



2019

# **INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE g7+**

Isabel Rocha de Siqueira  
BRICS Policy Center | International Relations Institute PUC-Rio



In 2019, the g7+ Secretariat commissioned the BRICS Policy Center – International Relations Institute (PUC-Rio) with the production of an “Independent Review of the g7+”.

This work is published under the responsibility of the BRICS Policy Center.



# Table of contents

Acknowledgements	5
Acronyms and abbreviations	6
Executive Summary	8
<b>1</b> Overview	11
<b>2</b> g7+'s Agenda for Change	18
<i>Interlude 1: The g7+'s role in the fragile states agenda</i>	26
<b>3</b> Past: Taking Stock of Expectations	29
<i>Interlude 2: g7+'s influence?</i>	40
<b>4</b> Present: g7+'s Influence and Action	44
<i>Interlude 3: SDGs and g7+'s 20 priority indicators</i>	78
<b>4</b> Future: Opportunities, Risks and Recommendations	81
<i>Interlude 4: UN Observer Status</i>	92
References	93
ANNEX I – List of Informants	99
ANNEX II – Questionnaire	100
ANNEX III – Terms of Reference	101
ANNEX IV - Taking Stock of Fragility Assessments	106

## Figures

Figure 1: The New Deal Instruments

Figure 2: MoUs (elaborated by Beatriz Nazareth Teixeira).

Figure 3: g7+'s recent publications (elaborated by Beatriz Nazareth Teixeira)

Figure 4: Chronology of g7+'s main events since 2015 (elaborated by Beatriz Nazareth Teixeira, Tatiana Castelo Branco and Lucas Manuel Machado)

Figure 5: Overview - relevance of fragility-related themes

Figure 6: Financial flows to fragile contexts

Figure 7: ODA to fragile and non-fragile contexts

Figure 8: Aid by sector in fragile contexts

Figure 9: Aid spending by DAC donor

Figure 10: ODA and Humanitarian Aid

Figure 11: ODA trends to sub-groupings most in need, 2011-2016

Figure 12: Peace, Justice and Governance in the post-2015 development agenda

Figure 13: UNDP's support to SDGs as of 2019

Figure 14: UNDP. Top 10 recipient countries

Figure 15: 2014 New Deal Monitoring Report, by IDPS

Figure 16: An overview of New Deal awareness and use

Figure 17: Lessons of New Deal Implementation

Figure 18: g7+'s priority indicators in the 2030 Agenda

Figure 19: SDGs/PSGs - UNPD SDG-Ready Project

Figure 20: Explaining UN observer status

## Tables

Table 1: Methodology of the review

Table 2: A few quotes on g7+'s agenda of change (from interviews)

Table 3: ToC

Table 4: Key mentions of g7+'s work (elaborated by Beatriz Nazareth Teixeira, Lucas Manuel Machado and Tatiana Castelo Branco)

Table 5: SDG16 UN indicators (Source: Rocha de Siqueira, I., 2018)

Table 6: UNDP's top budget values per SDG16 target

Table 7: New Deal engagement as of 2019

Table 8: g7+'s F2F (Source: g7+ and UNOSSC (2018))

## Boxes

BOX 1: ToC narrative - telling the story as if...

BOX 2: g7+ partners

BOX 3: ODA and PSGs

BOX 4: g7+ and IDPs

# Acknowledgements

This independent review of the work of the g7+ was produced by the BRICS Policy Center (BPC) - International Relations Institute (PUC-Rio), Brazil. The review was led by Isabel Rocha de Siqueira and supported by Beatriz Nazareth Teixeira, Lucas Manuel Machado, Tatiana Castelo Branco and Paulo Esteves.

We are grateful to the g7+ Secretariat for promptly sharing all material and contacts at every request.

We are extremely grateful to all interviewees who shared their time, information and impressions.

We appreciate the opportunity to share our study at the g7+ Ministerial Meeting, in Lisbon, in June 2019, to intensify the exchange and hopefully enrich the contributions.

The opinions and findings are the author's only and do not necessarily reflect the views of interviewees, BPC or the g7+.

Please, cite as

Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2019) "Independent Review of the g7+", BRICS Policy Center – International Relations Institute (PUC-Rio).

# Acronyms and abbreviations

ADB – Asian Development Bank

AfDB – African Development Bank

AU – African Union

BAPA – Buenos Aires Plan of Action

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CAR – Central African Republic

CAP – Common African Position

CSPPS – Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding\*

DAC – Development Assistance Committee (OECD)\*

DFID – Department for International Development (UK government)

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

F2F – Fragile to Fragile

FCAS – Fragility and Conflict Affected Situations

FCV – Fragility, Conflict and Violence

FOCUS – New Deal principles: Fragility assessment, One vision-one plan, Use PSGs to monitor results, Support political leadership and dialogue

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

HLP – High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda

IDA – International Development Association (World Bank)

IDP – Internally Displaced Persons

IDPS – International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (OECD)

ILO – International Labour Organization

IFI – International Financial Institution

ILAC – International Legal Assistance Consortium

IMF – International Monetary Fund

INCAF – International Network for Conflict and Fragility (OECD-DAC)\*

ISE – Institute for State Effectiveness

LDC – Least Development Countries

M&E – Monitoring & Evaluation

MDB – Multilateral Development Banks

MoU – Memorandum of Understanding

MDG – Millennium Development Goal

ODA – Official Development Assistance

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PFM – Public Finance Management

PSG – Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals

PVE – Preventing Violent Extremism

RCI – Rwanda Cooperation Initiative

SDG – Sustainable Development Goals

SSC – South-South Cooperation

ToC – Theory of Change

TOSSD – Total Official Support for Sustainable Development

TRUST – New Deal principles: Transparency, Risk-sharing, Use country system, Strengthen capacities, Timely & predictable aid

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNOSSC – United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

USIP – United States Institute of Peace

WB – World Bank

## Executive summary

The way we understand it, the most distinctive aspect of this engagement has been its crucially principled stance towards the way people think and do peace and development.

After nine years of its foundation, the g7+ faces a development agenda that is much different from before. If in 2010 the language was that of development effectiveness, now the group seems to have extrapolated that. The g7+ has grown to have 20 member countries and has consistently advocated for a different engagement with fragile states. The way we understand it, the most distinctive aspect of this engagement has been its crucially *principled* stance towards the way people think and do peace and development. Specific tools such as the New Deal, the PSGs, FOCUS and TRUST seem to be most valuable when they are advanced with the aim to foster new and more inclusive dialogues, redefine the terms of engagement and find space for fragile states in the international scenario. Meanwhile, the key challenges lie precisely in how these tools can be operationalized without losing sight of such important principles or turning them into templates. This has not always been done successfully and on that depends the g7+'s very possibilities of advocating for fragile states: if the group cannot showcase local successes, they will always risk losing attention in a world where attention span is most certainly decreasing. Cases of successes also help maintain the group's internal cohesion, offering member countries precisely the kind of hope and confidence the g7+ has been valued for from the beginning. However, with limited resources, it will always be a challenge for the g7+ to stretch itself between advocacy and action on the ground. The key lies in this balance.

This review, commissioned by the g7+ Secretariat as an independent study, maps out past and present g7+'s achievements and the challenges the group faces in terms of the core current events in the international scenario: there are more countries experiencing conflict than at any time in the past 30 years;<sup>1</sup> by 2030, it is estimated up to 80% of the world's poorest may be living in fragile and conflict-

<sup>1</sup> OECD (2018a). States of fragility. Available at <<http://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2018-9789264302075-en.htm>>, p. 7.



Both for internal support to outbound strategies and external knowledge of inbound processes, we make recommendations that range from fostering skills for political analyses to rebranding 'fragility' internationally.

affected states<sup>2</sup> and that by 2050, as many as 143 million people could become climate migrants in just three regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America).<sup>3</sup>

The key recent achievements of the g7+ show the group still counts with its mains assets: an articulate and effective secretariat; passionate people on the ground; an extremely relevant and consistent agenda; and some solidly supportive ears outside. However, even achievements need to be rooted in engaging narratives, accounted for and communicated. The g7+'s contributions for the approval of SDG16, for instance, are well acknowledged, yet the group has not taken advantage of that momentum and symbolic capital. Contributions to changes in resource flows and allocation, such as seen in the World Bank's IDA17 and, to some extent, IDA18 and new Strategy for Fragile States, in turn, are largely known outside the group, but not well known among members. On the other hand, F2F and the impetus created by the New Deal and Fragility Assessments are highly valued among members even in countries that have not quite put these into practice, while externals find these either not well implemented, or even currently irrelevant – 'out of fashion'. This is perhaps much related to the difficulties the group has historically faced to find a place among other developing countries. Both for internal support to outbound strategies and external knowledge of inbound processes, we make recommendations that range from fostering skills for political analyses to rebranding 'fragility' internationally.

Indeed, the way the group will choose to address the issue of the very term 'fragility' might be key for its capacity to face internal and external problems. Internally, the term still finds rebuke, especially among African countries; internal debates and whole-of-government approaches can help foster a consensus. These would, in addition, address the need to invest in diversifying the image of the leadership that is convened, inviting more active participation on the part of all members. Timor-Leste has offered remarkable leadership but clearly now needs others to step up; moreover, the group would benefit from actively showing their agenda is common and shared. Externally, 'fragility' faces difficulties dialoguing with the universality and indivisibility encouraged by the 2030 Agenda. The g7+ might want to address this challenge in a more direct way, positioning itself in terms of what being fragile means in this scenario; indeed, valuing their own expertise would be smart now that 'peace' is everywhere. However, at the same time, the group needs

<sup>2</sup> OECD 2018a, p. 7 and United Nations (2019), "Synthesis of voluntary submissions by functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council and other intergovernmental bodies and forums", E/HLPF/2019/4, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> World Bank. Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview>; OECD 2018a, p. 3.

to seek quality partnerships where they can be found; this expertise, therefore, should not isolate the g7+ but, on the contrary, serve to foment complementarity.

We also suggest the 'leave no one behind' agenda is a perfect entry point for the g7+'s agenda on solidarity, one that is naturally connected to all that the group has been defending, especially in the figure of the much-advocated SDG16. Nevertheless, as the study indicates, there might be pitfalls in this international inclusiveness discourse, as much as inclusiveness itself is extremely welcome and part of the g7+'s own advocacy. Changes in the way resources will be allocated, for instance, are complex and need perhaps to be constantly scrutinized before the group takes firm stances regarding subjects like terrorism and preventing violent extremism, to make sure such positions will actually benefit its members, and not stigmatize, nor indirectly take away resources from other important areas. The subjects are extremely relevant for fragile states, but a cautious approach is recommended.

Overall, the balance has been very positive. The group delivered much, even if not nearly all that it promised. The review showed there is great support still. In fact, the g7+ seems to be a special case in which the amount of support is not necessarily attached to a capacity to completely fulfil promises made. While all the time there are certainly new trends in development politics that constantly defy one's focus, the g7+ has shown an incredible capacity to follow up on partnerships and consolidate a network of optimist supporters. The group's way of doing things has certainly found resonance and should be nurtured, which should not, however, steal away from the motivation to make changes to adapt to this new and challenging development scenario.

*Dr. Isabel Rocha de Siqueira  
BRICS Policy Center, Brazil  
International Relations Institute (IRI), PUC-Rio*

# 1. Overview

In a certain way, one can say the mid-2000s inaugurated a time of intense reshuffling in the field of development cooperation. There was increasing investment in monitoring & evaluation (M&E), especially motivated by progress reporting on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),<sup>4</sup> but also by strong discourses about the need for more horizontality in the field and for development solutions that would be aligned to countries' priorities.<sup>5</sup> In this context, the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness initiated important discussions under the auspices of OECD. Principles for aid effectiveness approved were not only about changing realities on the ground, but about revisiting donors' responsibilities as well.<sup>6</sup> The latter had been historically insufficiently addressed and in the context of that more ample dialogue on aid effectiveness many problems with donor engagement in fragile states were brought to the fore: an abundance of frameworks that overwhelmed recipient countries' systems; a lack of proper recognition of the complex intersections between peace and development, especially in the case of fragile situations; too-rigid M&E systems that lacked contextuality and, therefore, produced little useful information for recipient countries while consuming vital and limited resources; slow response, short-time engagement and a lack of harmony among donors; the presence of

---

<sup>4</sup> United Nations General Assembly (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015. [without reference to a Main Committee (A/70/L.1)] 70/1. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Available at <[https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A\\_RES\\_70\\_1\\_E.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf)>.

<sup>5</sup> IPS – Guardian Development Network, 'Millennium Development Goals: Fragile States claim summit outcome off-target', 23 Sep 2010 Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2010/sep/23/millennium-development-goals-fragile-states>; Costa, Helder (2012). g7+ and the New Deal: Country-Led and Country-Owned Initiatives: a Perspective from Timor-Leste, *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 7:2, 96-102; The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). Available at <<https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>>; Accra Agenda for Actions (2008). Available at <<https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>>; g7+ (2010). Dili Declaration. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/resources/3235/>>; United Nations Economic and Social Council (2010). 'Report of Brazil, Morocco and South Africa on Member States' concerns with indicators released by the United Nations agencies, (E/CN.3/2011/16).

<sup>6</sup> Paris Declaration 2005; Accra Agenda 2008.

conditionalities while capacity-building was not a clear priority, and so on.<sup>7</sup> From 2005, in Paris, to 2011, in Busan (Figure 2), this scenario led to much push-back by recipient countries, who increasingly demanded important changes in business-as-usual.

As a key result of these dynamics, the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) was initiated in 2008 in Accra, Ghana, with support of the OECD. Out of the first meeting in Paris that year, the seven countries that volunteered to pilot the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, then just approved, started to galvanize support for the creation of the g7+. The group held its first official meeting in Dili, Timor-Leste, in 2010, approving its first key agenda-setting document, the *Dili Declaration*. In 2011, during the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, in Busan, the group and its main proposals were consolidated and a *New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States* (henceforth, the **New Deal**) was proposed under the auspices of IDPS and with the lobby and leadership of the g7+.<sup>8</sup>

As of 2019 the g7+ is composed of 20 member countries, with a Secretariat in Dili and a hub in Lisbon.<sup>9</sup> The group has been active in different fora, participating in all key annual and seasonal meetings in the development field, including World Bank and IMF spring meetings, the UN High Level Political Forum, and many others. The key messages that were present at its foundation are still being delivered, among them that **'without security there can be no development'**.<sup>10</sup> The g7+ has also asked for more **ownership**, simplified procedures and untied assistance. Crucially, members welcomed what was perceived as a new platform for fragile states.

All these initial claims have, in the past few years, been consolidated in specific strategies. The g7+ has been working on different fronts, lobbying for change in the international **narrative** around fragility; the adaptation of international systems to take their own understanding of fragility into account, through mechanisms and frameworks like the New Deal itself; and the practice of their own form of cooperation, as in what has been termed Fragile to Fragile cooperation (**F2F**).<sup>11</sup> The g7+ has also consistently lobbied organizations like the UN and the World Bank to

<sup>7</sup> For compilations, overview and analysis of these critiques, see Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2014) Measuring and Managing 'State Fragility': The Production of Statistics by the World Bank, Timor-Leste and the g7+. *Third World Quarterly*, 35 (2), 268-283; Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2016) Development by Trial and Error: The Authority of Good Enough Numbers. *International Political Sociology*, 11 (2). Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2017) *Managing state fragility: Conflict, quantification and power*. London, Routledge.

<sup>8</sup> International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011). A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. Available at <[https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer\\_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the\\_new\\_deal.pdf](https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf)>.

<sup>9</sup> See g7+ at <http://g7plus.org/>.

<sup>10</sup> Dili Declaration, 2010.

<sup>11</sup> g7+ (2013). Note on the Fragility Spectrum. Kinshasa, g7; g7+. (2014) *Pathways toward Resilience. The Journey Continues...* [Online]; g7+. (2015) *Annual Report 2014-2015*; 2016; g7+ *Pathways Toward Resilience*, Dili; g7+. (2016) *Strength in Fragility: "We are Writing our own History"*, Dili.

It is now time to conduct a thorough reflection on the g7+'s work, looking at the way the initial messages have been delivered, the obstacles that have been found, what has been achieved, what the costs have been and what political engagements have been key to the group.

turn attention to fragility; to increase knowledge production and direct action to the intersection between security and development; to increase risk-taking; and to support national strategies and country-owned solutions. Achievements of the global lobbying practiced by the group were recently exemplified by the inclusion of SDG16 on Peace, Justice and Inclusive societies in the 2030 Agenda.<sup>12</sup>

One can see signs that most of this varied portfolio of action is now apparently well-known: F2F has been cited alongside long-established South-South Cooperation initiatives;<sup>13</sup> the Fragility Assessments, at least initially, were an example of Southern self-assessment and more contextual indicators in M&E;<sup>14</sup> and a focus on fragility has led to some mainstreaming of fragility and conflict issues in important institutions, such as the World Bank, OECD, UN and others.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the g7+ has often seated at the table of the main policy dialogues in the development field, such as it was the case with the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda.<sup>16</sup>

For all that, it is now time to conduct a thorough reflection on the g7+'s work, *looking at the way the initial messages have been delivered, the obstacles that have been found, what has been achieved, what the costs have been and what political engagements have been key to the group.* One review has been conducted in 2015 and published in 2016, led by Sarah Hearn at the Centre on International Cooperation, New York University.<sup>17</sup> After nearly four years since the last review was conducted, the g7+ has now much to gain from a new study that can account for its political engagements at the international level, such as those with the 2030 Agenda and SDG16 specifically, and which includes analysis of the more recent F2F initiatives, as well as an overview of the current capillarity of the *New Deal*, addressing past and potential contributions of the Fragility Assessments and New Deal compacts in a moment where development organizations are increasingly looking for different contributions to M&E.

<sup>12</sup> International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS). (2011) *A Political Strategy to Secure International Acceptance of the PSGs*. Meeting of the Steering Group. Nairobi, IDPS.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017). *South-South in Action - Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation: Voluntarism, Cooperation and Solidarity*. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/resources/south-south-in-action-fragile-to-fragile-cooperation-2017/>>; Rocha de Siqueira, Isabel (2019). *The Case for South-South Cooperation on Peace and Development*. United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and BRICS Policy Center. Available at <<https://www.unsouthsouth.org/2019/03/18/the-case-for-south-south-cooperation-on-peace-and-development-2019/>>.

<sup>14</sup> Adio-Bolaji, Adedayo (2015). 'The Challenge of Measuring SDG 16: What Role for African Regional Frameworks?', European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper n. 175.

<sup>15</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2017).

<sup>16</sup> United Nations Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel of eminent persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Available at <<https://www.un.org/sg/en/management/hlppost2015.shtml>>.

<sup>17</sup> Hearn, Sarah. 2016. *Independent Review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States for the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding*. New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University.



With that in mind and based on the Terms of Reference (Annex III) elaborated by the g7+ Secretariat, the aims of this independent review are to systematically and independently review the various areas of activity of the g7+ since its inception and to evaluate the actions and initiatives of the group in light of the g7+ Charter, the Dili Declaration, the New Deal and other relevant guiding documents. This includes, without being limited to, the following specific matters and domains:

1. Global policy and advocacy initiatives of the g7+;
2. Fragile-to fragile cooperation initiatives;
3. Implementation of the New Deal at the country level;
4. Ministerial meetings and setting of strategic objectives;
5. External communication and outreach;
6. Institutional consolidation of the g7+, including with regard to its relationship with other multilateral organizations like the United Nations.

## Methodology

This review has started by clustering the domains above in four main areas of analysis that can be summarized as a) influence; b) action; c) internal cohesion; and d) outreach politics.

*The review is not an evaluation of policies on the ground; it is a sound reflection on lessons learned and, most important, considering the role of solidarity and internal cohesion for the group, the review focuses rather on *perceptions* of key internal and external informants about the work done by the g7+ so far, as per its own stated objectives and the expectations of its members. This is in line with the purpose to focus on *influence* in terms of *contributions* rather than attributions, which is strongly connected to g7+'s own historical view that any evaluation should be always contextually appropriate,<sup>18</sup> which means acknowledging subjective outcomes such as policy influence can benefit from a more nuanced analysis and one that takes into account the very political context where change is to take place.*

That said, notwithstanding, this review also looks at quantitative data as much as possible, as exemplified by analyses of resource flows; frequency of mentions in international documents; and more concrete achievements in the 'action' cluster.

---

<sup>18</sup> g7+ (2013).

