by diminishing access to the public realm (Fernandes, 2009; Marcuse, 2009). If we are to achieve a ‘Right to the City’ then we have to link sustainable development with human rights and embed these in our policies, and put in place implementable solutions (Muller, 2014).

CONCEPTUALISING ‘RIGHT TO THE CITY’ FOR SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa’s harsh and long history of human rights violation and racial discrimination steered the adoption of a post-liberation constitution that has been referred to as the ‘Roll Royce’. Yet even with the highly progressive constitution and Bill of Rights, firmly grounded in human rights approaches, these have not been sufficient in ensuring socio-economic redistribution and justice in the country. Instead, South Africa is now more unequal than it was before with many people socially, economically and spatially marginalised. It has been argued that this has been the direct consequence of neo-liberal policies that have been blamed for its “one-dimensional focus on cost recovery, efficiency, deregulation, privatisation, rolling back the state, limitations on planning, and commodification of

common spaces, services and resources” (Muller, 2014). Post-apartheid the new government implemented neo-liberal policies that have resulted in a distortion of the economy, spatial form and a political climate that tends to favour those that can afford to pay (Huchzermeyer, 2009). This has resulted in a wave of protests and unrest in many parts of South Africa, from people who are increasingly excluded from accessing resources.

The promotion of human rights and facilitating the shared ‘right to the city’ are thus imperative in achieving inclusive and just cities in South Africa. However the prevalent development paradigm has relegated this ‘right’ to being just words written on paper. Achieving spatial justice has proven to be more difficult to implement than to theorise. In fact, the management and design practices that influence spatial form in the country have tended to focus mechanically on producing, reproducing, or protecting places (Muller, 2014).

Comparatively, some countries in Latin America have succeeded in incorporating the ‘right to the city’ into their legal frameworks, thus proving that it is indeed possible. According to Fernandes (2009), achieving this ‘Right’ can be attained through the “integration of urban planning, urban law, and urban management, and on three interlinked processes of legal-political reforms: revival of representative democracy and wide participation; decentralisation of decision making, and a new legal administrative framework setting out the changing state-society relation”. However, South Africa’s urban policies (expressed through by-laws, etc.) and practices (as reflected in social norms and behaviours) have often been mismatched with the context within which they are implemented, often resulting in ‘unjust’ outcomes. State-driven examples include recurring incidents of street trader evictions on the basis of addressing illegality and uncleanness, and the accepted gentrification effects of public sector-driven urban regeneration efforts which seemingly aim for clean and green but empty or exclusionary enclaves. Socially, the phenomenon of parks for dog-walking suburbanites (usually white and/or middle-upper class) while domestic workers and other public users are relegated to curb-sides and residual spaces has persisted long beyond the censures of apartheid.

Sue Parnell and Edgar Pieterse (2010) suggest that South Africa needs to replace its neoliberal tendencies with a more radical, rights-based agenda for cities. For this, they

identify three categories of rights which constitute the right to the city which, the authors argue, can only be achieved through properly established and responsibly implemented institutional mechanisms. Their 1st generation rights category refers to the most basic exercising of democratic rights excluding socio-economic rights in the city. 2nd generation rights are achieved through the sustained delivery of affordable urban services to households and neighbourhoods (not individuals) and through viable service administration and finances (not just through infrastructure investment). 3rd generation rights refer to the full right to the city: freedom of movement, safety, environmental protection and economic opportunity (all of which are enshrined in the South African Constitution and International Declaration on Human Rights, but are poorly understood in the country because these rights are generally exercised / denied collectively and not individually).

THE CITY OF TSHWANE'S INNER-CITY REGENERATION STRATEGY

The City of Tshwane is located in the Gauteng Province. Formerly known as Pretoria, it is the capital city of South Africa and it houses the administrative seat of government. Tshwane is one of three large metropolitan municipalities in the Gauteng city region area and hosts several urban centres, including Pretoria (the CBD), Centurion, Akasia, Soshanguve, Mabopane, Atteridgeville, Ga-Rankuwa, Winterveld, Hammanskraal, Temba, Pienaarsrivier, Crocodile River and Mamelodi. In spatial (physical geographical area) terms, Tshwane is the largest metropolitan municipality in South Africa, and the third-largest city in the world after New York and Tokyo.

The city houses over 130 foreign embassies and missions, and is regarded as the birthplace of South African democracy with both its heritage and contemporary status as the place where all the nation's presidents are inaugurated. Tshwane also houses a rich arcadia of museums and the arts, such as the Pretoria Arts Museum, the National Cultural History Museum, and the State Theatre, and was the chosen site for the erection of Freedom Park, the national monument that symbolises the successful struggle of the South African people for democracy and freedom. Tshwane is therefore in fact not only a functional capital, but also a symbolic one that seeks to reinforce the African renaissance prerogative and invite tourism interest.