Research was conducted along six weeks by a team based at the BRICS Policy Center, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The research consisted of desk reviews, looking at specific documents produced by the group and those elaborated by other organizations about the g7+, such as is the case of the World Bank, UNDP, UNOSSC, OECD, and academic papers. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of member countries – a majority of focal points and a few ministers; members of the Secretariat; former staff seconded from other institutions; and externals that have been key figures in the networks and history of the g7+. Some, for logistical reasons, opted to respond questionnaires. Please see Annex I for a list of informants and Annex II for the questionnaires (offered in English, French and Portuguese). Observation and informal conversations were also conducted during the g7+'s 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting, held in Lisbon, on 26-27 June 2019. The review did not involve fieldwork and, apart the ministerial meeting, all consultations were conducted remotely. Digital techniques were used for mapping out mentions of relevance (Table 4). It is important to note much of the analysis was also based on years of previous experience conducting research about the g7+, so that prior access to other material and interviews were also taken into account.<sup>19</sup>

A suggested Theory of Change is offered at the start of the analysis, which is as a result of the review itself. A meta-analysis of what came up in up-to-date interviews and documents allowed for a renewed approach to the g7+'s Mission and Vision, which is advanced here as a proposition to further debate on expectations and achievements.

It is important to highlight two decisions were incorporated into this review:

I. This study understands the importance of absorbing previous efforts, which allows to accumulate knowledge production about the group and makes the most of other past and present initiatives to reflect on the g7+'s work. We believe this allows for a greater cost-benefit ratio and better results. Therefore, for instance, whenever possible, of relevance and in line with the focus of this review, we depart from the points raised by the previous review, taking into account Hearn's and her team's insights and contributions.

II. Similarly, we do not believe in reinventing the wheel and prefer to make maximum use of the resources provided for this review, which means we do not recount stories the members of the group know well and which have been reported in previous g7+ publications or publications about the group. This is the case, for instance, of the very history of the group (chronologically speaking). Whenever possible, we depart *from* these stories instead of retelling them. In these cases, we

<sup>19</sup> Publications by the main author include Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2014)(2016)(2017)(2019).

go only as far as seeking perhaps better ways of visualizing and making information accessible (as exemplified with Figures 2 and 3). That is why we start from a suggested theory of change, focusing, therefore, on the changes the group seeks as a main starting point, considering two goals of this review are to understand the g7+'s achievements in terms of both influence and action.

With that, this review aims to offer a sound independent analysis of what the g7+ has collectively achieved so far, updating past analyses and rethinking them only in terms of new events and goals and to the extent it can be of relevance to the group's current stated purposes.

Table 1: Methodology of the review

Thematic Cluster	Objectives	Methodology
Influence: past and future	Global policy and advocacy initiatives of the g7+;  External communication and outreach	1. Interviews with Secretariat
		2. Using the list of actors/fora mentioned to provide the basis for the Actor-Centred Theory of Change to be developed
		3. Seek contributions instead of attributions
		3.1. Analysis of processes of change in practices of actors
		3.2. Interviews: members' own view on how their actions impacted those changes
Action: policies on the ground	Fragile-to fragile cooperation initiatives;  Implementation of the New Deal at the country level;	1. Desk studies with a focus on the two issues
		2. Interviews
		2.1 Semi-structured interviews with focal points, regarding their views on achievements and challenges
		2.2. Interview the Secretariat about more technical issues, to learn about communication and decision-making procedures
		3. Map out mentions of F2F in key knowledge products of the major organizations in the field of development cooperation
Internal coherence and functioning	Ministerial meetings and setting of strategic objectives	4. Map out mentions of New Deal by members
		1. Chronology of the group's meetings, with registered attendance
		2. Graph of membership and partnerships (MoU as proxies), indicating possibilities
		3. Interview with Secretariat about achievements and difficulties in communication, internal working, and logistics
		4. Composing g7+' own narrative about creation of hub in Lisbon
Outreach politics: controversies and support	Institutional consolidation of the g7+, including with regards to its relationship with other multilateral organizations like the United Nations	1. Desk reviews divided into main themes
		2. Mapping exercise looking at recent partnerships
		3. Interviews with key characters in g7+'s history

## 2. g7+'s agenda for change

In nearly nine years, the g7+ has enlarged its membership to 20 countries and its networks to encompass organizations like the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNDP, think tanks like the Institute for State Effectiveness and the BRICs Policy Center, and academic institutions, like the University of Coimbra (Figure 2). Membership itself remains open and follows no criteria.<sup>20</sup>

The g7+'s stated **Vision** looks both inbound and outbound.<sup>21</sup> The group has historically sought to improve conditions on the ground in its member countries and to increase awareness of fragility, peacebuilding and statebuilding issues, as perceived by the g7+'s redefined approach:

*Our collective mission is to support our members to achieve transitions towards resilience and next stages of development, by engaging with actors at both the national and international level.*

*Drawing on shared experiences, we come together to form one united voice to advocate for country-led and country-owned peacebuilding and statebuilding processes to address conflict and fragility. In doing so, we envisage the development of capable, accountable and resilient states that respond to the expectations and needs of their populations.*

*Our priorities are articulated by the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), which were outlined in the 2010 Dili Declaration of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.<sup>22</sup>*

---

<sup>20</sup> Costa, Helder and Hage, Siafa (2013). Putting peace at the core of development. Development and Peace Foundation.

<sup>21</sup> Evans, Alex and Steven, David (2010). Towards a theory of influence for twenty-first century foreign policy: The new public diplomacy in a globalized world. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 6(1): 18-26.

<sup>22</sup> See <http://g7plus.org/our-mission/>. Access 18 July 2019.



The g7+ wants its member countries to be more resilient and to leave conflict behind and it wants to influence the international agenda enough so as to change the narrative about what is possible and *how* in terms of conflict and fragility.

In general, informants have presented that which we are calling 'inbound' and 'outbound' approaches, respectively, in terms of **implementation** and **advocacy**. This combination is an extremely difficult one when the challenges are as sizeable as conflict – the changes one has the capacity to operate and the changes one seeks as ultimate goals, which in the social world are often more about the seeking than the getting there. The g7+ wants its member countries to be more resilient and to leave conflict behind and it wants to influence the international agenda enough so as to change the narrative about what is possible and *how* in terms of conflict and fragility. So far, the g7+ has tried to create **momentum** out of specific **policy contexts**, such as the elaboration of the 2030 Agenda, and internally, whenever a country is in crisis and there is demand for support of the group. In those moments, the group strives to show **leadership and ownership**, acting with little resource, but aiming to show **action** when possible. The extent to which this is generally and specifically successful will be addressed ahead. For now, it is important to systematize this frame of influence in order to understand the g7+'s current goals, priorities and modes of influence. Below, we develop a theory of change (ToC)<sup>23</sup> that is a simplified model, based on desk reviews and interviews. In the following chapters, we will look into all of these proposed changes and analyse the extent of the perceived achievements and limitations.

## Theory of Change

A theory of change seeks to create a frame to explain how change takes place contextually. It states what the problems are one wants to address, what one thinks the ideal scenario would be and how one gets there.<sup>24</sup> This involves understanding historical contexts, local needs, what is feasible in a certain political reality and one's own capabilities well.<sup>25</sup> It can easily be just another framework which does not really help in making change happens, but often it helps organizing the scene, especially when goals are highly difficult to achieve and the gap between reality and goals keeps erasing the small successes. The review offers a suggested ToC for the g7+ after collecting members' narratives about what they saw/see in the g7+, that is, opportunities for change and the challenges that follow these.

<sup>23</sup> Also suggested by Peter van Sluijs (interview).

<sup>24</sup> Jones, Harry (2011). A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Available at <https://www.odi.org/resources/docs/6453.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> Jones (2011).

Table 2: A few quotes on g7+'s agenda for change (from interviews)

<p>“Everyone was talking about aid only, not conflict.”</p> <p>“There was ongoing conflict and crises, fragility in the institutions. Each country alone could not change the narrative”.</p> <p>“We miraculously became a group. Geographically, countries were always clustering around a few regional and economic categorizations.”</p> <p>“We use our definition [of fragility]. Their definition does not represent our nature. It’s not a characteristic, it’s temporary.”</p> <p>“We don’t approach countries. These countries are tired of imposition.”</p> <p>“Donors have their own narratives about our situation. Sometimes this reporting does harm. Most of what is measured doesn’t boost our confidence and might not make sense [contextually].”</p> <p>“Our main goals were to share experience, reform the way donors engaged with fragile states and change the narrative of fragility”<sup>26</sup></p>
<p>“Changing donor behavior, it was a long shot.”</p> <p>“Leaving conflict behind, it’s a political subject. You need leadership engaged.”<sup>27</sup></p>
<p>“We were supposed to help those countries leave fragility.”</p> <p>“One day, we will be resilient states.”</p> <p>“The resources went to Middle Income Countries, not to fragile states.”<sup>28</sup></p>
<p>“There was a focus on fragility as a development issue. They [donors] wanted to stay focused on poverty-reduction, traditional agendas.”</p> <p>“Nothing about us without us was one of the main reasons to be in the group.”</p> <p>“The MDGs didn’t take our reality into account.”</p> <p>“Sometimes we had support but then it could be for something we didn’t need or it would be without any planning.”<sup>29</sup></p>

<sup>26</sup> Interview with Habib Mayar.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Donata Garrasi.

<sup>28</sup> Interview with Helder da Costa.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with Antonio Co.

The key documents elaborated by the g7+ have historically kept key messages along the same lines. The *Dili Declaration* stated: "We urgently need to address conflict and fragility by supporting country-led peace-building and statebuilding processes. To improve the impact of our efforts we will take immediate actions and develop an International Action Plan on peacebuilding and statebuilding."<sup>30</sup> In the *Strength in Fragility* we also read: "...the measurements by which we are judged emerge not from our own situation – what the priorities are and what is realistic in our context – but from internationally imposed standards and bench-marks."<sup>31</sup> The path for change, therefore, seems to pass by some clear signposts: *ownership and leadership; peacebuilding and state-building goals; peer-learning; and contextual approach* (which is conducive to "do no harm"), as stated in the group's website.

<b>PSGs</b>	Inclusive Politics Security Justice Economic Foundations Revenue and Services
<b>FOCUS</b>	Fragility Assessment One Vision one plan Compact Use PSG to monitor Support political dialogue
<b>TRUST</b>	Transparency of Aid Risk Sharing Use and strengthen country systems Strengthen Capacity Timely and predictable aid

Figure 1: The New Deal Instruments

Thus, the ToC proposed here aims only to systematize the agreed upon priorities in the g7+'s agenda for change and to highlight the pathways to these changes, as per the group's own narratives. This is a simplified version, to serve as a basis for possible further discussion by the group.

#### BOX 1: ToC narrative - telling the story as if...

The leadership of the g7+ in the promotion of country-led and country-owned statebuilding and peacebuilding initiatives effectively contributes to reforming the international agenda on fragility, changing the way donors relate to conflict-affected countries and increasing resilience and inclusiveness at the local, national and international levels. The g7+'s peer-learning and solidarity enhance chances for continuing global and national engagement.

<sup>30</sup> Dili Declaration (2010), p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> g7+ (2016d). *Strength in fragility: "We are writing our own history"* – The emergence of the g7+ group from our own perspective. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/resources/strength-in-fragility-we-are-writing-our-own-history/>>, p. 8.

Table 3: ToC

<b>CONCERNS (the situation now)</b>	<b>CHANGE (how to impact on it...)</b>	<b>GOALS (to achieve...)</b>
Inappropriate, donor-led solutions	Peer-learning and knowledge-sharing lead to more appropriate local and national solutions and voice at the international tables with the possibility to gain space for other solutions.	Country-owned and country-led solutions
Unrealistic expectations	Contextual understanding through Fragility Assessments and FOCUS leads to a focus on resilience instead of one-size-fits-all solutions.	Change of narrative on fragility
Low risk tolerance	Face-to-face meetings, public diplomacy, lobbying and advocacy help changing procedures in donor organizations.	Increased tolerance to risk
Donor fragmentation – too many frameworks	New Deal promotes mutual accountability and alignment with country's priorities.	Increased alignment with national plans and harmonization of procedures
Lack of donor support	Face-to-face meetings, public diplomacy, lobbying and advocacy help increasing international support. F2F offers internal support.	Change in international agenda on fragility
Conflict and fragility	New Deal, PSGs, F2F and knowledge-sharing all serve to increase resilience and chances of peace. Face-to-face meetings, public diplomacy, lobbying and advocacy allows time and space for these to have buy-in.	Peace and resilience
Weakened institutions	New Deal, PSGs, F2F and knowledge-sharing all serve to increase resilience and chances of peace. Face-to-face meetings, public diplomacy, lobbying and advocacy allows time and space for these to have buy-in.	Strong institutions

In the ToC above, there is a mix of **value-led lobbying and evidence-based advocacy**.<sup>32</sup> The lobbying practiced by the g7+ is based on the values of ownership, mutual accountability, leadership, solidarity and inclusiveness, as richly represented in the narratives about the group's foundation and which offer the basis for the image transmitted globally. The group's advocacy, in its turn, has been mostly based on knowledge-sharing regarding conflict and governance, as exemplified by the initiative on natural resources<sup>33</sup> and the tools that have been the hallmarks of the g7+'s approaches to fragility: PSGs, FOCUS and TRUST, which compose the New Deal (Figure 1).

In pursuit of these changes, the g7+ seems to have been mostly **actor-centred**: be it individuals (**champions**) or organizations, the group has had specific targets for its lobbying and advocacy. Champions like the former Timorese minister Emilia Pires and externals at the World Bank, UNDP and OECD have offered critical support and points of cohesion in **times of political momentum**. As we will see, this has important benefits but also limitations.

Through these actors in the **international stage**, we can say the g7+ has sought *attitudinal changes* (the way donors engage), *discursive commitments* (pledges of effectiveness and political support), *procedural changes* (bureaucratic adjustments, like those undergone at Multilateral Development Banks, MDBs) and *specific policy contents* (SDG16 being central). The terminology is less important than the frame itself, hence the ToC above. **Internally**, the g7+ has faced challenges that are not only local or national, but global: conflict, fragility and weakened institutions have defied many approaches; they are among the toughest obstacles on the way of global priorities such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).<sup>34</sup> Not coincidentally, internal challenges of **implementation** are those that require the use of the complete set of tools at the g7+'s disposal.

We will analyse how the g7+ has effected changes in these dimensions of policy through the notion of **contributions** rather than attributions.

<sup>32</sup> Jones (2011), p. 2.

<sup>33</sup> Martins, N., Leigh, C., Stewart, J., Andersson, D. (2014). Natural Resources in g7+ Countries. g7+ Secretariat. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/resources/natural-resource-management-publication-2015/>>.

<sup>34</sup> g7+ (2016d).



### Attribution vs. contribution

"How does one attribute impacts to an intervention? In a results-based approach, the attribution of change to a series of resources-actions-products can be relatively easy to identify...Nevertheless, many other external elements exist when one observes a situational change or the indirect benefits of an intervention (in general, associated to big changes that are highly aggregated in a sector, as in poverty reduction or peace building). The notion of a 'gap of attribution' is used to explain this space in which several elements, besides the intervention itself conducted via a project or program, act to effect a certain indirect impact; at this level the relationship between actions and benefits is not direct or exact and for this reason one cannot attribute these uniquely to a program or project. It follows that, beyond the 'gap of attribution', it is all about identifying possible contributions to the indirect benefits which defines the orientation for peacebuilding projects, for instance....The idea of contribution invokes a situation in which one cannot assume that the benefit which is obtained (for instance, decreasing violence levels, improvement in terms of living together or poverty reduction) results directly from a certain intervention, but one can establish that the latter, alongside with many others, has provided contributions to a certain result."<sup>35</sup>

There is also a rich aspect of **storytelling** that has been a hallmark of g7+'s engagements<sup>36</sup> and which this review attempts to place at the core of its methodology as well, relying not only on narratives for composing this which seems to constitute the g7+'s agenda for change, but also bringing excerpts of members' talks from different settings to be coupled with more quantitative or technical analysis. This will come up more clearly in the **Interlude** sections, which are embedded in the report, showcasing clear quantitative or technical aspects of g7+'s policy influence, such as changes in the language of certain reports along inputs provided by the group (mentions of keywords and so on), accompanied by quotes from the interviews conducted for this review. Moreover, the *Interludes* aim to offer enough context for each part of the analysis, so that the report is a narrative or a story itself that is measured against its own parameters and standards for the purposes of this report.

<sup>35</sup> GTZ (2006). *Prácticas sensibles a los conflictos y la paz: Contribuciones conceptuales y ejemplos de aplicación*, pp, 19-21. Our translation.

<sup>36</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2017)

## INTERLUDE 1

### The g7+'s role in the fragile states agenda

"It's key, the idea of civil servants and politicians who are hybrid in their background and who understand our thinking, but at the same time also are firmly anchored on their own local realities."<sup>37</sup>

"Most of these countries have been dependent on aid or at the mercy of the donors. In the international discourse, they were kind of passive in conversation, and were always facing the donor's confidence...that was one of the reasons the conversations were always, donor-driven, they would always be pursuing their own agenda ."<sup>38</sup>

"That's the notion, the starting point of the g7+, we simply started by saying that donor's assistance to these countries has not been effective. That is the flag and it is evidence-based."<sup>39</sup>

"I think the idea of the g7+ was an excellent one, it's exactly what was missing in the scene. We had donors, international partners, coming together and talking about how you do peacebuilding and statebuilding in conflict affected countries and it was a very one-way conversation. I always thought and I actually continue to think that having what would you call 'the client', ...being key parts of the conversation on how you need to do better peacebuilding and statebuilding in countries emerging from crisis was and remains a critical element to improve the way these countries are supported and are able to transition out of fragility."<sup>40</sup>

"We were a bunch of countries saying 'we are fragile' and that was a different word because countries had not owned a term that was seen as negative, and I think that was one of the first things that we did was say 'look, yes, this is who we are and we own this'... We are suffering and let's move on, how can we solve our problems and go on so we are no longer fragile."<sup>41</sup>

"The countries affected by conflict should have a voice, a strong voice when advocating for the right assistance they should get, in the right platforms. We are not alone. We as one of the countries affected by conflict, now it is almost 40 years having internal conflict, we wanted to join some other like-minded, countries in similar situation, so that we have a stronger voice."<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Christian Lotz.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with Habib Mayar.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with Helder da Costa.

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Donata Garrasi.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with H.E. Muhammad Mustafa Mastoor.

1st High Level Forum  
**Rome, 2003**

2nd High Level Forum  
**Paris, 2005**

3rd High Level Forum  
**Accra, 2008**

4th High Level Forum  
**Busan, 2011**



Figure 1: Flow of changes in the language of the aid effectiveness debate (our elaboration)

After Busan, the dialogue on statebuilding and peacebuilding took different paths. The g7+ continues to act on its own, aiming at consolidating its membership, advocacy messages and implementation of the New Deal. It also remains engaged in the International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (IDPS) of which g7+ member state Sierra Leone is co-chair since 2018, and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPDEC). In addition, the g7+ has signed MoUs with diverse actors in recent years and participated in different fora, as the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings, Global Summit on Finance for Development, the High Level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, and others. After the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, therefore, there have been diverse engagements. The flow above shows the beginning of some these engagements up until 2011. The quotes before the flow reflect on what was expected from the g7+ at its foundation amid the aid effectiveness debate. This review looks at what engagements have been developed since then and with what prospects. Below, a list of recent publications and a chronology of events since 2015.

#### BOX 2: g7+'s partners



Figure 2: MoUs (our elaboration)




Figure 3: Key g7+'s or related recent publications (our elaboration)

# Chronology 2015-present

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<p>Participation in the Bangui National Forum</p> <p>Side Event at 3rd Global Summit on Financing for Development</p> <p>Side event at the UN General Assembly</p> <p>g7+ technical meeting in Nairobi (F2F Cooperation Matrix)</p>	<p>4<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting in Kabul</p> <p>5<sup>th</sup> Global Meeting of the IDPS (Stockholm Declaration)</p>	<p>Missions to São Tomé and Príncipe and Union of Comoros</p> <p>Participation in World Bank Spring Meeting</p> <p>High Level Side Event on WB and IMF Spring Meeting</p> <p>Global Conference on SDG for fragile and conflict-affected states</p> <p>High Level Side Events at the UN General Assembly</p> <p>Opening of Lisbon Hub</p> <p>Technical Meeting to discuss SDG monitoring</p> <p>g7+ WTO Accession Group</p> <p>High Level Roundtable discussion on Managing UN Transitions</p>	<p>Delegation at the Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development</p> <p>High Level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace</p> <p>High Level Side Event at the UN General Assembly</p> <p>Participation at the High Level Roundtable on Security Sector Reform and Sustaining Peace</p> <p>Public Forum on “Trade for Peace” organized by the Secretariat and WTO</p> <p>g7+ Technical Meeting in Lisbon (Action Plan for F2F Cooperation for the year 2019)</p> <p>Ratification of g7+ Charter by Afghanistan</p>	<p>g7+ Justice Ministerial Meeting in the Hague</p> <p>International Conference on Natural Resources for Resilience and Development</p> <p>5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting in Lisbon</p> <p>High Level Political Forum Side Event on SDG 16 in Conflict-Affected Situation: Ambition vs Reality</p>

Figure 4: Chronology of g7+ mains events since 2015 (our elaboration).



### 3. Past: Taking stock of expectations

In the spirit of making the most of previous efforts at stocktaking, it makes sense to start by looking at what others who aimed to understand the contributions of the g7+ (including members) considered were promising and promised paths, potential turning points or dead paths. We rely on the analyses that were produced by the group or that come from official institutional assessments of g7+ partners. We list very specific points that were raised in reports, speeches and publications, especially the 2016 review. We highlight 'promises' of the international agenda, turning points and dead paths that at some point were considered '**events to observe**', because these indicate expectations about the political national or international scene that would somehow affect the g7+. That way, it is possible to have a picture of what kind of role the g7+ was expected to have in these recent events and pathways and how much of these **expectations** were met. We group these elements under different headings that came up as **key transversal topics** that will guide the in-depth analyses of specific achievements and limitations in the following chapters.

It is important to notice that this exercise 1) does not intend to cover all member countries; it focuses on key, more verifiable items and events that have come up publicly; and 2) it does not look at previous *recommendations*, because it is understood these have not necessarily been based on processes that were already in motion, nor were considered of interest by key actors.

## Recent mapped expectations about the g7+

### VOICE AND NARRATIVE

“As far as priorities are concerned, through the g7+ countries affected by conflict and fragility now have a **recognised forum** that will continue to push for change and support each other until all of our members have become **resilient**.”<sup>43</sup>

“In the next few years, we hope to see some of our members **graduate** from fragility – a number of members are on track to do so.”<sup>44</sup>

“We at the g7+ Secretariat will continue with our **focus on the people** of our countries whom we serve while seeking to enhance a deeper and more meaningful understanding with our partners.”<sup>45</sup>

For the g7+, there has always been clear value in just being together in the same platform, and the priority is using it to have a say on how ‘fragile states’ are viewed in the international stage. It seems clear that the motto “**Nothing about us without us**”<sup>46</sup> was never just about aid effectiveness but about elbowing through for space and visibility. Having a voice has been both a constant and a long-term expectation.<sup>47</sup>

The focus on the realities of member countries, while engaging internationally, requires short- to mid-term planning for some change on the ground, but at the same time presents the most significant long-term challenge of turning around extremely complex situations. The g7+ was always unique in terms of expressing the wish for members to graduate out of the very features that mark their membership in the group.<sup>48</sup>

### Dilemmas:

- short- / long-term expectations: energy is limited. Both in the national and international scenarios, short-term achievements cost much energy and often might take stamina out of long-term expectations but are a definitional part of the group and also serve to mobilize long-term engagements.
- advocacy for change in narrative / change on the ground through implementation: related to the above, advocacy benefits from change within member

<sup>43</sup> g7+ (2016d), p. 58.

<sup>44</sup> g7+ (2016d), p. 58.

<sup>45</sup> Costa, H. (2012), p. 101.

<sup>46</sup> g7+ (2016d).

<sup>47</sup> All interviewees, without exception, mentioned the relevance of the g7+ in that regard.

<sup>48</sup> Interview with Habib Mayar.

countries which can be showcased; otherwise, advocacy may have little effect.<sup>49</sup> However, implementation demands political will, attention and resources, which are limited, besides facing obvious major challenges in reality, and the costs of this type of engagement impact on the possibility of advocacy.

## RESOURCE FLOWS AND MODALITIES

"...limited difference in investment patterns across New Deal participants, the wider group of fragile states in the OECD's fragile states list, and the total group of developing countries. Differences are within the range of 1-2 percent in core areas of politics, security, justice and developing core state functions and country systems, meaning that **aid flows** remain largely insensitive to the specific priorities of g7+ countries. Allocations to **politics and security** even appear to be stagnant or declining."<sup>50</sup>

"**tolerance for risk** of using country systems appeared to be level or declining."<sup>51</sup>

"Although many countries have committed more aid to fragile states in the SDG era, the allocations may be increasingly driven toward **geopolitical priorities**."<sup>52</sup>

"...**humanitarian trends** [of insufficient funding and funding for migration issues in Europe] are likely to result in short- and long-term financial short-falls in at least some g7+ and other fragile countries"<sup>53</sup>

"...the present global financial crisis is encroaching on aid budgets with greater scrutiny and less appetite for risk. A number of donor countries have also seen their aid departments folded back into foreign affairs ministries. This increases the role that **foreign policy interests** play in aid – although of course, these interests have always been there."<sup>54</sup>

The g7+ was founded amid debates on aid effectiveness in IDPS, so that concerns that were on the table from the beginning aimed mainly at how resources were committed and applied. The g7+ has always pushed for the use of country systems, harmonization among donors, alignment of aid with national priorities and the adoption of **country-owned and country-led** solutions. The unpredictability of these flows, lack of long-term engagement, low tolerance to risk and prioritization of donors' interests have always been at the core of the group's agenda for change. On

<sup>49</sup> Interviews with Siafa Hage, Anne-Lise Klausen and Peter van Sluijs.

<sup>50</sup> Hearn, S. (2016), pp. 31-32.

<sup>51</sup> International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2014) New Deal Monitoring Report. Available at [https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer\\_public/bd/e3/bde37bb3-abd0-4faa-9a85-c4eea438a32b/ndmr14.pdf](https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/bd/e3/bde37bb3-abd0-4faa-9a85-c4eea438a32b/ndmr14.pdf).

<sup>52</sup> Hearn, S. (2016), p.52.

<sup>53</sup> Hearn, S. (2016), p.53.

<sup>54</sup> g7+ (2016d), p. 57.

the one hand, fragile states benefit from mobilizing concerns that are at the forefront of donors' interests – climate change and migration, for instance, are among the key concerns of the European Union and European countries.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, however, any such alignments have often meant that fragile states' own priorities, like peace and security, are sidelined. Moreover, recent trends have raised concerns about financing for least developed countries.<sup>56</sup> This has been compounded by the fact that even in this group, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is not generally going to those most in need (more ahead).<sup>57</sup> The g7+ has lobbied for predictable flows towards fragile states and aid modalities that make use of country systems. There is an enormous potential for investment that comes along with the SDGs that can perhaps be tapped by fragile states. Much is being discussed about where the needed investment will come from, but there is also a clear opportunity in aligning with the 2030 Agenda: *"Public policies that are firmly and consistently formulated to achieve sustainable development can realign incentives and alter market perceptions of risk"*.<sup>58</sup>

## Dilemmas:

- Fashionable themes / established priorities: focusing on trendy topics such as international migration might help attract important resources but can also have detrimental effects to g7+ countries' own priorities and attract a kind of undesired attention, carried with stigma (internally displaced persons – IDPs – being a key priority for the group, however. More ahead).
- Tapping into SDGs resources / developing M&E capacity: this is a dilemma of sorts to the extent that in many ways addressing the urgent financing need of the SDGs in terms of implementation might lead away from long-term concerns with capacity-building in statistical offices, for instance, which has been a priority of the g7+. <sup>59</sup>

<sup>55</sup> OECD (2018b). Development Co-operation report 2018 – Joining forces to leave no one behind. Available at <<https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-co-operation-report-2018/7721.htm>>.

<sup>56</sup> OECD (2018b).

<sup>57</sup> OECD (2018b).

<sup>58</sup> United Nations Secretary-General (2018). The Secretary-General's strategy for financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2018-2021). Available at <[https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SG-Financing-Strategy\\_Sep2018.pdf](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SG-Financing-Strategy_Sep2018.pdf)>, p. 3.

<sup>59</sup> An issue raised after conversation with Anne-Lise Klausen about World Bank's support to the g7+ around 2016 to monitor the SDGs (more ahead).

## SDG16 – 2030 AGENDA AND THE UN

“the launch of the SDGs offers an opportunity to **align the SDGs, PSGs** and national plans and to instigate national dialogues about priorities that can be enshrined in compacts.”<sup>60</sup>

“With the adoption of a **specific goal on peace**, the topic will remain prominent throughout the life of the next global development agenda.”<sup>61</sup>

“For the g7+, the priority will be to promote and support the **country level implementation** of the SDGs....”<sup>62</sup>

“...I am particularly happy to announce that the g7+ will facilitate the ownership and leadership of the member countries in implementing and monitoring of this agenda (2030). In this regard, the g7+ will establish a **monitoring mechanism** after consulting with the member countries to ensure that our countries are not under-reported.”<sup>63</sup>

“We the g7+ have planned to lead the implementation and monitoring of the progress on SDG.”<sup>64</sup>

The PSGs have been central to the g7+ in advancing globally the thinking that there can be no development without peace and there can be no peace without development.<sup>65</sup> This kind of undissociated view on peacebuilding and statebuilding was lacking in the international peace and development agenda, and for that the arrival of the PSGs was lauded.<sup>66</sup> A more holistic view on these issues is also the message in the 2030 Agenda: “**integrated and indivisible**”.<sup>67</sup> The Resolution adopted in 2015 says “[s]ustainable development cannot be realized without peace and security; and peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development.”<sup>68</sup> In that and many other ways, the SDGs and the PSGs are naturally not only compatible but well aligned. For a while, the g7+ was a strong voice pushing for SDG16 on

<sup>60</sup> Hearn, S. (2016), p. 47.

<sup>61</sup> Costa, H. and Hage, S. (2013), p. 2.

<sup>62</sup> g7+ (2016b). Newsletter, March. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/project/march-2016-g7-newsletter/>>, p.1.

<sup>63</sup> g7+ (2015). Newsletter, October. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/project/october-2015-g7-newsletter/>>, p.1.

<sup>64</sup> UNGA 2015 Side Event, H.E.Kaifala Marah, then chair of the g7+, at g7+ (2015). Newsletter, October, p. 2.

<sup>65</sup> g7+ (2016d); see also International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011). A Political Strategy to Secure International Acceptance of the PSGs. Meeting of the Steering Group. Nairobi, IDPS.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with Habib Mayar; interview with Helder da Costa.

<sup>67</sup> United Nations General Assembly (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015. [without reference to a Main Committee (A/70/L.1)] 70/1. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Available at <[https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A\\_RES\\_70\\_1\\_E.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf)>, p. 6.

<sup>68</sup> United Nations General Assembly (2015), p. 9.

peaceful, just and inclusive societies; now the challenges involve navigating the **universality** of the agenda, taking stock of recent changes on how peace is defined and making good use of the momentum without losing sight of the key priorities of the group.

## Dilemmas:

- New Deal / SDGs: this is in no way an opposition, but there is a dilemma in terms of energy and resources here as well when it comes to what will be projected globally, which impacts on how the g7+ shapes its strategies and priorities.<sup>69</sup> “Who will monitor and evaluate”, “with what capacity” and “what indicators will be monitored” are questions that might not necessarily put New Deal instruments and SDGs into alignment.
- Leadership on SDG16 / issues of capacity: after successfully pushing for SDG16 (more ahead), there is the issue of how much the g7+ wants to lead on this agenda. Enjoying the momentum might help with visibility and political capital,<sup>70</sup> but it can demand high capacity and put considerable strain especially on the secretariat.
- Focus on SDG16 / universality of the agenda: concerns with justice, security and institutions have been key for the g7+, which might make it a logical decision to focus on SDG16 in the 2030 Agenda, especially after the effort to get it approved. However, many actors see the universality of the agenda as something that cannot be risked for the sake of specific goals.<sup>71</sup>
- Considering concerns with both monitoring and implementation, all the above leads also to questions about perceptions of success. The 2030 Agenda, as a universal and integrated one, has 232 indicators.<sup>72</sup> The g7+ is currently looking into focusing on 20 priority indicators (more ahead). Will that be perceived as an indication of realistic decision-making and priority-taking or as lack of capacity and potential problem for the indivisibility of the agenda?

<sup>69</sup> Interview with Anne-Lise Klausen; interview with Gary Milante.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with Gary Milante; interview with Siafa Hage.

<sup>71</sup> Pointed out by Sarah Cliffe (interview).

<sup>72</sup> See UNGA. “Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, A/RES/71/313.

## MDBs' FRAMEWORKS

WB - "...by 2018, one half of the world is expected to be fragile and by 2030, it is predictable that two out of every three people will live in fragility. This is not a rich-poor problem. A decade ago, the vast majority of fragile states were low income countries but today, half of all fragile states are middle income countries. The World Bank and the African Development Bank have recognized the **global trend towards greater fragility**; they are currently restructuring their organizations to respond appropriately."<sup>73</sup>

WB - "The record \$75 billion commitment under the International Development Association's (IDA) 18th replenishment marks a strategic shift, **making reducing the risk of fragility and conflict a top development priority**. This will enable the WBG to **double resources** for countries affected by FCV to more than \$14 billion. New financing mechanisms include \$2 billion to support refugees and host communities, \$2.5 billion to spur private enterprise, as well as support for countries to mitigate the risk of falling into fragility."<sup>74</sup>

WB - "To deliver, the Bank is deepening its knowledge and expanding its '**toolkit**' for FCV. This includes: Risk and Resilience Assessments...; Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments..."<sup>75</sup>

"ADB will adopt differentiated business processes for FCAS operations and develop a more appropriate **risk framework**. Responding to its commitments under the New Deal, ADB will identify special arrangements and an associated risk framework to address capacity gaps and other challenges facing FCAS DMCs."<sup>76</sup>

"ADB will develop an institutional strengthening framework for FCAS DMCs. This framework will aim to help better identify the **capacity needs** of FCAS countries and design long-term support to build their institutions."<sup>77</sup>

"ADB will consider establishing a pool facility to finance institutional capacity building in FCAS DMCs. Peacebuilding and statebuilding, which are viewed through the international consensus on the New Deal as basic to achieving development in FCAS, require dedicated resources over a sustained period of time."<sup>78</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Costa, H. and Hage, S. (2013), p. 1.

<sup>74</sup> World Bank. Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence. Available at <<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview>>.

<sup>75</sup> World Bank. Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview>.

<sup>76</sup> Asian Development Bank (2013). Operational plan for enhancing ADB's effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Available at < <https://www.adb.org/documents/operational-plan-enhancing-adb-effectiveness-fragile-and-conflict-affected-situations>>, p. vii.

<sup>77</sup> Asian Development Bank (2013), p. vii.

<sup>78</sup> Asian Development Bank (2013), p. 19.



AfDB - “No country is immune to fragility. We have learned that engaging in fragile situations is risky, but the cost of not engaging in such situations is much higher. Similarly, there is no prescribed blueprint of solutions and no toolkit. Innovations and flexibility in our responses are critical.”<sup>79</sup>

AfDB - “Country Strategy Papers will be grounded in fragility assessments and strategic choices will need to be geared to effectively addressing the key drivers of fragility by identifying key entry points for building resilience.”<sup>80</sup>

IMF – “Technical assistance should be flexible, and reflect countries’ needs and changing circumstances.”<sup>81</sup>

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have decisively incorporated fragility among its core agendas in the past ten years. This has been translated into strategic documents and units, operational changes, new tools and more funding (more ahead). In the case of the World Bank, for instance, funding to fragile states has doubled:<sup>82</sup> “It will prove impossible to achieve the World Bank Group’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity unless fragility, conflict, and violence are tackled.”<sup>83</sup> AfDB has a Transition Support Department which accounts for engagement with fragile states and has been conducting Country Resilience and Fragility Assessments (CRFA), which have similar clusters as the PSGs;<sup>84</sup> and the ADB has been conducting what it has called Fragility Assessments.

## **Dilemmas:**

- Energy / results: engagement with MDBs that can generate change usually demands much energy for frequent meetings and consultations, but not always pay back in terms of recognition. Many of the key documents on fragile states produced by MDBs in the context above seem inspired by g7+ initiatives, for instance, but the group or its instruments, like the New Deal, are not so often mentioned (see Interlude 2).

<sup>79</sup> African Development Bank (2015). Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa. Available at <<https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/addressing-fragility-and-building-resilience-in-africa-the-afdb-group-strategy-2014-2019-48812/>>, p. 4.

<sup>80</sup> African Development Bank (2015), p., p.

<sup>81</sup> Baer, Katherine; Gupta, Sanjeev; Pessoa, Mario (2017). Building Fiscal Institutions in Fragile States. IMFBlog. Available at <<https://blogs.imf.org/2017/08/09/building-fiscal-institutions-in-fragile-states/#more-20944>>.

<sup>82</sup> World Bank. Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence, p. 2.

<sup>83</sup> World Bank. Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence, p. 2.

<sup>84</sup> See <https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/fragility-resilience/about-the-facility/>.

- Old / new frameworks: reforming the narrative and operations of MDBs has involved advocating to have mechanisms and procedures changed while the g7+ also develops its own. As member countries navigate these frameworks, it can be easier to follow the old-refurbished templates, where most of the money lies, instead of investing in g7+'s mechanisms.

## THE NEW DEAL

"Development Partners remain largely off-track in delivering on the TRUST principles. While there are some islands of good practice, there have not yet been tremendous changes in **donor behaviour**. But we must remember this is a long-term endeavour. We are talking about changing narratives and mind-sets that have been in place within the development industry for decades. Changing these will require time, and it will also require greater political commitment on the part of donors."<sup>85</sup>

"g7+ will strengthen efforts to **implement** the New Deal at the **country level**. The FOCUS commitments, which are largely those to be implemented by g7+ countries, have met with varied performance...We will support our members to improve on these results so that the vision of the New Deal can be realised in every country in a fragile situation."<sup>86</sup>

"...after the launch of the New Deal, there was a lot of energy around it. There was equal inspiration on the sides of donors and g7+ countries. But as time passed by, we see progress only on the **technical** aspect of the New Deal as is found by its first Monitoring Report in 2014 (IDPS, 2014). In other words, it seems to be falling out of fashion, whereas it has a pioneering role in the international system and policies related to conflict and fragility."<sup>87</sup>

The New Deal is composed of principles for engagement in fragile states and of ways of putting these into practice to implement the vision of the group of helping countries move out of fragility into resilience. The Fragility Assessments and compacts are part of that implementation plan and require self-assessment, inclusive dialogue and politics. The latter would lead the way to the former, that is, politics would guide the technical part of the exercise. However, it has been difficult to get buy-in for implementing the New Deal at the country level. This is intrinsically connected with the fact that there have not been as much change in donor behavior as expected by the countries of the g7+. Previous external analysis suggested that

<sup>85</sup> g7+ (2016d), p. 56.

<sup>86</sup> g7+ (2016d), p. 57.

<sup>87</sup> Mayar, Habib Ur Rehman (2014). The Journey Towards Resilience Continues: g7+ Priorities to Confront Ebola, Implement the New Deal and Influence the Post-2015 Agenda. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 9:3, p. 3.

“[i]nstead of a paradigm shift, implementation of the New Deal had become largely a technical check list.”<sup>88</sup> At the same time, given the nature of the challenges faced, implementation will always present difficulties.

## Dilemmas:

- Principles / practices: the politics and the principles of the PSGs and TRUST might be some of the most important actual and potential contributions of the g7+ to the development agenda. However, there is pressure for ways of putting these into practice and there are expectations among countries as well that these can help exiting fragility and conflict by improving aid effectiveness. Faced with such expectations and not enough resources, the g7+ deals with the back and forth of advocacy and implementation: implementation cases are needed to back up advocacy and such cases are hardly possible without strong work behind the scenes as well. The paces do not easily match.
- National buy-in / international support: the national buy-in required by the New Deal is firmly based on the notions of country-owned and country-led solutions. These take time, require dialogue and political engagement. From the moment the New Deal was internationally approved, however, this pace has been hard to keep. International support comes with waves of experts, templates and deadlines. On the other hand, without international support, the aid effectiveness agenda cannot be successful.