The inner city of Tshwane contains a rich concentration of historic and cultural places, and importantly a key concentration of government-owned and -rented buildings as well as numerous international institutions. The city is thus regarded as a “capital core”, and its public value and interest is particularly key. Tshwane’s ambitions for its inner city to also serve as a “functional and symbolic heart of the Capital City of South Africa and Africa,” and as a centre that celebrates African culture and heritage, also elevates the demands on the city’s standards and values.

In 2012, the City of Tshwane embarked upon an ambitious visioning and strategy process named “Tshwane, South Africa’s Capital 2055”. The resultant vision statement was:

In 2055, the City of Tshwane is liveable, resilient and inclusive, whose citizens enjoy a high quality of life, have access to social, economic and enhanced political freedoms and where citizens are partners in the development of the African Capital City of excellence. (<http://www.tshwane2055.gov.za>)

Tshwane’s Inner City Development Strategy which underpins Tshwane vision is therefore based on the notion of *the African Capital City of Excellence*, taking on the role of first class ‘Capital City status’ and, extending its influence beyond its jurisdiction and being a city that provides a sense of place for the entire nation’s citizenry and represents a continental flagship.

The ICR is expressed practically through an 18-Month programme of projects (2014-2016) which are intended to achieve a set of specified results:

Outcome 1: A resilient and resource efficient City
Outcome 2: A growing economy that is inclusive, diversified and competitive
Outcome 3: A City with quality infrastructure development that supports liveable communities

Outcome 4: An equitable City that supports happiness, social cohesion, safety and healthy citizens

Outcome 5: An African Capital City that promotes excellence and innovative governance solutions

Outcome 6: South Africa's Capital with an activist citizenry that is engaging, aware of their rights and presents themselves as partners in tackling societal challenges

The city indicates that it will go about implementing its vision through a set of elements namely:



APPROACH TO PUBLIC SPACE IN TSHWANE ICR

Tshwane ICR approach intends to strategically target specific areas and invest in those as a way to catalyse development and corral private sector investment. Relating specifically to public spaces, Tshwane's objective is to make the city pedestrian-friendly, provide public spaces (hard and soft), make safety its main priority, and put in place a dedicated management structure. Tshwane's status and vision for itself as the capital city leads to its significant reference points being its existing monumental and historic buildings, and large, significant public spaces such as the Union Buildings, Church Square and Burgers Park. However broader definitions also apply.

According to Tshwane's Integrated Development Plan or "IDP", the definition of public spaces is embedded within the definition of open spaces: "developed open spaces (decorative parks, play parks, traffic islands, boulevards, malls and squares), undeveloped open spaces (play parks, traffic islands, *spruit* areas and road reserves), semi-developed open spaces (play parks, traffic islands) and nature areas. The nature areas consist of nature conservation areas, mountains, ridges, river systems and catchment areas, parks and recreational facilities" (Tshwane, 2011).

Tshwane's Open Space Framework which was developed by the city's Environment Management division, also considers public space falls under the broader category of open spaces: "green space consisting of any vegetated land or landform, water or geological feature in an urban area as well as civic space (brown space) consisting of squares, market places and other paved or hard landscaped areas with a civic function. Some spaces may combine green and civic space elements, but one type or other will usually predominate. As such, open spaces within Tshwane are defined along a continuum of soft/green/natural space on the one end and hard/brown/urban on the other end" (Tshwane 2006).

Tshwane's Spatial Development Framework then defines "Public Open Spaces" as: "All space of public value, including public landscaped areas, public squares and civic spaces, plazas and entrances to shopping areas, pedestrian areas, bikeways

and paths, playing fields, parks and play areas, and also including not just land, but also areas of water such as rivers, canals, lakes and reservoirs, which can offer opportunities for sport and recreation or can also act as a visual amenity and a haven for wildlife. These areas usually remain unbuilt upon” (Tshwane, 2012b).

Tshwane’s vision with regard to its open spaces is to “attract foreign investment, expand the tax base, and create job opportunities”, and public open spaces are seen as being fundamental towards attaining overall vision of being the African Capital City of Excellence. This may be interpreted to refer to its range of open space types, and including its public spaces defined in the terms of this paper.

In this regard, in physical terms, Tshwane’s ICR states that its capital precinct plans will be articulated through the use of ‘stately trees’ and/or ‘fountains’ as a way to give the space character. Furthermore, street cafes are seen as elements that can be used to characterise an area.