### F2F COOPERATION AND PEER-LEARNING

*“fragile-to-fragile cooperation* initiatives are likely to enjoy uptake over time because actors have relevant **experience and empathy** for the difficulties of managing assessment and reform in fragile situations.”<sup>89</sup>

“We also hope to establish international **exchanges between our ministries**. For decades we have benefited from technical assistance from donors to countries in a fragile situation, but we see great potential for peer learning from other states also.”<sup>90</sup>

“We will continue to build F2F cooperation, with a particular focus on **peace and reconciliation, natural resource management and public financial management**. These have been identified as critical entry points where we can learn from each other also.”<sup>91</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Phillips, Ann L. (2018). The New Deal has failed. What must be done?. Impulse 07-08/2016. FriEnt. Available at <https://www.frient.de/news/details/news/the-new-deal-has-failed-what-must-be-done/>

<sup>89</sup> Hearn, S. (2016), p. 47.

<sup>90</sup> g7+ (2016d), p. 58.

<sup>91</sup> g7+ (2016d), p. 58.

Fragile to Fragile cooperation (F2F) seems to have been welcome in the cooperation stage. Cases of F2F, although still few, have been studied and published by major donors,<sup>92</sup> and perhaps most important, g7+ member countries have been showing considerable interest in the initiative.<sup>93</sup> It has also been shown that aid effectiveness is not about the volume as much as it is about the principles and processes of engagement.<sup>94</sup> Yet funding is an obstacle and not many countries apart Timor-Leste have come forward.

## Dilemmas:

- F2F / South-South Cooperation: there is much to be said about the potential alignments between both modalities, but the g7+ has also made a point to differentiate these at least to the extent that fragile states are part of a diverse group. Even among fragile states, the differences are of course considerable,<sup>95</sup> so conversation under one term might pose important challenges, and political background are quite diverse. Nevertheless, the similarities in principles are strong and the history of cooperation in the South can provide an important platform.
- Solidarity / results: there is a central debate around what the priorities in the F2F agenda can and should be. Solidarity is a crucial word in the g7+ discourses and much of what has been said about F2F has focused on that aspect of the modality. Just as with the advocacy/implementation dilemma, however, principled discussion might soon be forced to offer more space to results on the ground, as the initiative takes hold and gain broader international support.

---

It is against the background of these expectations and dilemmas that, in the following, this review contrasts the specific fronts of influence and action that the g7+ has taken up especially in recent years.

---

<sup>92</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017).

<sup>93</sup> Interview with Cyriaque Miburo; interview with Antonio Co.

<sup>94</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu interview, Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2019).

<sup>95</sup> Interview with H.E. Muhammad Mustafa Mastoor.

## INTERLUDE 2

g7+'s  
influence?




Figure 5: Overview - relevance of fragility-related themes (our elaboration<sup>96</sup>).

<sup>96</sup> Data from OECD (2018a).

Table 4: Key mentions of g7+'s work (our elaboration)

Organization	Publication	Year	Issues of interest	Relevant Mentions
United States Institute of Peace	Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach	2019	Three recommendations made by the report to the US government: 1. Adopt a Shared Framework for Strategic Prevention 2. Establish a Strategic Prevention Initiative 3. Launch a Partnership Development Fund	Acknowledgment of g7+ and specific mention of the New Deal
World Bank Group	Maximizing the Impact of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations the World Bank Group in Fragility and Conflict-Affected Situations	2018	Risk based approach Forced Displacement Humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus Innovative financing Climate change and fragility	Signing of MoU with g7+ in 2016  Partnership with g7+ for knowledge sharing
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the International Monetary Fund	The IMF and Fragile States: Evaluation Report 2018	2018	Scale of IMF engagement with fragile states IMF's impact on fragile states Evaluation of IMF's tailoring to fragile contexts	9 out of the 16 case study countries and 4 out of the 8 additional focus countries of the report are g7+  g7+ and New Deal mentioned as indicative of the need to improve the current ways of working in fragile contexts
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) / The World Bank	Pathways for Peace Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict	2018	Prevention and Sustaining Peace Arenas of contestation (governance, natural resources, service delivery, security and justice) Country approaches to preventing violent conflict	New Deal highlighted alongside the Paris Declaration and the Accra Action Agenda as international commitments which recognized the role of development aid in peacebuilding  New Deal as providing a framework for connecting aid from both development and security actors to national processes of prioritization
United Nations	The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2018	2018	Overview of progress made on SDG Highlights interlinked nature of SDG Relevance of data in accomplishing the 2030 Agenda SDG 6 - Water and sanitation for all SDG 7 - Affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy	Points to conflict as an obstacle in achieving SDGs, describes in more detail its implication regarding access to water and sanitation

Organization	Publication	Year	Issues of interest	Relevant Mentions
IBRD and International Development Association (IDA)/ World Bank Group	IDA 17 Retrospective: Maximizing Development Impact	2018	<p>Fragile and conflict-affected states among IDA's special themes</p> <p>Fragility as intertwined with global dynamics such as migratory and demographic pressures, illicit flows of drugs and arms, and climatic and environmental stresses</p> <p>Among its conclusions regarding approach to fragile and conflict-affected situations: imperative of prevention and the need for the WBG to adopt a stronger risk-based approach</p>	<p>g7+ countries mentioned among the WB's partners in situations of fragility, conflict and violence that are brought together in the IDPS</p> <p>Creation of the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility as a response to request by the g7+ and G20</p> <p>2 out of the 3 countries where the new exceptional allocation regime for "turn-around" situations was introduced are g7+ members (CAR and Guinea-Bissau)</p>
OECD	States of Fragility 2018	2018	<p>More and smarter investment in fragile contexts</p> <p>ODA focus on technical assistance, strengthen capacity for domestic resource mobilization, budget execution, decentralization, and small and medium-enterprise development</p>	<p>New Deal mentioned specifically.</p> <p>Regarding the New Deal:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- foundation for funding decisions regarding priority areas</li> <li>- problematic implementation</li> <li>- persisting relevance</li> </ul>
OECD	Financing for Stability in the Post-2015 Era	2018	<p>Strategic use of ODA by development-financing actors</p> <p>Inadequacy of some development-financing actors' tools in fragile contexts</p>	<p>g7+ and New Deal mentioned specifically, as well as "Aid instruments for peace and statebuilding";</p> <p>PSGs and Climate-Fragility Risks</p>
International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)	Hitting the target, but missing the point? Assessing donor support for inclusive and legitimate politics in fragile societies	2017	<p>Inefficiency on aid</p> <p>Governance in fragile and conflict-affected states</p> <p>Donor's engagement with the country and necessity of political lenses to avoid inefficiency</p> <p>Risk-management</p>	<p>g7+ and New Deal mentioned specifically;</p> <p>Evaluation of New Deal's PSG1;</p> <p>Fragility assessments;</p> <p>Pilot countries (Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste)</p>
IDA/ World Bank Group	IDA 18 Final Report Towards 2030: Investing in Growth, Resilience and Opportunity	2017	<p>Linkage between investments and SDGs</p> <p>As part of the 2030 agenda, focus on building resilience and responding to crises</p> <p>Fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) among IDA's special themes</p> <p>Introduction of a new exceptional regime to mitigate FCV risks</p>	<p>Mention of bilateral work with g7+ as part of the bank's engagement with fragile and conflict-affected contexts</p>
IDA/ World Bank Group	IDA 18 Special Theme: Fragility, Conflict and Violence	2016	<p>New conceptual framework for strategic engagement on Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV)</p> <p>Highlights need for sustained engagement to build legitimate governing institutions and restore citizens' trust in the state</p> <p>Development approach for forced displacement</p>	<p>WB as an active supporter of the New Deal for Fragile States</p> <p>g7+ countries mentioned among the WB's partners in situations of fragility, conflict and violence that are brought together in the IDPS</p>



Organization	Publication	Year	Issues of interest	Relevant Mentions
United Nations Development Programme	UNDP Offer on SDG Implementation in Fragile Situations	2016	<p>Notion of fragility and its relevance</p> <p>Paradigm shift: from MDG to SDG</p> <p>Key principles and implications of SDG for fragile situations</p> <p>UNDP Value Proposition for fragility-affected context</p>	<p>New Deal cited as evidence of progress in the issue of fragility</p> <p>Identifies echo of countries echo the principles applied through the New Deal for engagement in fragile situations in the g7+ countries in many of the principles introduced in the protracted crisis scenario in middle-income</p> <p>Cites as example of the Integration imperative the g7+'s position that how countries choose to prioritize and sequence the adoption of SDGs in their respective national and local development plans must be based on a 'suitability' basis.</p> <p>Strong partnership of UNDP with g7+ strengthened by signing of MoU</p> <p>g7+ as example of supported South-South exchange</p>
United Nations Development Programme	Engaged Societies, responsive states: the social contract in situations of conflict and fragility	2016	Governance practices in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Insufficiency of traditional approaches. National context. Inclusion. State legitimacy.	New Deal mentioned and discussed on the matter of establishing a social contract, as well as when discussing inclusion
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	Mapping Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations in Asia and the Pacific: The ADB Experience	2016	<p>Mapping of the main fragility issues in each of the current ADB FCAS countries and their common weaknesses</p> <p>Country Performance Assessments (CPA) for each ADB FCAS country</p>	g7+ and New Deal mentioned specifically; New Deal endorsement and Dili Declaration cited as evidence of international consensus regarding the prioritizing of fragility
High-Level Panel on Peace Operations/ United Nations	Report of the Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations	2015	<p>Essential shifts for Peace Operations</p> <p>Role of the United Nations System and Peace Operations in Sustaining Peace</p>	<p>Among its conclusion, the need for the United Nations to build a coalition to identify and mobilize innovative approaches and capacities for preventing emerging conflicts. The g7+ is mentioned among those which should participate in said coalition.</p> <p>Mention of PSG as exemplar of the need for setting nationally owned priorities</p>

## 4. Present: g7+'s influence and action

There are central areas the g7+ has attempted to influence in recent years and some other factors that are important to consider in order to analyse this influence. We look both at outbound – resource flows and advocacy – and inbound – New Deal and Fragile-to-Fragile cooperation – influence and action. This analysis takes into account the expectations seen in the previous chapter, that is, the latter also serve here as parameters against which to judge these influence and action, so that in a strong way conclusions are drawn according to the g7+'s priorities and narratives. Moreover, this analysis should set the scene for the exploration of possible opportunities and risks in the next chapter and help make way for recommendations.

### Resource flows and MDBs

It is useful to start with a review of current trends in resource flows to fragile states and with changes in the processes employed by MDBs, both because the g7+ has actively lobbied for some of these changes and because these factors have great impact over member countries' development plans.

“Official development assistance (ODA) matters immensely in fragile contexts. Aid is the only financial flow that directly invests in the foundations for peaceful and stable societies, an investment that invites more inclusive growth and sustainable development. Aid will remain critical, as it will take many years for most fragile contexts to have a diversity of financing options at their disposal, including from private sector. When part of a larger financing strategy, aid can also incentivise and constructively reward progress and results that promote stability.”<sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>97</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 18.



Figure 6: Financial flows to fragile contexts (Source: OECD 2018)

Aid flows to fragile contexts<sup>98</sup> have outstripped ODA to non-fragile contexts.<sup>99</sup> “ODA to fragile contexts has been on the rise since the end of the global financial crisis, growing by 26% in real terms from 2009 to 2016.”<sup>100</sup>




Figure 7: ODA to fragile and non-fragile contexts (Source: OECD, 2018)

<sup>98</sup> To use OECD's terminology for its data.

<sup>99</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 18.

<sup>100</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 116.

Most of this growth, however, is due to humanitarian aid flows: "From 2015 to 2016 alone, humanitarian assistance for all fragile contexts increased by 38%."<sup>101</sup> Humanitarian flows tend to go to contexts of acute crises: "during the 11-year period from 2003 to 2012, Afghanistan and Iraq together accounted for fully 22% of all ODA to contexts then classified as fragile."<sup>102</sup> Among the top 20 recipient countries, besides Afghanistan, only DRC, South Sudan and Somalia are members of the g7+.<sup>103</sup>




Figure 8: Aid by sector in fragile contexts (Source: OECD 2018)

Foreign policy and geopolitical interests have historically marked international engagement with the countries that now compose the g7+. Some of it was always publicly expressed (USAID and DFID, for instance, in their respective 2005 strategic papers spoke of privileging their geographical and thematic areas of concern);<sup>104</sup> for the rest it is necessary to continuously engage in context analysis. One way of grasping those interests is through flows of resources such as aid and through the diagnostics of 'donor orphans' and 'donor darlings' that these generate.

<sup>101</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 117.

<sup>102</sup> OECD (2015), States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions, OECD Publishing *apud* OECD (2018), p. 120.

<sup>103</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 122.

<sup>104</sup> US Agency for International Development (USAID) (2005). Fragile States Strategy; UK Department for International Development (DFID) (2005). Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states.




Figure 9: Aid spending by DAC donor (our elaboration)




Figure 10: ODA and Humanitarian Aid (our elaboration)

Moreover, interests are also divided by themes. In recent years, there is a clear tendency for donor countries to prioritize issues of migration both in discourse and budget. This has been pointed out as a populist moment and regarded as a key feature of the current international agenda, and one that has been taking attention away from other key peace and security concerns.<sup>105</sup> Despite recent discourse on peace, which has moved things a little more towards

<sup>105</sup> Interview with Christian Lotz.

a concern with prevention (more ahead), ODA to prevention is still 2% and only 10% is going to peacebuilding activities.<sup>106</sup>

## BOX 1: ODA and PSGs

"Current OECD analysis using the most recent data finds that nearly half of ODA (48.7%) going to fragile contexts in 2016 was channeled towards the five PSGs [for the five, see figure 19]. The portion of ODA going to PSGs 1, 2 and 3 remains low and has even fallen since the 2015 report. The relative distribution of aid among the five PSGs, however, has remained fairly consistent over time, as has the total amount of ODA directed towards the PSGs in fragile contexts. In addition, the percentage of ODA going to some PSGs is consistently higher in non-fragile contexts than in fragile contexts (figure 8). One reason may be that PSGs 4 and 5 cover many areas of standard development practice around economic growth. Presumably as regards these PSGs, it also is easier to implement more and larger-scale projects where fragility is absent. Nonetheless, it is worth repeating that the politically sensitive and arguably purely peacebuilding aspects of the New Deal that are embodied in PSGs 1, 2 and 3 receive almost the exact same support proportionally in non-fragile and in fragile contexts. This raises important questions regarding how much donors are tailoring their development approaches for the special needs of fragile contexts."<sup>107</sup>

Although the numbers are still positive, recent changes in the UN architecture and in procedures and allocations within OECD, all accompanied by a wave of conservative nationalist governments in donor countries, have made analysts perceive the scenario as a challenging one for fragile states. The mood is generally cautious, to say the least. "The scenario is not good. It hasn't been good since 2015."<sup>108</sup> Some traditional donor countries now have leaders who expressly question the role of ODA, for instance. So far, the kind of lobby practiced by the g7+ seems to contribute to keeping fragile states on the agenda throughout key political moments at the international stage. Any trends can hardly be attributed to the g7+, but the overall perception is that the group has *contributed* to getting fragile states some voice: "the g7+ is a voice for fragile states, an important amplifier for countries whose voice can now reach a broader platform."<sup>109</sup>


<sup>106</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 18.

<sup>107</sup> OECD (2018a), pp. 155-56.

<sup>108</sup> Anonymous.

<sup>109</sup> Interview with Mustakim Waid.

Figure 11: ODA trends to sub-groupings most in need, 2011-2016 (Source: OECD, 2018)<sup>110</sup>



This lobbying seems to have become more patent when looking at the g7+'s historical relation with MDBs, especially the World Bank. By actively engaging in consultations and meetings, some say the g7+ managed to contribute to positive changes in the way the bank allocates resources to fragile states. "I would not attribute it exactly to the g7+, because the conditions were there, people had been thinking about how these countries were different for a while, but the g7+ definitely did the best they could with the resources and capacity they had. They did a good job of keeping attention to this topic [fragility, conflict and violence]."<sup>111</sup> One of the ways this contribution can perhaps be perceived is through IDA17 (2013), entitled "IDA's Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States", when fragile states were largely incorporated into the WB's IDA replenishment exercise. The document stated:

In designing the framework, Management has strived to: (i) build on IDA's implementation experience, including addressing the need to strike a balance between rules and judgment; (ii) better reflect the recent understanding on fragility and conflict, including integrating the work of the g7+ under the New Deal; and (iii) simplify the allocation system while ensuring a meaningful engagement in all countries.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>110</sup> OECD (2018b), p. 235.

<sup>111</sup> Interview with Gary Milante.

<sup>112</sup> World Bank (2013). IDA 17 - IDA's Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, IDA Resource Mobilization Department, Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships, pp. i-ii.



There was, therefore, strong recognition of the role of the g7+ in direct terms. Indirectly, “[a]long with post-conflict and re-engagement countries, the IDA17 propose[d] the category of turnaround states, an addition supposed to increase the orientation of IDA towards poverty reduction by making optimum use of situations of change”.<sup>113</sup> In addition, at the time “IDA17 use[d] the sub-category of turnaround states as a possibility to ‘mitigate [the 3.2] threshold effects’ associated with the definition of fragile states”.<sup>114</sup> Aligned with the movement that started with the 2011 World Development Report (WDR11) on Conflict, Security and Development, IDA17 aimed also at promoting the creation of more responsive and agile operational policies. The g7+ had been closely following and contributing to discussions on IDA17.<sup>115</sup> This seems to be less true of IDA18, however, when debates seem to have continued without so much input of the group. It seems, fragility and conflict had been mainstreamed enough that the g7+'s advocacy was not so instrumental.<sup>116</sup> Nevertheless, the g7+ is mentioned in the document in terms of World Bank's continued bilateral engagement (Table 4).<sup>117</sup>

IDA18 has seen allocations to fragile states double<sup>118</sup> and other changes in formulae, criteria and procedures, such as “the CPR exponent in the PBA formula will be reduced from 4 to 3 to enhance its poverty orientation. This adjustment will particularly benefit FCS as they are generally at the low end of the CPR spectrum”<sup>119</sup> – the formula measures performance and need, and had for long been criticized for leaving those most in need behind.<sup>120</sup> A reduced focus on performance might increase substantially the chances of addressing those most in need.

Overall, it is impossible to *attribute* these changes in MDBs and in financing for development to g7+'s initial influence and action, but those who work(ed) at these institutions or close are of a view that the group's engagement was very valuable: “They played it really smartly there [at the World Bank].”<sup>121</sup> “They are movers.”<sup>122</sup> Among g7+ members, few bring up the subject but those who spontaneously speak about it, say changes in IDA are one of the group's greatest achievements.<sup>123</sup>

<sup>113</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2017), p.105.

<sup>114</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2017), p.106.

<sup>115</sup> Interview with Anne-Lise Klausen.

<sup>116</sup> Interview with Anne-Lise Klausen.

<sup>117</sup> World Bank (2016). IDA 18 – Special Theme: Fragility, Conflict and Violence, IDA Resource Mobilization Department (DFIRM).

<sup>118</sup> World Bank. Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence, p. 2.

<sup>119</sup> World Bank (2017). IDA18 - Additions to IDA Resources: Eighteenth Replenishment Towards 2030: Investing in Growth, Resilience and Opportunity, p. 51. PBA stands for Performance-Based Allocation; CPR stands for Country Performance Rating.

<sup>120</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2017)

<sup>121</sup> Interview with Donata Garrasi.

<sup>122</sup> Interview with Anne-Lise Klausen.

<sup>123</sup> Interview with H.E. Muhammad Mustafa Mastoor.

These changes and trends are extremely relevant and need to be continuously assessed by the g7+ Secretariat. Contributions can also perhaps be better communicated to member countries.

## SDG16 – Negotiations, achievements and costs

The history of the approval of Goal 16 among the SDGs is one that is hard to piece together. We started by gathering the general impressions of informants. Our conclusions here are based on the indirect accounts to which we had access. Any misunderstandings are our own.

*“Those who know the processes, they know it was the collective effort of the g7+. They would certainly give credit to the g7+ above any other”<sup>124</sup>* – Yet, as with any global process, the key is in how much and how often now that the agenda has moved on. First, there seems to be a geographical difference: in Africa, the contribution of the g7+ to get SDG16 approved gets rightly mixed with the contributions of important African leaders as well. Mostly, however, this does not subtract from the role strongly attached to the efforts of the g7+ (of which some African countries are part). Only one informant, working in Africa, reported not having been in touch with anyone who would give credit to the g7+ on SDG16, but says “it doesn’t mean it’s not good work”.<sup>125</sup>

Many informants have pointed out the crucial role the g7+ played in the approval of SDG16. In 2012, a meeting involving government and civil society from the g7+, Pacific island countries and African members of the Portuguese-speaking community, PALOP, discussing the way forward post-2015, revealed a common diagnostics: “We know the well-being of our people depends upon the achievement of outcomes that were not adequately reflected in the MDGs, most notably in the areas of peace and justice and climate change.”<sup>126</sup> The group later had a direct representative in the figure of the former Minister of Finance of Timor-Leste and former chair of the g7+, **Emilia Pires**, as a member of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda (HLP).<sup>127</sup> The co-chair of HLP was H.E. Ms. **Ellen Johnson Sirleaf**, then President of Liberia, a g7+ member country. Having permanent missions in New York was key.<sup>128</sup>

<sup>124</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

<sup>125</sup> Interview with Donata Garrasi.

<sup>126</sup> g7+ (2012). “The Dili Consensus”.

<sup>127</sup> United Nations Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel of eminent persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Available at <<https://www.un.org/sg/en/management/hlppost2015.shtml>>.

<sup>128</sup> Interview with Sarah Cliffe.

*"SDG16 was the most difficult goal of all. It didn't come lightly"*<sup>129</sup> – At the beginning, it seems the Timorese delegation, in the figure of Emilia Pires (considered a strong leader by all informants), were alone.<sup>130</sup> "I felt for them. There was a lot that couldn't be shared, so they felt alone. As co-chairs of the HLP, we were responsible for shepherding the entire process and could not be the champion of a peace/fragility goal. We could not play favorites but we made sure the issue remained on the agenda."<sup>131</sup> Then Timorese ambassador Sofia Borges was also instrumental, pushing for the adoption of a goal on peace in the diplomatic scene to the point of being judged by some as an envoy of the Security Council.<sup>132</sup> She, as Emilia Pires, apparently faced quite personal battles to get the message through to the HLP. The g7+ is said to have held position, refusing to negotiate on a lesser goal.<sup>133</sup> "I think Emilia didn't want to compromise."<sup>134</sup> For some, the battle (and the unwillingness to cede) started back in Monrovia, when after negotiation, it was agreed the discussion on peace would be a pillar in the new post-2015 agenda.<sup>135</sup> So that, when a first draft was circulated in the HLP which did not mention peace, the panel was almost disbanded.<sup>136</sup>

Meanwhile, African representatives had been holding regional discussions which involved the same debate around peace and security. The *Common African Position*,<sup>137</sup> a key document produced by the **African Union** that would later be crucial in supporting the approval of SDG16, was being drafted under a lot of negotiation as well. Nevertheless, when a first draft was submitted to the Head of States, it did not include anything on peace and security,<sup>138</sup> and it seems it was from the Head of States that came the pressure to go back and include peace in the document. There was fear this would not go well with New York, but a point of convergence was found in the similarities with Agenda 2063.<sup>139</sup> Finally, then, pillar five in the *Common African Position* (CAP) covered peace and security.

As CAP was being negotiated, Emilia Pires was pushing behind the scenes in the HLP and H.E. Ms. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was articulating the African support, without which, she could not stand up for SDG16 in the panel.

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Helder da Costa.

<sup>130</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

<sup>131</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

<sup>132</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>133</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>134</sup> Anonymous.

<sup>135</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>136</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>137</sup> African Union (2014). Common Africa Position (CAP) on the Post 2015 Development Agenda.

<sup>138</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>139</sup> African Union (2013). Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. Available at <[https://au.int/en/Agenda2063/popular\\_version](https://au.int/en/Agenda2063/popular_version)>.

*"Without it [African support], there would be no SDG16, because Africa is huge in the G77. Sirleaf was fighting that battle while Pires fought in the HLP"*<sup>140</sup> – At the HLP, Emilia Pires and the g7+ were facing distrust on the part of emerging countries and from the G77+China in general, who feared this was an OECD-driven group articulating the agenda of donors.<sup>141</sup> There were serious concerns about the consequences of including peace in the 2030 Agenda:

	Critical question
<b>Sovereignty</b>	Will they (unduly) infringe on sovereignty?
<b>Linked but separate</b>	Are peace and justice linked to development, but do they need to be kept separate?
<b>Scope</b>	How broad should the approach be?
<b>The power of words</b>	Can they be framed so that all UN member states can agree?
<b>Universality</b>	Are these issues universal or only valid for conflict-affected states?
<b>Enablers or outcomes</b>	Will labelling them as enablers mean they will not be included in the agenda as goals or targets?
<b>Goal or target</b>	Should they be included as a standalone goal or as targets under other goals, or mainstreamed?
<b>Measurement</b>	Is measurement feasible?
<b>Aid flows</b>	Will aid flows shift as a result?

Note: The issues are not listed in order of importance.

Figure 12: Peace, Justice and Governance in The Post-2015 Development (Source: Henk-Jan Brinkman (2013))<sup>142</sup>

After negotiations, it seemed the goal would be approved, yet at one crucial point, then Prime Minister David Cameron of United Kingdom was announcing the end of a meeting without putting the goal on peace on the table. "He was saying it was not a priority".<sup>143</sup> However, H.E. Ms. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf raised the point again then concluded saying "you can end the meeting now."<sup>144</sup>

<sup>140</sup> Interview Siafa Hage.

<sup>141</sup> See, for instance, Ribeiro Pereira 2014 "What's Peace Got To Do With It? Advocating Peace in the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda". Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Perspective - FES New York; Rosenthal 2017 "Assessing the Reform of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture: Progress and Problems, Two Years On". Briefing 47, Future United Nations Development System, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, CUNY Graduate Center; United National General Assembly. A/71/PV.77. Official records of Seventy-first session, 77th plenary meeting. Thursday, 20 April 2017, 10am; Muggah, R. et al (2013): "A promoção da paz no contexto pós-2015: o papel das potências emergentes", Nota Estratégica 7. Igarapé and Safeworld; Mr. Giacomelli da Silva (Brazil) (20 April 2017). Statement at the General Assembly - Seventy-first session, A/71/PV.77; Interview with Brazilian diplomat, anonymous, conducted by colleagues at BPC; Brazil's internal diplomatic mail, confidential. Orientations for World Humanitarian Summit, in Istanbul, 2016. See also Jeremy Allouche and Jeremy Lind, "Beyond the New Deal: Global Collaboration and Peacebuilding", IDS ISSUE 59 • APRIL 2014.

<sup>142</sup> Brinkman, Henk-Jan (2013). Peace, Justice and Governance in The Post-2015 Development Framework. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 8:3.

<sup>143</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

<sup>144</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

*"The Timorese were critical to getting the wording right. But Sirleaf was instrumental with the political will. Pires had also all her technical gravitas. Sirleaf was silently leading the meetings. Pires was the champion"*<sup>145</sup> – By then, the behind the scenes battles fought by Emilia Pires were converging with the approval of the CAP. Once the African Heads of States had signed a document supporting peace and security along with a development agenda, it was much more difficult for a UN panel to ignore it.<sup>146</sup> "That was how we got the resolution in the HLP. There was a political platform and political clout beyond Cameron".<sup>147</sup> After that, African countries strongly supported Emilia Pires's work in the HLP as well.

*"Timor-Leste and Liberia were the ones which put a strong statement. Sierra Leone too, to a limited extent. Timor-Leste put their image at stake"*<sup>148</sup> – A few are not so sure what the negotiations were like, or how much the g7+ pushed compared to others.<sup>149</sup> This might well be because there was very little written about the negotiations around SDG16, although only an even more thorough account would be able to ascertain it with more clarity. Nonetheless, among those who followed the discussions from close, the g7+'s achievement is quite largely acknowledged.<sup>150</sup> *"SDG16 is their [g7+'s] biggest achievement. They weren't the only ones but timing was perfect and they were influential."*<sup>151</sup> In our interviews, we heard that *"The g7+ was extremely good at that [lobbying for SDG16]";*<sup>152</sup> *"They were able lobbyists for governance and security";*<sup>153</sup> *and even that "SDG16 came straight out of the New Deal and the [International] Dialogue [on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding]."*<sup>154</sup>

*"The g7+ had a strong impact on the approval of SDG16"*<sup>155</sup> – The curious for some is in fact **how little the g7+ has capitalized on that achievement.** There is a general feeling that the group could have used this advocacy case to sell itself as capable and able lobbyists and to garner support. Indeed, it is patent that the g7+'s track is lost just after the approval of the agenda: *"They should have declared victory."*<sup>156</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

<sup>146</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>147</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

<sup>148</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>149</sup> Interview with Anne-Lise Klausen.

<sup>150</sup> H.E. Muhammad Mustafa Mastoor, for instance, states this is one of the greatest achievements of the group.

<sup>151</sup> Interview with Gary Milante.

<sup>152</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>153</sup> Interview with Peter van Sluijs.

<sup>154</sup> Interview with Christian Lotz.

<sup>155</sup> Interview with Sarah Cliffe.

<sup>156</sup> Interview with Sarah Cliffe.

*"The PSGs are a great contribution to the SDGs. The g7+ was really instrumental and delivered a lot. They should have declared victory and transitioned out of PSGs"<sup>157</sup> – It seems a good question to ask why the g7+ has not followed up on this achievement, influencing the debate around SDG16, bringing in the politics, questioning indicators and demanding country-owned definitions of peace and country-led solutions for conflict.*

*"Honestly, I sympathize with this feeling. I think, we tend to be humble. Maybe we didn't have the capacity to follow up closely on the process. We should have helped in strengthening coordination among Permanent missions of g7+ countries in New York by consolidating our group. We were not sure about it becoming a trend and that some actors had resisted inclusion of Goal on Peace and then tend to become champions of SDG16. SDGs became too universal and of course, it is because it is universal agenda. But implementation is and should be local. We need to ask what realizing SDG 16 and particularly peace means for each country. For instance, making peace in a certain country might be in the realm of the Security Council; in another, it might mean addressing internal conflict; and in others addressing urban violence. We have to become more fluid, to adapt to each context. Yes, I think we should have claimed our victory on SDG16, protect it, so it is not manipulated. We should have continued our engagement in conversation on indicators. But it is also true, that, we couldn't catch up with the pace that the discourse was going on with. We agreed in 2016 to report jointly on priority indicators, that we selected; it became very challenging due to lack of data. However, we engaged through HLPF every year to highlight and share the g7+ perspective on SDG 16, even when it was not being reviewed yet."<sup>158</sup>*

It is interesting to observe in the excerpts above that most who mentioned the approval of SDG16 were externals, working in the g7+ Secretariat or at the high level in member countries. It seems focal points do not know the story of the negotiations well, nor generally how much the g7+ contributed to get SDG16 approved.

On the other hand, new important initiatives have come up in the SDG16 front, like the Pathfinders, based at the Center on International Cooperation (CIC), New York University; and new leadership is coming on board with their respective agendas on peaceful, just and inclusive societies: Tunisia and Colombia are said to have started making way. Brazil, among the initial opposition to including SDG16 in the 2030 Agenda, is now one of the conveners of Pathfinders. After the negotiations with the G77+China and others, it seems representatives of countries like Brazil felt the language approved was a good common ground.<sup>159</sup>

<sup>157</sup> Interview with Gary Milante.

<sup>158</sup> Interview with Habib Mayar.

<sup>159</sup> Interview with Sarah Cliffe.



Table 5: SDG16 UN indicators (Source : Rocha de Siqueira, I., 2019)

INDICATORS				
16.1	16.1.1 Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age	16.1.2 Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause	16.1.3 Proportion of population subjected to physical, psychological or sexual violence in the previous 12 months	16.1.4 Proportion of population that feel safe walking alone around the area they live
16.2	16.2.1 Proportion of children aged 1–17 years who experienced any physical punishment and/or psychological aggression by caregivers in the past month	16.2.2 Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation	16.2.3 Proportion of young women and men aged 18–29 years who experienced sexual violence by age 18	
16.3	16.3.1 Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms	16.3.2 Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population		
16.4	16.4.1 Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars)	16.4.2 Proportion of seized small arms and light weapons that are recorded and traced, in accordance with international standards and legal instruments		
16.5	16.5.1 Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months	16.5.2 Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months		
16.6	16.6.1 Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar)	16.6.2 Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services		

<b>16.7</b>	<b>16.7.1</b> Proportions of positions (by sex, age, persons with disabilities and population groups) in public institutions (national and local legislatures, public service, and judiciary) compared to national distributions	<b>16.7.2</b> Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group
<b>16.8</b>	<b>16.8.1</b> Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations	
<b>16.9</b>	<b>16.9.1</b> Proportion of children under 5 years of age whose births have been registered with a civil authority, by age	
<b>16.10</b>	<b>16.10.1</b> Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months	<b>16.10.2</b> Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information
<b>16.A</b>	<b>16.A.1</b> Existence of independent national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles	
<b>16.B</b>	<b>16.B.1</b> Proportion of population reporting having personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international human rights law	

However, there are some disagreements as to this very language. Some say the frame is quite strong, even if implementation will always be a challenge. "It's like climate and the MDGs. Similarly, people feel the indicators are not good. But I think it creates momentum and brings that openness."<sup>160</sup> For others, nevertheless, the language was supposed to be more about positive peace, for which the goal itself was a 'poor compromise':<sup>161</sup> "It speaks of peaceful societies; the targets, however, are Peace and Security. Agreement was for more positive language, but the targets are about conflict, with few exceptions. The language instrumentalizes peace rather than dealing with society – it's one that invites intervention not societal concerns. But ok, that's the nature of compromise."<sup>162</sup>

Donors are being quick to reorganize and re-strategize around SDG16. Indeed, we can already have a glimpse of the changes SDG16 is promoting in terms of aid flows and prioritization, as we can see in the data below. The challenge now is how to unpack the goal and go about discussing peace in the development agenda, *if* the g7+ decides to embrace their previous achievements and dispute some of the terms being set. We talk more about these possibilities in the next chapter.

---

<sup>160</sup> Interview with Sara Cliffe.

<sup>161</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>162</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.




Figure 13: UNDP's support to SDGs as of 2019 (Source: UNDP, 2019)

Target	UNDP Budget 2019
16.1	\$137.40M
16.3	\$453.11M
16.6	\$320.32M

Table 6: UNDP's top budget values per SDG16 target




Figure 14: UNDP. Top 10 recipient countries.<sup>163</sup>

<sup>163</sup> All graphs from <https://open.undp.org/sdg/16/Peace,%20justice,%20and%20strong%20institutions>. H21 stands for Bureau Policy and Program Support; SVK stands for Regional Center, Istanbul.

## New Deal: reported analysis and impressions

Now moving on to look into the influence of one of g7+'s key instruments, the New Deal, it is important to again emphasize that this is not an *evaluation*, but a review based on the perceptions around the contributions and limitations of the g7+. The discussion that follows is not focused on understanding how the New Deal has been operationalized. The review aims instead at gathering narratives on how the New Deal has been seen by donors, member countries and other constituencies; how it has changed over time; what the expectations are now about its potential and limits (compared to the expectations at the beginning, highlighted in the previous chapter); and what role it has played so far in the development agenda. It is hoped this will provide an overview of the political willingness around the New Deal and the possible ways forwards now that other key global factors, such as the SDGs, are in place.

If we were to summarize, the general assessment has been that the New Deal has

- a) not considerably changed donor behavior in fragile states;
- b) faced important challenges of implementation on the ground – from the numbers of countries that have conducted the Fragility Assessments (and done a second one) to the ownership of these exercises;
- c) become too technical, cumbersome and donor-driven;
- d) not been necessarily conducive to inclusive politics; and
- e) at the same time, and not perhaps to be undervalued, symbolized the existence of an important political agenda, of which most member countries are not ready to give up.

Because this is not an evaluation of implementation, we *do not go over the experience of each member country*. Through desk reviews and interviews, we aim to offer a glimpse of the mood towards the New Deal and its components. Any further detail of specific experiences would require a long evaluation, complete with field visits. As said, however, it is the aim of this review to make the most of previous quality reviews. With that in mind, we use the cases below as examples which are not necessarily representative of the whole of the g7+. We prioritize the post-2015 period, considering there was a previous review which covered the years until 2015.<sup>164</sup>

---

<sup>164</sup> Hearn, S. (2016).

FOCUS Principles	TRUST Principles
FRAGILITY ASSESSMENTS	TRANSPARENCY
ONE VISION/ONE PLAN	RISK SHARING
COMPACTS	USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS
USE OF PSGS TO MONITOR	STRENGTHENING CAPACITIES
	TIMELY/PREDICTABLE AID

Figure 15: 2014 New Deal Monitoring Report, by IDPS.

At the beginning, seven pilot countries volunteered to implement the New Deal, which was evaluated by IDPS in 2014.

**New Deal pilot countries:** Afghanistan, CAR, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste (see Annex IV: Taking Stock of Fragility Assessments).

Table 7: New Deal engagement as of 2019 (our elaboration)

New Deal Instruments	g7+ countries where applied	Expected countries
Fragility Assessments	Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste (2), South Sudan, Afghanistan, (Somalia) <sup>165</sup>	DRC, Liberia, Comoros, Afghanistan, Togo (2015 and 2016) and Guinea Bissau <sup>166</sup>
Compacts	Somalia, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone	

The 2016 review, by Sarah Hearn and her team, found that the New Deal was still facing considerable challenges in terms of implementation, national buy-in and donor behavior. In addition, it was indicated that the New Deal depended heavily on Finance Ministries, often losing space for other frameworks from other areas. The

<sup>165</sup> Information about pilots is not always publicly clear. Because of the goal of flexibility, the secretariat has apparently not influenced the way processes were classified (interview with Habib Mayar). The 2016 review mentions eight countries because it considers Somalia, which in theory has done the compact but not exactly the Fragility Assessment (at least not officially presented as such). Comoros's focal point considers the Fragility Assessment done but says it has not been translated yet.

<sup>166</sup> See quotes below: many others understand some implementation took place, e. g., Guinea-Bissau. Antonio Co from Guinea Bissau also reports the country has conducted its first Fragility Assessment in 2016-17, although it has not yet finished its compact. However, the document is not in the public domain yet.

report also concluded that there were not significant investments being directed to the PSGs.<sup>167</sup>

One year after the publication of the independent review, another report came out, focusing on PSG1, but reflecting on the whole process of the New Deal implementation. The table below, from the study commissioned by OECD in 2017, cites four cases studies, whereby the report concludes there was still a mixed level of awareness of the New Deal.

Case study	New Deal implementation
Afghanistan	<i>Low:</i> The New Deal is known across the donor community, with the Afghan Ministry of Finance being its main proponent in government. Some New Deal elements are pursued through the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). A fragility assessment is ongoing.
Somalia	<i>High:</i> A New Deal-based process gained primacy once the violence of the civil war abated sufficiently. The Compact agreed through multi-stakeholder consultations in 2013 (albeit described by many as a rushed process) became the pre-eminent framework for prioritising, aligning, and coordinating aid between government and donors.
South Sudan	<i>Medium:</i> The government (led by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning) conducted a fragility assessment in 2012 and pursued a Compact in partnership with key donors until the process was abruptly halted by the outbreak of large-scale violence in late 2013.
Timor-Leste	<i>Medium-High:</i> The government has mainly focused on the resource-enabling aspects of the New Deal and on taking on a leading role in the g7+ secretariat. It led self-organised fragility assessments in 2012 and 2015.

Figure 16: An overview of New Deal awareness and use (Source: van Veen, Erwin and Dudouet, Véronique (2017))<sup>168</sup>

Knowledge of the New Deal is mostly concentrated in **Finance ministries**, in addition to focal points and a few other actors. The fact that the member countries' representatives for the g7+ are ministries of Finance or Planning has always been indicated as one of the group's weaknesses. Because that was the point of departure of the group, there has always been difficulties in reaching out to other ministries and the presidents, so that the objectives of **whole-of-government approaches and national**

<sup>167</sup> Hearn, S. (2016).

<sup>168</sup> van Veen, Erwin and Dudouet, Véronique (2017). Hitting the target, but missing the point? Assessing donor support for inclusive and legitimate politics in fragile societies. OECD. Available at <[https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/Hitting\\_the\\_target.pdf](https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/Hitting_the_target.pdf)>, p. 7.



**buy-in** are among the key challenges faced by the g7+ internally: "The g7+ was supposed to be whole-of-government but this happens very sporadically".<sup>169</sup>

Beside the challenges of buy-in at the higher levels, there is the fact that many countries with committed public servants still have to face realities of **instability and crisis** that disrupt exercises.<sup>170</sup> In general, it seems, however, that these are the very countries whose current focal points believe the New Deal is a crucial political tool and important self-assessment that can effectively change reality on the ground, so long as the g7+ keeps investing in its implementation.