In administratively and management terms, the city seems to envisage a range of sectorial support (i.e., partnerships, research and intelligence) being applied, and an Intergovernmental Task Team is to be established between the key decision-making spheres of government (this seems, for example, to include the Department of Public Works which holds the mandate around state-owned immovable assets). The establishment of City Improvement Districts are also indicated as being essential to the ICR. A caution is made that “The success of these CID’s however depends on a good relationship between all the parties involved, and the municipality should never see this as a transfer of responsibility to the private sector, but rather an enhancement of the responsibilities of the local government”. Finally, Tshwane sees the establishment of an Investment and Development Promotion Agency as being instrumental to the municipality in terms of accountability. “The purpose of this Agency will be to attract and facilitate investment, to liaise with important role players such as the Department of Public Works and to establish Public-Private Partnerships”. Additionally, the agency can increase the efficiency of CIDs and manage the operational aspects related to the CID.

CAUTIONARY NOTES

It is too early to venture any robust critique of Tshwane's ICR programme as it is still largely conceptual, though some of the projects are at various stages of packaging and inception. However it can be suggested that it is therefore not too late for the City to take on board warning signs that emanate from the discourses presented in this paper, and broader experiences.

While on the one hand, the City expresses through its rhetoric about ICR an intension of "bringing into reality a city where both the rich and poor are in close proximity to not only their workplaces, but also parks, shops, and a full range of amenities" (City of Tshwane presentation to Portfolio Committee on Public Works on the Inner City Master Plan Project, November 2012), it simultaneously represents the vision of the ICR as reflecting a slick, global city-styled imagery complete with references to Times Square, Mona Lisa murals and glass sky-scrapers, relegating affordable housing to the external limits and making no reference to the incorporation of the majority poor population (City of Tshwane presentation to City Budget Forum, March 2014). Herein lie the risky signs of a possible conflict between well-meaning intent, and likely outcomes from the approaches taken.

There is a wide range of literature showing how such public space programmes unravel into unintended outcomes. One concern is that of management approach. The need for defining what public spaces are is important, because pathways are defined as being public however the department or entities responsible for managing such spaces are often not aligned effectively. In Tshwane's case, the process of developing public squares for instance will be undertaken by the Department of Public Works in collaboration with the Tshwane government, as well as other state entities. The accesses (pathways and roads) will be the responsibility of the Department of Transport to ensure the coordination of such with the city's plans. The complexities and misalignment prospects of these arrangements are quite likely to yield the typical result of compromising nuanced outcomes.

This paper has also presented a key criticism of neoliberal regeneration approaches and policies as sweeping out the old, and that which does not fit into the image. This

usually results in gentrification due to increased rents, or the perceived use value of a space. In South African cities, especially, informality has been frowned upon as it does not fit within the 'world class' narrative of popular city visions. City officials tend to perceive urban regeneration policies as a way of fitting into their western visions of world class status, ignoring the processes through which cities of the global north may have managed to revitalise their cities (often in starkly exclusionary ways); yet it is from these cities that we draw inspiration (Winkler, 2007).

While other large South African cities, like Tshwane, claim to encompass socio-economic issues onto their urban framework, the reality however is that their regeneration has led to the exclusion of lower income residents. The prevalent scenario is that developers, encouraged and even backed by public programmes and investments, buy inner city buildings and renovate them hence rendering them unaffordable to the existing tenants. Urban regeneration projects of this standard type are a means towards facilitating the notion of the new economy and the consumption demands of the middle- to upper- classes. These strategies involve the participation of the private sector, whose inner city projects have become 'best practice precedents', where economic competitiveness, responsive governance and social cohesion are in vogue. Urban regeneration of this nature is therefore, not perceived as a means to reducing inner city poverty or increasing inclusion, but as creating economic growth, inflated property prices, and a higher tax base revenue for local governments (Winkler, 2007).

PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

While government ownership and vision may appear to be the solution to the challenges of exclusion and the 'right to the city', this is not a foregone conclusion. There are numerous examples of state-owned public spaces also becoming more exclusive and less public, often driven by benign neoliberal approaches and in the name of pragmatic market orientation or individual consumer citizenship (Ruppert 2006). Achievement of the 2nd and 3rd generation rights in the city requires a far more fundamental and conscious engagement by the state with the processes of city formation, and how to

provide enabling delivery and management approaches for addressing collective needs and use values that do not have an exchange value. In relation of public space, “we need to turn our attention away from resources, spaces and goods as constitutive of public space to that of regulatory regimes. In this way we can think of systems of laws, regulations, designs, surveillance and security as shaping the possibilities of who and what constitutes the public and that through a just configuration of liberty the social and political use values of public space can be expanded” (Ruppert, 2006, p.35).

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