In many realities of conflict, nevertheless, as perhaps realistically expected, it seems the New Deal was in no condition to **compete with other frameworks or interests**, and that immediate needs, like in the case of Somalia at some point, the priority was to get donor support. In the case of South Sudan, some comment on the difficulties of getting a compact signed in 2013, just before the crisis, due to certain *de facto* conditionalities imposed on the country.<sup>171</sup> Yet it is said South Sudan is willing to get back to the New Deal and has organized a workshop first thing into the peace process, in order to conduct some self-assessment.<sup>172</sup>

Perhaps the central point is that many suggest the New Deal has become **too technical**, and that politics needs to be brought back in. Without it, some say, difficult but essential subjects like **legitimacy and inclusiveness** cannot be properly addressed, much less in a contextual manner. Both flexibility and openness have been historically valued in the context of g7+ discourse, and some actors seem to place both in a central role, above the capacity to offer templates to donors or to follow the international agenda too closely.<sup>173</sup>

One key limitation in the implementation of the New Deal deriving from its perceived too-technical character is the lack of dialogue with **civil society** in those countries. A study conducted by USIP on the implementation of the New Deal in Liberia indicated "inadequate civil society participation and influence."<sup>174</sup> Citing another study by the Brookings Institute, it generally concluded that implementation of the New Deal throughout has seen civil society "under-represented in steps taken to date".<sup>175</sup> This is something also strongly criticized by one informant, who in addition pointed out that CSPPS participation in IDPS was never equal, compared to the other two constituencies, g7+ and INCAF.<sup>176</sup>

<sup>169</sup> Interview with Helder da Costa.

<sup>170</sup> Interview with Antonio Co.

<sup>171</sup> Anonymous.

<sup>172</sup> Anonymous.

<sup>173</sup> Mentioned by several focal points and civil society representatives.

<sup>174</sup> Phillips, Ann L. Liberia's New Deal and the Ebola Crisis (draft).

<sup>175</sup> Phillips, Ann L. Liberia's New Deal and the Ebola Crisis (draft).

<sup>176</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

**TRUST** and **FOCUS** have been mostly not mentioned as such in the interviews or were mentioned as political guidance that can offer a sense of a common platform for engagement with donors. The **PSGs**, on the other hand, have been mentioned especially by those countries with a heavy history of engagement with peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities.

Much has been said about the New Deal failing to achieve much change in **donor behavior** by informants and previous reviews, yet the example of Afghanistan draws attention to the possibility of some small change, although its special character in terms of geopolitical interests invites some caveats. In 2016, the g7+ also published a study, *Aid instruments for peace- and state-building: Putting the New Deal into practice*, with cases studies showing a few more innovative donor initiatives, such as the European Union State Building Contracts (SBCs), which are supposed to offer increased risk-tolerance and long-term engagement.<sup>177</sup> Nevertheless, an independent evaluation conducted in 2013 founded that only 6% of the European Commission's budget support initiatives took the form of SBCs going to fragile states. Yet, of ten countries with SBCs as of 2013, seven were g7+ members.<sup>178</sup> One eligibility criteria is to have a **national plan**,<sup>179</sup> something many informants indicated was a key contribution of the g7+ which is related to the New Deal implementation process.<sup>180</sup> In addition, the dimensions of SBCs' risk analysis resemble the PSGs.<sup>181</sup> Thinking of the SBCs, however, it is worth remembering what an anonymous informant mentioned, that there might have been more changes to donors' behavior in terms of state building than in peacebuilding, which is something to observe. One has to take into account still that much support often comes attached to conditionalities of different kinds, as is the case with Afghanistan.<sup>182</sup>

A study suggests that in Somalia "the New Deal and the language it provides has been an important vehicle for enhancing the dialogue that enables partner trust and donor use of country systems."<sup>183</sup> In case of Timor-Leste, it says: "There is some criticism that the New Deal itself did not contribute to the increases in the use of country systems or peacebuilding/statebuilding frameworks in Timor-Leste, but New Deal advocacy has kept the principles front and center."<sup>184</sup> Results in that case are said to be

<sup>177</sup> g7+, *Aid instruments for peace- and state-building: Putting the New Deal into practice*, p. xii.

<sup>178</sup> Volker Hauck, Greta Galeazzi and Jan Vanheukelom (2013). "The EU's State Building Contracts. Courageous assistance to fragile states, but how effective in the end?", *ecdpm*.

<sup>179</sup> Volker Hauck, Greta Galeazzi and Jan Vanheukelom (2013).

<sup>180</sup> Volker Hauck, Greta Galeazzi and Jan Vanheukelom (2013).

<sup>181</sup> See also *Updating the South Sudan Fragility Assessment: Establishing Fragility Factors to inform a medium term National Development Strategy*.

<sup>182</sup> A point brought up by Naheed Sarabi, Deputy Minister for Policy, Ministry of Finance of Afghanistan, during the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting, in Lisbon, on 27 June 2019.

<sup>183</sup> International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2017). *The Use of Country Systems and the New Deal: The State of Play in 2017*, p. 15.

<sup>184</sup> International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2017), p. 19.

mixed: "While Timor-Leste has made great strides towards increasing use of country systems, it is working to build the whole-of-government approach necessary for New Deal implementation. The Ministry of Finance, which has championed the New Deal process, has not been able to mobilize other ministries sufficiently. The role of the Ministry of Finance has also meant that New Deal implementation has been seen as an overly technical endeavor."<sup>185</sup>

Overall, for this review, only one anonymous informant thought the New Deal was no longer relevant outside IDPS and the g7+ but suggested that (s)he might not be well informed. The others did suggest important adaptations, which we will address in more detail in the next chapter. In general, therefore, a majority see relevance in the New Deal but cannot quite agree on how much or on how to operationalize it in a more effective way. The **technical character** assumed by the instrument was the most criticized aspect of the New Deal in current application. Its political capacity to deliver a voice, open dialogue, to flexibilize understandings of peace and help achieve more aid effectiveness were highlighted as some of its most relevant potential contributions. To leverage those, however, the group would need to considerably improve communication at national and local level, getting buy-in and promoting whole-of-government approaches to the New Deal.



Figure 17: Lessons of New Deal Implementation (Source: g7+ (2016c))<sup>186</sup>

<sup>185</sup> International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2017), p. 19.

<sup>186</sup> g7+ (2016c). Aid instruments for peace- and state-building: Putting the New Deal into practice. Available at < <http://g7plus.org/resources/aid-instrument-for-peace-and-statebuilding-putting-the-new-deal-into-practices-2016/>>, p. vii.

"The New Deal is an approach that can help fragile states to evolve towards resilience. But political leaders in fragile states and donors seem not to be respecting the engagements of the New Deal." (Mukululuki.)

"The knowledge of g7+ is usually concentrated on Ministries of Finance. I know more because I was there before. President did know about the g7+, but not Foreign Affairs. In part, I think, because they don't deal with assessments, but it would be good to have their involvement for F2F, peacebuilding." (H.E. Minister Mastoor).

"The are issues of buy-in at higher levels in all countries. The governments don't know where the money was supposed to go"

(Paul Okumu)

"The New Deal and IDPS were useful for statebuilding and peacebuilding at the beginning, focusing on specific issues of these countries as opposed to middle-income countries. The g7+ achieved a tremendous point there. It has been instrumental. It has also created momentum for these countries."

(Peter van Sluijs.)

"The New Deal through the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) and the FOCUS and TRUST principles aims to foster inclusive political dialogue and build trust between all national and international actors involved in aid and development. These are good principles and should be boosted. National and international actors should be monitored in adherence to these goal and principles through their performance reports." (Emmanuel Williams.)

"The New Deal is not being implemented [in Guinea-Bissau]. We were among the first in the g7+ after Busan. We could have been among the first pilot countries, but crisis held us back. The process was initiated in 2014, but we couldn't do the Fragility Assessment, only in 2016/17. It took us almost 3 years to conclude a process of 3 months. And after that we were again in a period of instability". We finished a matrix of fragility, but only at the technical level. We decided we couldn't lose more time. The government acknowledged it, but didn't participate at the beginning. The ministerial council never approved. Now the government was supposed to elaborate the compact, it was the next step, but it's in the drawer."

(Antonio Co)

"As an approach that values the local context of each country, the New Deal should be strengthened. It sends a strong message to fragile states. We need methodology and also financial instruments." (Farz Abdallah)

"About South Sudan, we got it wrong. We didn't look enough into the politics."

(Siafa Hage)

"To all fragile states, the New Deal should be a document or approach of reference for more aid effectiveness. The problem is with its application or implementation in fragile states, but also by donors. It's necessary to do new evaluation in each country about the degree of implementation of the New Deal and certainly to reformulate new strategies." (Armand Borrey)

"The New Deal is very much alive in South Sudan, more on the government side than with donors, because these change all the time. I think they would like to go back and try again to implement the New Deal. They just finished the First National Development Strategy (coming out of peace agreements) and the first thing they did was to have a workshop and refresh the Fragility Assessment. The peace agreement had a paragraph on the New Deal." (Anonymous)

"At the time [of the crisis], South Sudan was costing too much in humanitarian aid. Donors talked to the government but because of the war they went for the local governments. And the government was fine with it. This is the kind of new thing that we didn't talk about at the beginning in IDPS. And the New Deal is not supposed to be traditional; it's about resilient institutions [not just in the central government]." (Anonymous)

"In South Sudan, there was also little focus on peacebuilding. There was little resource to dialogues and peace processes. The New Deal was to prevent, but donors thought it was too thorny, too political."  
(Anonymous)

"The New Deal is only one framework. Frameworks compete. The New Deal lost stamina because of this competition. But it continues focusing mostly on ownership" (Helder da Costa)

"In Somalia, the entire process was hijacked by donors. The country was not so important for the New Deal; it became a pawn. They used the Somalia compact to put a showpiece. But the compact has not much in terms of ownership. It's a lot about donors and donors are willing to fund."  
(Anonymous)

"In 2013, during the IDPS meeting, the requirements of donors were not the right ones. Donors wanted to prepare the ground for direct budget support, so there was a concern with fiduciary risks. The requirements were embedded in the compact but this was unrealistic. Donors were optimistic and naïve. They were not flexible enough. In theory, they understood but fell back to IMF-conditionalities. Of course the factors [for war] were there, but yes, an opportunity was lost."  
(Anonymous)

"The New Deal offered a structure around what fragile countries should consider to be important. The PSGs acted as a baseline for countries to build upon. The group facilitated conversations with donors, with an emphasis on the need to focus on country systems. In the case of Somalia, the process must be owned and was owned by the Somalis. g7+ understood the need for Somalia to talk of a National development plan rather than New Deal and after it evolved, they started talking about new deal."

(Mustakim Waid)

"There were a couple of mishaps. The Fragility Assessments... If you try to use numbers, it gets difficult. That's true everywhere, with every assessment; it's difficult to be consistent among all countries. They spent a lot of time coming up with indicators for the PSGs. There were meetings in Nairobi... Then there was a disconnect between energy spent with that and the possibilities. There are challenges to speaking with one voice when you're many."  
(Gary Milante)

"The compact in Somalia, it was a process for coming together: the process itself gave opportunities, it was rehabilitating for a country that was so splintered. Of course there was room for improvement, challenges around setting the top things to do, deciding what were the right issues."  
(Mustakim Waid)

"The New Deal became less and less recognized".  
(Anonymous)

"FOCUS and TRUST are nice heuristic arguments. But they tried to unpack them, rigorously tried to put them into Fragility Assessments, and they lost value as heuristic tools. It could be that it couldn't just work for everyone or that they didn't have the capacity. I was involved and didn't quite believe in that. I wasn't convinced by the need of quantitative assessments."  
(Gary Milante)

"The terms New Deal and Fragility Assessment themselves are out of fashion."

(Anonymous)

"The New Deal is very much attached to the OECD. No one knows about the New Deal outside the OECD and g7+. I'm not sure how useful these tools are. They seem big technical analysis, but how do they get translated into implementation? But maybe I just don't know."  
(Anonymous)

"In terms of the New Deal, we all failed. We never created a mechanism to actually implement and carry out the work. We had a guidance but it never really took traction. We never had strong results. The success is that the entire process has strengthened the organization, a strong advocacy, making sure we are in the agenda and our voice is heard."  
(Siafa Hage)

"We never planned for what would come next, after Busan. Then the next thing came, the SDG16 advocacy, and we were doing that instead of figuring out the compacts. After getting SDG16, we came back but there had been no traction between countries and donors. But that advocacy achieved results, and no one thought the PSGs were going anywhere." (Siafa Hage)

"[In Afghanistan] the volume of aid hasn't changed much, which was mainly because of political interests. But it did change in terms of modality. No other country receives that much in budget support, particularly after the New Deal. For instance, USAID usually gives off-budget aid. Increasingly now, it is on-budget." (H. E. Minister Mastoor)

"This is the platform to discuss thorny issues. Countries like South Sudan and Yemen, for instance, they are questioned about legitimacy. But they can still be supported. The value of IDPS is in there. Same for Burundi and the role of civil society. We should be able to discuss that with the g7+ and IDPS, not to find a solution, but at least being able to have that dialogue." (Anonymous)

"The way of addressing statebuilding and peacebuilding is different everywhere. On the PSGs, we haven't benefitted much. Peacebuilding, no change. Statebuilding, yes, on the issue of institution-building, avoiding parallel institutions At least on this, it has helped. In terms of peace processes, the ownership is not happening, the way we designed is not being followed. This is probably true with others too." (Anonymous)

"The New Deal framework and principles have not lost their relevance but need to be reframed more positively, taking into account aspects of resilience that need to be reinforced." (Peter van Sluijs)

"The way of addressing statebuilding and peacebuilding is different everywhere. On the PSGs, we haven't benefitted much. Peacebuilding, no change. Statebuilding, yes, on the issue of institution-building, avoiding parallel institutions At least on this, it has helped. In terms of peace processes, the ownership is not happening, the way we designed is not being followed. This is probably true with others too." (Anonymous)

"Politics is crucial. The way the New Deal was implemented was technocratic. If you look at the g7+ as a collective: all have a representative in New York. But it is important to look at the country level: political dialogue at this level is needed, for instance, for prioritization." (Peter van Sluijs)



## Fragile-to-Fragile cooperation

*"Fragile-to-Fragile (or F2F) cooperation is the support that countries experiencing conflict or emerging from crisis provide to each other, including through peer learning, capacity building, mobilization of third-party support, financial assistance or knowledge generation."<sup>187</sup>*

Like the g7+ itself, F2F is based on volunteerism, cooperation and solidarity. It was conceived by the group in 2013 and first took place in practice through cooperation between Guinea-Bissau and Timor-Leste in 2014. The g7+'s priorities in this area so far have been on peace and reconciliation and national reconciliation mechanisms; elections; public finance management; natural resources; and recently, UN transitions.

Having had emerged from the 2012 g7+ Haiti ministerial meeting, the idea of peer-to-peer learning has become a priority for the group: "Peer-learning will thus help the sharing of experiences in peacebuilding and statebuilding, enhance knowledge-generation from g7+ countries, and stimulate specific initiatives to help fill in knowledge and capacity gaps in PSG achievement."<sup>188</sup> The main F2F mechanisms are peer learning, capacity building, experience sharing and knowledge generation.<sup>189</sup> The group officially states that Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation consists of three main pillars:

- a) Supporting g7+ member countries in implementation of the New Deal;
- b) Peer-learning, knowledge generation and capacity development around peacebuilding and statebuilding; and
- c) Supporting g7+ member countries in dealing with acute and emerging crises.<sup>190</sup>

Regarding the New Deal, one of the main goals is to use F2F to address bottlenecks and help getting in-country support. In crises, the g7+ aims to "advocate[e] for early and appropriate action by the international community, and feeding information to the development partners on realistic entry points for immediate action."<sup>191</sup> The group also states its purpose to employ whole-of-government approaches.<sup>192</sup>

<sup>187</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017), Executive Summary.

<sup>188</sup> See <http://g7plus.org/our-work/peer-learning-and-cooperation/>.

<sup>189</sup> g7+. g7+ Policy Note on Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/our-work/peer-learning-and-cooperation/>>.

<sup>190</sup> g7+. g7+ Policy Note on Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation.

<sup>191</sup> g7+. g7+ Policy Note on Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation, p.7.

<sup>192</sup> g7+. g7+ Policy Note on Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation, p. 8.



As a recent modality, F2F has not yet a big corpus of results to show but the g7+ has moved relatively quickly to get word around. The group has published one policy note and a brief point-by-point presentation, besides including the topic in many of its internal communications. In 2016, the g7+ conducted a mapping exercise with the goal of getting members discussing what knowledge they felt their country could share and learn and based on which countries' experiences. Actual varied and diversified engagement by all members other than Timor-Leste have not quite materialized as of 2019. Conditions on the ground in many member countries, including frequent change in offices, and lack of funding available are key factors. A vast majority offered to share experience in the area of peace, with a few mentioning possibilities in terms of extractive industries, oil, gas and transparency.

Little long after the signature of an MoU, in 2018, the UN Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) published a volume in its South-South in Action series about F2F, with a good compilation of cases and recommendations.<sup>193</sup> Taking these into account and based on the research conducted for this review, two general points can be highlighted:

- Impressions have been quite **positive** so far with externals but also much so with member countries. UNOSSC's publication stated: "The F2F cooperation program is still in its infancy, but may already be considered a success. In addition to the direct beneficial impacts, it has led to the accumulation of considerable knowledge and experience."<sup>194</sup> And among members who were interviewed for the present review, almost all spoke about F2F and those who mentioned F2F, placed it among the g7+'s most important contributions for member countries.<sup>195</sup>
- One common aspect that has been pointed out as a limitation is the fact that all initiatives have depended on **Timorese** resources, and that tells not only of a financial aspect but also of a more political one about F2F, indicating a variation in the countries involved with F2F would be welcome.

So far the g7+ has engaged in three cases of F2F that involved convening awareness-raising meetings and making visits – Timor-Leste with CAR, with Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, and with Guinea-Bissau; one initiative which resulted in a collective publication; and two initiatives encompassing frequent meetings for peer-learning, on Justice and on Public Finance Management (PFM) (Table 8).

<sup>193</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017); <http://g7plus.org/our-work/peer-learning-and-cooperation/>; g7+, g7+ Policy Note on Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation; g7+. 7 Things To Know About Fragile-to-fragile (F2f) Cooperation. Available at < <http://g7plus.org/our-work/peer-learning-and-cooperation/>>.

<sup>194</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017), Executive Summary.

<sup>195</sup> Questionnaires had an explicit question about F2F. In conversations, we generally waited to see whether this would come up spontaneously.

In **Guinea-Bissau**, Timor-Leste offered support to organize elections in 2014 at the request of the transitional Government of Guinea-Bissau. Since a crisis in 2012, most traditional donors had left the country. In addition, donors' estimated costs for the organization of the elections were higher than they were willing to fund.<sup>196</sup> "A Timor-Leste mission visited the country, diagnosed the need to update electoral systems and provided an estimated sum almost seven times less than that provided by traditional donors."<sup>197</sup> "Another mission soon arrived and prepared the stage for the elections; a second instance of cooperation involved civil education campaigns, continuing IT and logistical support, organizing public debates, financial assistance and donations of material."<sup>198</sup> The elections went well and Guinea-Bissau representatives reported great satisfaction with the cooperation. Timor-Leste's mission also helped monitoring the voting. At the end of the process, Guinea-Bissau successfully pledged 1 billion in financial support at a donors' round table in Brussels in March 2015.<sup>199</sup> Antonio Co, having been a public servant for 37 years in Guinea-Bissau and a focal point with the g7+ for the past 9 years, that is, since the group's inception, says

*"F2F is disinterested assistance; it's based on the historical relationships between countries. We had similar realities of having come out of conflict. Beyond the resources, the cooperation with Timor-Leste raised awareness: 'if Timor-Leste managed it, we can too'. This was much stronger than before, even if the sentiment was not widespread. I have been to Timor-Leste three times; I even spoke to the president. I felt the warmth of friendship. Some common people now know about Timor-Leste too, not just government people. It was different: these people who were coming were not revolutionaries, they were agents of development. With F2F, we have taken a positive step; there is hope."*<sup>200</sup>

In **CAR**, in turn, the goal was to achieve peace and reconciliation. "In 2014, concerned with the escalation of the conflict, the g7+ organized a closed-door meeting in Dubai between a delegation from the Central African Republic, the g7+ Chair and Secretariat, and focal points from several g7+ countries."<sup>201</sup> Considered an aid orphan, CAR could have been off-radar; g7+'s initiative was much welcome: "The g7+ did really good in CAR; they managed to raise awareness."<sup>202</sup> There was a first high level visit by Timor-Leste after that first meeting. A second was made by Deputy General Secretary of the g7+, Mr. Habib Mayar, who attended the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation.

<sup>196</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017); Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2019).

<sup>197</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2019) p. 48.

<sup>198</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2019), p. 48.

<sup>199</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017), p. 25.

<sup>200</sup> Interview with Antonio Co.

<sup>201</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017), p. 25.

<sup>202</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

Later on, a \$51M was donated by Timor-Leste to support the 2015 and 2016 elections. In a third visit to monitor the Bangui agreement, Timor-Leste was part of a delegation that pledged further \$1,5M to help settle IDPs: "The funds were transferred through the g7+ Secretariat to the Government of the Central African Republic and, a few months later, all 24,000 persons had been successfully resettled."<sup>203</sup>

In the case of cooperation with **Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia**, the goal was to help tackle the Ebola epidemics that killed 11,000 people. Ten countries had been affected but these three especially so. Together with Côte d'Ivoire, they established response plans, but the money was not getting through.<sup>204</sup> "[T]he late release of international support and its inability to fully incorporate local effort are rightly criticized", but later on "the support of international responders provided a great boost to the fight against the Ebola epidemic."<sup>205</sup> In 2014, a donation of \$2M by Timor-Leste helped pay for medical supplies, medical equipment for clinics and hospitals, food for quarantined homes, protective equipment, payment of doctors and nurses, and training. "Crucially, the funds were entirely channeled through the national systems of the countries in question in order to help strengthen them at a time of acute need."<sup>206</sup>

In addition to these more direct forms of F2F, the g7+ has been convening frequent meetings on justice and on PFM with the goal of sharing experiences and offering peer-learning. **Access to justice** has been an agenda of special issue to the group. A first high level roundtable was organized in Monrovia in 2014. A second was held at the Lisbon hub in 2017; and a third took place in The Hague, in June 2019, with support from the Dutch government. A study of the gap in the sector in all member countries is expected, commissioned to the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC).

In the area of **PFM**, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste have been together for peer-learning sessions. An Afghan delegation visited the country to learn about the use of a software in PFM.<sup>207</sup> A publication had been produced on the two countries' experience in PFM before.<sup>208</sup> The cooperation was aligned to the g7+'s purpose of strengthening country systems: "Establishing systems for PFM in conflict-affected or post-conflict fragile states is challenging, to say the very least. There might be on-going conflict, but even if not, the shadows of conflict – mistrust, trauma, and chaos – are almost certainly present. The result of bypassing country systems and the annual budget process is

<sup>203</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017), p. 27.

<sup>204</sup> See also Fiifi Edu-Afful (2019) Deconstructing Ebola in West Africa: Options for Future Response, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 13:2, 241-247.

<sup>205</sup> Fiifi Edu-Afful (2019).

<sup>206</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017), p. 30.

<sup>207</sup> United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017), p. 31.

<sup>208</sup> Ashcroft, Vincent; Laing, Andrew; Lockhart, Clare (2017). Statebuilding in conflict-affected & fragile states: a comparative study.

Institute for State Effectiveness and g7+. Available at <<https://effectivestates.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ISE-6-timorAfghan-1-WEB.pdf>>.

usually large-scale fragmentation.”<sup>209</sup> The result of F2F in that area was positively evaluated by Afghan and Timorese representatives, and it was even suggested that good standards for budget support can emerge out of this cooperation.<sup>210</sup>

In the area of **extractive industries**, early in 2014, the g7+ has commissioned a study of all members' approaches to natural resources management.<sup>211</sup> “Findings from the g7+ extractive industries country profiles reveal a series of shared challenges facing resource-rich fragile states, which are each grappling with how to best make use of their natural resource wealth...Addressing these shared challenges is an important part of implementing the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ the PSGs can serve as a useful framework to think about the impact of the extractive industries on peacebuilding and statebuilding.”<sup>212</sup> It is a shame, however, that the booklet, which offers a quite long analysis of the situation of natural resources management in 18 countries,<sup>213</sup> does not finish with a strong collective message, but is more limited to individual analyses at country level. Such a message could guide focus on the similarities between countries and facilitate ‘match-making’ for F2F.

Finally, in 2017, the g7+ has engaged in discussion about the reform of UN peace and security architecture. A first study with CIC was then prepared and a second one on **peacekeeping** is under elaboration as of 2019. The report will again focus on host countries' views on peace and security and UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda.

The g7+'s 2019 Action Plan for F2F includes a considerably ambitious list of countries outside the group which are to receive missions aiming at peer-learning and possible instances of triangular cooperation. These include Cambodia, Colombia and Rwanda. Support from UNOSSC, Sweden, the g7+ Foundation and the engagement of Rwanda Cooperation Initiative (RCI) are expected.

<sup>209</sup> Ashcroft, Vincent; Laing, Andrew; Lockhart, Clare (2017), Executive Summary.

<sup>210</sup> Naheed Sarabi, 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting, Lisbon, 27 June 2019.

<sup>211</sup> Martins, N., Leigh, C., Stewart, J., Andersson, D. (2014).

<sup>212</sup> Martins, N., Leigh, C., Stewart, J., Andersson, D. (2014), p. 1.

<sup>213</sup> São Tomé and Príncipe did not participate.

Table 8: g7+'s F2F (Source: g7+ and UNOSSC (2018))<sup>214</sup>

Countries involved	Area	Mechanisms	Date
All members <sup>215</sup>	Natural Resources	Publication – knowledge-sharing	2014
All members	Justice ministries	Meetings – peer-learning	2014-present (3 meetings as of 2019 – last being held in June 2019 in The Hague)
Afghanistan and Timor-Leste	Public Finance Management (PFM)	Meetings – peer-learning	2014
Timor-Leste and Guinea-Bissau	Elections	Financial support in the amount of \$6 million and technical assistance from the Government of Timor-Leste to the organization of legislative and presidential organization elections.	2014
Timor-Leste and Central African Republic	Peace and reconciliation; national reconciliation mechanisms <sup>216</sup>	Three high-level visits by g7+ delegations to promote peace and reconciliation. Financial assistance in the amount of \$2.5 million to support the 2015 and 2016 presidential elections and the resettlement of 24,000 internally displaced persons.	2014-2016
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Timor-Leste	Ebola	Coordinated response to the emergency by Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Donation from the Government of Timor-Leste in the amount of \$2 million. Global advocacy efforts by the other g7+ member countries.	2014

<sup>214</sup> The table is based on information gathered from United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017). We have focused on initiatives after 2013, that is, after the group started using the term 'Fragile-to-Fragile', so that the event when a delegation visited South Sudan just after independence, in 2011, is not being listed, for instance. At the time, a donation to fund a primary school was made by Timor-Leste. Similarly, we are not listing initiatives that have been mentioned in documents before but have yet to be put to practice in a clear way.

<sup>215</sup> 18 at the time.

<sup>216</sup> See Costa Guterres, Francisco (2017). A forward looking model of reconciliation. *Research Findings Brief*, g7+.

## ANALYSIS

Although F2F has only existed for six years, the g7+ has explored a considerably diverse set of areas for cooperation among its countries. There are now many challenges, not least of resources, and many possible decisions that are in need of political scrutiny, such as the approximation with much longer-established South-South Cooperation (SSC), as practiced by emerging countries and others in the G77+China, for instance. In general, however, perception is very positive: *"It was an excellent idea; they should wear [F2F] like a badge".*<sup>217</sup>

Overall, the leadership of Timor-Leste in F2F is praised especially by member countries. It does not go unnoticed, however, that Timor-Leste has led all F2F initiatives so far. This is an aspect that has been leading some to think of F2F as an agenda of Timor-Leste. Some report having heard comments among donors of the type "this is **Timorese foreign affairs** in practice".<sup>218</sup>

*"I think there is a genuine desire to help other countries. But as to where this goes, this is all for Timorese areas of interest. All people in these pictures are Timorese. When they meet it's with countries that are of interest to Timor. It's usually going to their interests first and others second. They are not doing anything essentially harmful, so they let them do it."*<sup>219</sup>

*"For us, it is very clear. When we were seeking independence and then support, other countries came and helped us. We couldn't have done without them. So now, for us, we feel it's our part; we need to help other countries too. For us, it's very clear."*<sup>220</sup>

*"I like it, but I haven't seen much done, except for Timor-Leste acting. Timor-Leste has the power of the purse."*<sup>221</sup>

Most member country representatives indicate **financing** as a key problem of the group, and considering the secretariat is still funded mostly by Timor-Leste, until this reality changes, we might not see others share the reins due to a lack of dedicated resources. Funding dynamics inside the group maybe be less conducive to a more diverse F2F for as long as other countries do not come forward with more resources. In the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting, however, the Secretariat established as the first point in the agenda to discuss the financial support by all members, which had been approved at a \$15,000 minimum in a previous meeting, as a way of not only increasing funding for the

<sup>217</sup> Interview with Christian Lotz.

<sup>218</sup> Anonymous.

<sup>219</sup> Anonymous.

<sup>220</sup> Timorese MP present in the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting, in Lisbon, 26 June 2019. This was said during the first round of comments on the first item of the agenda: discussing members' contributions in financing the group with a minimum amount previously agreed.

<sup>221</sup> Anonymous.

group but of also clearly sending out a political message of unity and common goals. This has been largely supported. The meeting was chaired by H.E. Dr. Francis Mustapha Kai-Kai, Minister of Planning and Economic Development of Sierra Leone, the new g7+ chair, and Naheed Sarabi, Deputy Minister for Policy, Ministry of Finance of Afghanistan, was unanimously voted Deputy Chair, which might invite further diversification in leadership in the group.

For now, in terms of F2F, reported results and perceptions indicate an overall very positive outcome: *"What F2F does or can do is to provide solidarity and voice; educate and support the members in addressing the larger and broader issues around conflict in these countries."*<sup>222</sup> In terms of **inbound** engagement, having F2F take place with other members other than Timor-Leste or organizing more forms of F2F that involve all members, such as the Justice meetings, might mitigate the feeling that more diversity is necessary, which seems to be a crucial for generating general positive impression. Indeed, for the future, the group can benefit from a more diversified engagement in F2F both in terms of countries involved and in terms of the types of results sought.

On that note, a few actors are skeptical because they feel **results** so far have been more on the symbolic side: *"In spirit, F2F is about connecting people; it's always valuable. But it needs a more distinct theory of change. They need to be more ambitious and move beyond the symbolic value, which of course is also important. It can't be just about travelling and having nice chats; they could embark on actual exchange and peer support."*<sup>223</sup> Because of the nature of the challenges faced in each member country, there is in any case the obstacle of having to deal with national and local **short-term issues**: *"The constant instability makes it difficult to develop internal programs, The first step is to fix the house."*<sup>224</sup> However, pushing for measurable results can also lead down the road of business-as-usual – SSC has been having this debate for quite a while now.<sup>225</sup> There is an important sense in which the group might need to find a balance of its own, and in doing so, contribute for a key debate taking shape now in SSC. Exploring this balance will be important in the near future. So far, as a very recent initiative, our reading is that F2F has considerable room to maneuver and experiment.

In terms of **outbound** engagement, F2F shares a lot of the principles of SSC, like solidarity, demand-drivenness and horizontality, and many of the same challenges, such as violence and economic fragility. For that reason, our recommendations are much in line with some of UNOSSC's: along with an approximation of SSC actors, there

<sup>222</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>223</sup> Interview with Peter van Sluijs.

<sup>224</sup> Interview with Antonio Co.

<sup>225</sup> BRICS Policy Center and Articulação SUL (2017). Caminhos para a construção de sistemas e processos de monitoramento e avaliação da cooperação Sul-Sul. Available at <<https://articulacaosul.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Caminhos-MA.pdf>>.



can be better exploring of the potential for triangular cooperation arrangements, which in certain limited ways is already happening – for instance, third parties funding and offering logistical support for collective meetings on Justice and others, so long as New Deal principles are valued. Reaching out to non-g7+ countries to explore avenues for collaboration can increase the visibility of the g7+, especially in a moment when the group seeks support for the UN observer status (more ahead).

## Some thoughts on current influence and action

The g7+'s contributions have been clear in certain cases – such as offering a platform and voice for fragile states, making it possible to lobby MDBs and other actors; perhaps clear but not accounted for in others – such as with SDG16; valued for its symbolical weight in the bigger development scenario – as with F2F; and more about promise and hope, perhaps, than about changes on the ground when it comes to the New Deal. Nevertheless, the trajectory is positive so far and the group was able to open important paths ahead in national and international terms. The challenges in the near future now are not only about whether the g7+ can keep up with these many fronts, but also whether it can simultaneously invest in the changes that are perhaps necessary to increase the group's relevance *and* do justice to their own expectations.

## INTERLUDE 3

SDGs and g7+'s  
20 priority  
indicators

### 20 PRIORITY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS INDICATORS




Figure 18: g7+'s priority indicators in the 2030 Agenda

## 20 PRIORITY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS INDICATORS

9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE



13. National kilometres/miles of all-season roads

10 REDUCED  
INEQUALITIES



14. Proportion of people living below 50 per cent of median income, by age, sex and persons with disabilities

11 SUSTAINABLE CITIES  
AND COMMUNITIES



15. Proportion of urban population living in slums, informal settlements or inadequate housing

12 RESPONSIBLE  
CONSUMPTION  
AND PRODUCTION



No priority indicator was defined for this specific goal

13 CLIMATE  
ACTION



No priority indicator was defined for this specific goal

14 LIFE  
BELOW WATER



No priority indicator was defined for this specific goal

15 LIFE  
ON LAND



No priority indicator was defined for this specific goal

16 PEACE, JUSTICE  
AND STRONG  
INSTITUTIONS



16. Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population  
17. Proportions of positions\*\* in public institutions\*\*\* compared to national distributions  
18. National number of Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees\*

17 PARTNERSHIPS  
FOR THE GOALS




19. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services  
20. Dollar value of financial and technical assistance (including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation) committed to developing countries\*

\* Indicator not a part of United Nations' 'official' list, but deemed an important dimension for tracking progress towards its respective goal

\*\*By gender, age, persons with disabilities and population groups

\*\*\*National and local legislatures, public service and judiciary

Figure 19: SDGs/PSGs - UNPD SDG-Ready Project (Source: IDPS). An example of how the PSGs can feed into the SDGs and vice-versa.<sup>226</sup>



<sup>226</sup> From International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Realisation of the SDGs in Countries Affected by Conflict and Fragility: The Role of the New Deal. Conceptual Note, p. 9. The referred UNDP project, however, does not seem to be active anymore, at least not within these parameters.

## 5. Future: Opportunities, risks and recommendations

Based on the perceptions regarding the g7+s's current influence and action, as seen in the previous chapter, and contrasting these with the expectations introduced before, we offer here reflections on opportunities, risks and a few recommendations for the group. It is important to remember this review was not planned as an evaluation of action on the ground, but as a sound reflection on the perceptions of key actors within the g7+ and outside it about the group's trajectory so far and the pathways ahead. This review is also based on previous research conducted by the main author since the g7+'s foundation. The points that follow are offered, therefore, with respect towards the history of the group, bearing in mind g7+'s members' own narratives, and with the aim to facilitate discussions and provide a consolidated overview of achievements and challenges.

### Opportunities

*Leave no one behind vs fragility everywhere?*

One key transversal theme in the 2030 Agenda is the motto “**leave no one behind**” (LNOB). If the MDGs had left fragile states out of the equation by not addressing issues of conflict and violence, the SDGs do not, and make it their top priority to move with everyone on board. By emphasizing yet that the agenda is “**integrated and indivisible**”,<sup>227</sup> it discourages a ‘pick-and-choose’ attitude: just as there can be no peace without development and vice-versa, there is no top performance

---

<sup>227</sup> United Nations General Assembly (2015), p. 6.

that should be able to ignore poor outcomes in gender equality or access to clean water, for instance. A discussion paper by UNDP suggests five criteria to help identify who is or can be left behind: a) discrimination; b) geography; c) governance; d) socio-economic status; and e) shocks and fragility.<sup>228</sup> The g7+ is well positioned to help the world understand (e), but, actually, all others as well. In fact, in this specific issue, the dilemma, previously mentioned, is that of choosing to present themselves as experts in fragility and helping the world in this key aspect of the LNOB agenda, or to precisely advocate against possible stereotypes or stigmas and point out the hypocrisies of a world full of fragility everywhere. In the latter discourse, there is the idea that everywhere there are pockets of poverty, inequality and violence – “we are all developing countries”,<sup>229</sup> which if not incorrect, it is not wholly correct either. For some, behind this apparently self-critical notion is an escape route out from discussing deep global inequalities.<sup>230</sup> First of all, if we are all developing countries, who will pay for the 2030 Agenda?<sup>231</sup> Yet, there is indeed a very good point in saying that no one problem in this agenda is isolated, and this is the kind of argument that also avoids previously prejudiced discourses. For the g7+, this debate means walking a very thin line.

*“I think the g7+ should choose one case – South Sudan, for instance. Say ‘we’re going to make this a project’. It needs to be more than a Timorese delegation. Have it like a success story. They need policy implementation successes. Find a way of being an implementer. It will help advocacy too”<sup>232</sup> / “The g7+ should just focus on a few cases, be known for fewer issues.”<sup>233</sup> – For some interviewees, it is crucial that the g7+ find a new balance between advocacy and implementation. Although one might not be able to sustain itself without the other, as seen, there might be different forms of complementarity that can be explored. A ‘**success case**’ can strengthen g7+’s ability to rebrand itself in this SDG-world as a collective of **experts in fragility** which can help with LNOB. Moreover, by focusing on the local while also aiming at this global branding, the g7+ could also address concerns of civil society that the global is taking too much energy and the **local**, “where change happens”, needs more attention.<sup>234</sup> At the global level, in turn, by pivoting their role in getting SDG16 approved, some consider*

<sup>228</sup> United Nations Development Programme (2018). What does it mean to leave no one behind? A UNDP discussion paper and framework for implementation. Available at <<https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/what-does-it-mean-to-leave-no-one-behind-.html>>, pp. 3-4.

<sup>229</sup> Esteves, Paulo (2017). Agora somos todos países em desenvolvimento? A Cooperação Sul-Sul e os ODS. Pontes, Volume 13 - Number 3. Available at <<https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/pontes/news/agora-somos-todos-pa%C3%ADses-em-desenvolvimento-a-coopera%C3%A7%C3%A3o-sul-sul-e-os-ods>>.

<sup>230</sup> Esteves, Paulo (2017).

<sup>231</sup> Esteves, Paulo (2017).

<sup>232</sup> Interview with Siafa Hage.

<sup>233</sup> Interview with Anne-Lise Klausen.

<sup>234</sup> Interview with Peter van Sluijs.



they could even alleviate the problems with the label 'fragile' (more ahead) and increase value in being a member of the g7+ by offering to help others achieve successes in advocacy: "This is a great strength of the group; all these countries have experiences to share among them and, why not, with the world".<sup>235</sup>

At the end of the day, however, the group will have to take a firmer stance as to where it sees itself when it comes to being more active in initiatives like the Pathfinders, which, if we can use it as a proxy, sees SDG16 as everyone's goal.<sup>236</sup> "They are members of Pathfinders, but if they were the conveners, people might think the universality [of the agenda] was lost".<sup>237</sup> This idea seems to ring true: "We are involved, but it is not focused on conflict-affected countries. If we were to engage fully, we always try to bring our perspective."<sup>238</sup> So far, the diplomatic skills of the Secretariat seem to have served to work around these issues of belonging, but as the implementation of the 2030 Agenda goes forward, not taking a firmer stance might mean losing out on opportunities to access resources and develop partnerships. **The choice of a 'success case' that can be rebranded internationally in terms of an expertise can walk hand in hand with fully belonging with more global initiatives.** This careful positioning would also perhaps help recover the history of leadership in getting SDG16 approved.

## *Showcase: how is peace done by way of the New Deal?*

The 2030 Agenda, with all its transversal themes, has been approved amid UN reforms in its peacebuilding architecture. In 2016, the twin resolutions on sustaining peace have brought to the fore a more complex and holistic understanding of peace, which opposes clear-cut linear and sequential images like the 'pre'- and 'post-conflict', and opens space for the contributions of what academics call 'positive peace':<sup>239</sup> "sustaining peace implies deliberate policy objectives to achieve 'everyday peace', which not only means that demand is driven by real local conditions, including political will, but that true peace is neither accidental, nor can it be externally imposed."<sup>240</sup> There is also important focus on prevention, which as seen has historically accounted for the smallest portion of aid flows, and is now understood as a key aspect of sustaining peace.<sup>241</sup>

<sup>235</sup> Interview with Farz Abdallah; Mustakim.

<sup>236</sup> See <https://www.sdg16.plus/research>

<sup>237</sup> Interview with Sarah Cliffe.

<sup>238</sup> Interview with Habib Mayar.

<sup>239</sup> Galtung, Johan. "Peace, Positive and Negative". The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Daniel J. Christie,

<sup>240</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2019), p. 37. See also International Peace Institute (IPI) (2017), "Sustaining Peace: what does it mean in practice?"

<sup>241</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2019), OECD (2018a).



This all puts politics at the core of issues of peace and development. Peace is political. In that sense, as was said the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting, maybe the group could invest in using its platform in a political way to garner support from key regional actors that have important weight on peace and security.<sup>242</sup> “Development has also always been political, of course, but in the past few years it has become increasingly more technical, populated by M&E systems that are often focused more on making data available than on incentivizing real learning from them.”<sup>243</sup> Let us say that “sustaining peace begins with identifying those attributes and assets that have sustained social cohesion, inclusive development, the rule of law, and human security—the factors that together contribute to a peaceful society.”<sup>244</sup> All this strongly resonates with the New Deal principles found in TRUST and with the PSGs. **This conversation needs politics.**

“We might be able to contain the immediate impact of violence, but we cannot tackle the root cause without addressing the grievances that drive these conflicts. Pursuing country-led dialogue and reconciliation is the most affordable option to address those grievances. If the UN is serious about making its ‘sustaining peace agenda’ a reality, it should facilitate and support all possible tracks of diplomacy to stop ongoing wars and conflicts first. There are countries and champions of peace whose experience can inspire us. Despite meager resources, the g7+ group has identified its own champions of peace to promote dialogue and reconciliation through peer-learning and ‘fragile-to-fragile cooperation.’”<sup>245</sup>

“What is crucial is for politicians to understand the causes of conflict.”<sup>246</sup> / “Addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility with full recognition of the countries’ unique context is at the core of success towards peace and resilience.”<sup>247</sup> – A central part of the New Deal and PSGs has been based on contextual approaches to peace that look into the root causes of conflict, be they sourced inside, outside or in a more complex combination of those, as is usually the case. **The g7+ can take the opportunity of the intense flux of changes in this area to make outstanding contributions to how peace is contextualized in conflict-affected situations, by sharing ways of valuing local expertise about root causes.** One way of doing this is by redefining the very indicators that will be used to measure results in the 2030 Agenda, especially SDG16 but not only – peace is precisely not just about conflict, or even justice and institutions; peace is

<sup>242</sup> Naheed Sarabi, 5th Ministerial Meeting, Lisbon, 27 June 2019.

<sup>243</sup> Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2019), p. 32. See also Rocha de Siqueira, I. (2017); Ramalingam, B. Aid on the Edge of Chaos. Rethinking International Cooperation in a Complex World. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>244</sup> International Peace Institute (IPI) (2017), p. 2.

<sup>245</sup> Mayar, Habib (2018). Sustaining peace and shared prosperity: The question of fragile states. Global Social Policy, Vol. 18(2) 222–227.

<sup>246</sup> Interview with Cyriaque Miburo.

<sup>247</sup> g7+ (2018). Newsletter, June. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/project/june-2018-g7-newsletter/>>, p. 2.

about education, equality, health and society in general, and the world is increasingly supporting that view. Having chosen 20 priority indicators (see Figure 18), the g7+ can perhaps now go deep into defining the terms of the indicators chosen, which can influence debates held inside and outside the group. This can be done by adding, as done, for instance, an indicator on IDPs, which is crucial for the g7+ countries, or by deciding how and who will collect data. “Doing oneself” was always at the core of the Fragility Assessments; more related to capacity-building and country-led solutions that help to galvanize societal report and awareness than to perfectly technical templates. Moreover, it seems the **g7+ would benefit from using the selected 20 indicators as showcases of country-own, country-led monitoring**. This does not mean that no assistance would be used but that the exercise itself would be conducted with ownership and leadership of g7+ countries. **Local experts should be hired whenever possible**. Offering inputs to a key area of the 2030 Agenda, the g7+ can better bargain for the right kind of support. “The UN has to deliver on this agenda. Find the resident coordinators; they have to commit, and the g7+ can be an important ally in this regard.”<sup>248</sup>

In an interim report on its priority indicators, the g7+ states

“The key criterion for inclusion in the list of priority indicators was that they should closely relate to these countries’ priority concerns, as discussed and decided by the member countries themselves. *Fourteen of these twenty indicators are part of the UN list of ‘official’ SDG indicators comprised in the Agenda 2030. The remaining six are not a part of that list, but were deemed important dimensions for tracking progress towards their respective Goals.* In the case of some of these indicators, comprehensive, comparable data are not yet available – these should constitute a priority focus for governments and donors alike when it comes to improving statistical systems, and data on them will be included in future g7+ SDG reports as they become available.”<sup>249</sup>

<sup>248</sup> Interview with Gary Milante.

<sup>249</sup> g7+. g7+ SDG Report 2018, partial draft, our emphasis.

## BOX 2: g7+ and IDPs

*"Many of the global policy agendas regrettably lack specific goals and indicators on internal displacement."<sup>250</sup>*

*In addition, "no SDG targets or indicators specifically related to internal displacement".<sup>251</sup>*

Based on data from OECD's *States of Fragility* 2018, four out of the top ten countries with the largest population of IDPs are members of the g7+ (in order from the largest): DRC, Yemen, South Sudan and Afghanistan, with numbers varying from almost 1,8 million to more than 2,2 million.<sup>252</sup> One big challenge for LNOB is how to monitor the vulnerabilities of this particular group when many countries do not have baseline data.<sup>253</sup> Nevertheless, the g7+ chose to include "National number of Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees" as an indicator under SDG16, and this is classified as 'available' for some countries, not all.<sup>254</sup> Specific, tailored and principled engagement with international support for this issue might be made a 'success case' (see above) for country-led monitoring of the SDGs.

### *Funding justice and other priorities: inclusiveness*

As seen, research has shown that ODA to fragile states in key areas of PSGs 1 – Legitimate politics; PSG 2- Security; and PSG 3 – Justice are not faring better than for non-fragile states. PSG 4 – Economic foundations and PSG 5 – Revenues & Services concentrated a larger portion of ODA. There are important caveats, like the fact that "certain activities cost more than others. For instance, PSG 4 (economic foundations) and PSG 5 (revenues and services) most likely will always receive more support than PSG 1 (legitimate politics), by virtue of the type and number of activities they include."<sup>255</sup> Yet PSGs 1-3 are priorities for the g7+ just as PSGs 4-5. Although there are difficulties in monitoring those areas, as seen above, there might be opportunities in these challenges: a) continued engagement in the area of '**access to Justice**' might offer visibility and also lead to non-ODA alternatives to funding; and b) more active engagement with **civil society** can also attract new country-led solutions to PSG 1,<sup>256</sup> besides being a long-time priority of the group which some perceive has been put in

<sup>250</sup> See <https://www.sustainablegoals.org.uk/tackling-internal-displacement-sdgs/>

<sup>251</sup> See <http://sdg.iisd.org/news/to-leave-no-one-behind-brief-calls-for-considering-idps-in-sdg-implementation/>.

<sup>252</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 109.

<sup>253</sup> See <https://www.sustainablegoals.org.uk/tackling-internal-displacement-sdgs/>

<sup>254</sup> g7+. g7+ SDG Report 2018, partial draft.

<sup>255</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 141.

<sup>256</sup> van Veen, Erwin and Dudouet, Véronique (2017).

second place in the context of IDPS and even in g7+’s processes.<sup>257</sup> Both pathways would lead to **inclusiveness**, which would fit with the key priorities in the 2030 Agenda. Moreover, ‘access to Justice’ seems to be the most well-funded targets at least by UNDP, while ‘participatory decision-making’, for instance, is the third most well-funded, and this is just under SDG16, by its turn, the largest funding among the SDGs in UNDP (see Figure 13).<sup>258</sup>

In terms of other key priorities, recommendations offered by interviewees and during the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting seem crucial: there are certain conditions on the ground, that is, structures put in place by organizations such as the UN and the World Bank, that can be better strategically put to use. This is the case of the resident coordinators and of World Bank local representatives, who can perhaps be approached more often and in concrete ways to get an understanding of how best to make use of organizations’ windows of opportunity in funding.<sup>259</sup> Of course, the challenges of actually being heard apply,<sup>260</sup> but that is also where the group can perhaps offer support, technical and political, providing guidelines on how to engage.

## *International engagement*

In terms of outbound influence and action, the secretariat’s diplomatic and advocacy skills have been almost consensually praised among interviewees and in diverse documents. Perhaps the most direct, prominent test and opportunity now is with the g7+’s application to have **UN observer status** (see Figure 20). The observer status requires consensus at the UN; “it would mean to move from a *de facto* only to include a *de jure* acceptance.”<sup>261</sup> The process is already in motion and it is not going to take long. Some key actions, however, can perhaps still increase chances of good receptivity, such as making sure externals are invited to meetings, and engaging with SSC discourse and practice – for instance, co-convening side events. As the secretariat has stated before, approximation of the five Security Council members could also be helpful.<sup>262</sup> The non-intervention agenda is a vehicle for that, but it comes at a political cost when argued in the context of notorious traditional donors’ flags, such as gender equality and LNOB. As an interviewee suggests, the best approach might be neutrality, but it only works to a certain extent.<sup>263</sup> Another interviewee suggested that for this and other key interactions

<sup>257</sup> Peter van Sluijs says the fact, for instance, that there is no civil society co-chair evidences unbalanced approach to the three constituencies in IDPS – INCAF, g7+ and civil society. Paul Okumu says more dialogue is necessary (interviews).

<sup>258</sup> See <https://open.undp.org/sdg/16/Peace,%20justice,%20and%20strong%20institutions>

<sup>259</sup> Similar points were made by Christian Lotz, Gary Milante and Amara Konneh, Advisor for Fragility, Conflict and Violence at the World Bank (this during the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting, Lisbon, 27 June 2019).

<sup>260</sup> As well mentioned by a focal point during the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting, Lisbon, 27 June 2019.

<sup>261</sup> Interview with Helder da Costa.

<sup>262</sup> Interview with Helder da Costa.

<sup>263</sup> Interview with Iriana Ximenes.

at the global stage, the group should invest in the formation of **skilled people**, who “can go back to the drawing board and rethink the **politics**.”<sup>264</sup> Another suggestion that sounds viable and strategic in the long-term is to consider partnering with think tanks, academic departments and civil society, “so they fight the fights the g7+ can’t at the international stage,”<sup>265</sup> producing sound analysis, close advice but without directly committing the group – as done by many centers in the US.

Some recommendations offered during the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting sound extremely relevant to increase international engagement and support at UN stages and regards how the g7+ shows itself as a group. First, as the work done to get SDG16 approved shows, it is key to make use of permanent missions in New York. In addition, when it comes to public engagement, it is vital that member countries mention the g7+ and its importance in speeches offered at the General Assembly. On the side, the group can also benefit of less formal partnerships, like creating a “Friends of the g7+” network that includes actors from different backgrounds.<sup>266</sup>

Finally, it is important to be aware and sensitive towards Least Developed Countries (LDC)’s concerns. Resources have been quite limited for this group (Figure 11).

## Risks

### *Label*

There have been issues with the word ‘fragile’ since the inception of the group, especially among African countries. Although some focal points indicated this is not a major obstacle to engagement, it is known it has caused disengagement before.<sup>267</sup> Language already is adapted to each context – ‘fragility’ goes well with MDBs but not at the UN. Some documents refer to ‘conflict-affected countries’ instead, which some members of civil society also seem to prefer.<sup>268</sup> Considering the opportunity of a ministerial meeting to hear all members might be important at this strategic point – when approximation to the UN is on the table. It is important to acknowledge, however, that a certain ‘brand’ has indeed been secured already and any changes might mean some loss in that sense.

---

<sup>264</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>265</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

<sup>266</sup> These recommendations were offered by Noeleen Heyzer, former Undersecretary General and now member of the g7+ Foundation.

<sup>267</sup> Ethiopia and Nepal.

<sup>268</sup> Interview with Paul Okumu.

## *Internal cohesion*

As indicated in many instances of this report, although both the Timorese and the Secretariat in general have been extensively complimented by their skilled leadership, many externals have pointed out that internationally the group does not look diverse enough. There is also ample concern with the lack of **buy-in or whole-of-government** approaches. As the group faces news considerable challenges, it is key to retain and even increase internal cohesiveness, so the ongoing processes are not negatively affected. Three actions could be considered, and a fourth more urgently so. Starting with the latter, approval of the g7+ **Charter**, which was elaborated in 2014 and is a requirement for the observer status, is pressing. In the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting, it was agreed this matter will be pressed further in each country. The group could also seriously consider a) organizing a Summit of Head of States, to get national buy-in in member countries; b) improving a few internal processes, such as the frequency when annual reports are made available and the clarity as to who the focal points are,<sup>269</sup> keeping profiles up-to-date on the website; and c) making concerns of **Small Islands** a little more visible – Papua Nova Guinea and Haiti seem little engaged in the group, for instance, and this might be related to the absence of this subgroup's priorities among the g7+'s key agenda, such as concerns with climate change. For instance, among the 20 priority indicators selected by the g7+, there is none on climate change (Interlude 3).

## *Counterterrorism and preventing violent extremism (PVE)*

Recently, OECD has undergone consultation to rethink how it calculates ODA. "To protect the integrity of the ODA concept, the boundary between security and development expenditures has been kept clear."<sup>270</sup> With the perspective of seeing change to a new statistical measure called Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD), the 2018 *States of Fragility* lists examples of activities currently excluded from ODA that could be considered under TOSSD:

"Some counter-terrorism activities beyond preventing violent extremism, which now is the only such activity included in ODA. 'Combatting terrorism' is explicitly covered under SDG target 16a and could thus be considered under TOSSD."<sup>271</sup>

"Peacekeeping expenditures beyond the 15% ODA coefficient currently applied so that the development activities embedded within these operations are captured. Now, ODA

<sup>269</sup> The latter two pieces of advice were offered by Anonymous and Anne-Like Klausen, respectively.

<sup>270</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 146.

<sup>271</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 147.

support for the Arms Trade Treaty and other disarmament activities is limited to small arms and light weapons (SALW) and to demining, while it excludes disarmament activities related to such items as chemical and nuclear weapons.”<sup>272</sup>

It would be highly recommended that the g7+ commission a detailed study about how these changes can impact member countries. This should perhaps include previous research on the correlations between fragility, terrorism and PVE.<sup>273</sup> Any engagements with this theme can have long-term impacts that would best be scrutinized.

## Some brief concluding thoughts on the future of the g7+

The g7+ has lived through a steep learning curve, learning to be together as a group and, in a way, learning to effectively share with others about their realities. As a still recent initiative, in our view, it has achieved quite a lot in a short period of time. These are not the kind of achievements that can be *attributed* but, in fact, the view of those engaged count high in the kind of influence the g7+ seeks to practice, so that an overall positive impression, even more so in such a difficult agenda, balances things in favor of the group. If one theme cuts across all others in the vision ahead is the need to discuss politics inside and out. Internally, involving civil society, increasing buy-in, promoting contextual country-led approaches to fragility; and internationally, addressing the thorny issues that loom in the horizon, such as the dilemmas over universality and fragility, monitoring and context-specific approaches for the SDGs, reclaiming past achievements and rebranding them in light of new language, effectively using the platform to redefine peace in terms of root causes and prevention, engaging with other developing countries and continuously fighting for long-term effective engagement in fragile states.

Overall, the review showed there is great support still, so that the key factor in making influence and action possible is there. In fact, the g7+ seems to be a special case in which the amount of support is not necessarily attached to a capacity to completely fulfil promises made. While all the time there are certainly new trends in development politics that constantly defy one's focus, the g7+ has shown an incredible capacity to follow up on partnerships and consolidate a network of optimist supporters. The group's way of doing things has certainly found resonance and should be nurtured, which should not, however, steal away from the motivation to make changes to adapt to this new and challenging development scenario.

<sup>272</sup> OECD (2018a), p. 147.

<sup>273</sup> See Mathews, R. (2006) The 9/11 Factor and Failed States -Food for Thought Notes. In: Pureza, J. M., et al. (eds.) Peacebuilding and Failed States. Some Theoretical Notes Coimbra, Oficina do Centro de Estudos Sociais, Laboratório Associado, Universidade de Coimbra (CES), pp. 14-21; Stewart, P. (2011) Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press.





Figure 20: Explaining UN observer status (our elaboration).

## References

- Adio-Bolaji, Adedayo (2015). The Challenge of Measuring SDG 16: What Role for African Regional Frameworks?. European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper n. 175.
- African Development Bank (2015). Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa. Available at < <https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/addressing-fragility-and-building-resilience-in-africa-the-afdb-group-strategy-2014-2019-48812/>>
- African Union (2013). Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. Available at <[https://au.int/en/Agenda2063/popular\\_version](https://au.int/en/Agenda2063/popular_version)>
- African Union (2014). Common Africa Position (CAP) on the Post 2015 Development Agenda.
- Allouche, Jeremy and Lind, Jeremy (2014). Beyond the New Deal: Global Collaboration and Peacebuilding. IDS Policy Briefing. Issue 59
- Ashcroft, Vincent; Laing, Andrew; Lockhart, Clare (2017). Statebuilding in conflict-affected & fragile states: a comparative study. Institute for State Effectiveness and g7+. Available at < <https://effectivestates.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ISE-6-timorAfghan-1-WEB.pdf>>
- Asian Development Bank (2013). Operational plan for enhancing ADB's effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Available at < <https://www.adb.org/documents/operational-plan-enhancing-adb-effectiveness-fragile-and-conflict-affected-situations>>
- Baer, Katherine; Gupta, Sanjeev; Pessoa, Mario (2017). Building Fiscal Institutions in Fragile States. IMFBlog. Available at <<https://blogs.imf.org/2017/08/09/building-fiscal-institutions-in-fragile-states/#more-20944>>
- BRICS Policy Center and Articulação SUL (2017). Caminhos para a construção de sistemas e processos de monitoramento e avaliação da cooperação Sul-Sul. Available at <<https://articulacaosul.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Caminhos-MA.pdf>>
- Brinkman, Henk-Jan (2013). Peace, Justice and Governance in The Post-2015 Development Framework. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 8:3.
- Costa, Helder (2012). g7+ and the New Deal: Country-Led and Country-Owned Initiatives: a Perspective from Timor-Leste, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 7:2, 96-102
- Costa, Helder and Hage, Siafa (2013). Putting peace at the core of development. Development and Peace Foundation.
- Costa Guterres, Francisco (2017). A forward looking model of reconciliation. *Research Findings Brief*, g7+.

Edu-Afful, Fiifi (2019). Deconstructing Ebola in West Africa: Options for Future Response, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*. 13:2, 241-247.

Esteves, Paulo (2017). Agora somos todos países em desenvolvimento? A Cooperação Sul-Sul e os ODS. *Pontes*, Volume 13 - Number 3. Available at <<https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/pontes/news/agora-somos-todos-pa%C3%ADses-em-desenvolvimento-a-coopera%C3%A7%C3%A3o-sul-sul-e-os-ods>>

Evans, Alex and Steven, David (2010). Towards a theory of influence for twenty-first century foreign policy: The new public diplomacy in a globalized world. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 6(1): 18-26.

g7+ (2010). Dili Declaration. Available at < <http://g7plus.org/resources/3235/>>

g7+ (2013). Note on the Fragility Spectrum. Kinshasa, g7+.

g7+ (2014a) The Haiti Declaration.

g7+ (2014b) Lomé Communiqué.

g7+ (2014c) Pathways toward Resilience. The Journey Continues... [Online]. Available from: [http://www.g7plus.org/sites/default/files/resources/g7plus-Charter\\_0.pdf](http://www.g7plus.org/sites/default/files/resources/g7plus-Charter_0.pdf). Accessed: 18 April 2016.

g7+ (2015) Annual Report 2014-2015. Available at < <http://g7plus.org/resources/g7-annual-report-2014-2015/>>

g7+ (2015). Newsletter, October. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/project/october-2015-g7-newsletter/>>

g7+ (2016a). Newsletter, October. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/project/march-2016-g7-newsletter/>>

g7+ (2016b). Newsletter, March. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/project/march-2016-g7-newsletter/>>

g7+ (2016c). Aid instruments for peace- and state-building: Putting the New Deal into practice. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/resources/aid-instrument-for-peace-and-statebuilding-putting-the-new-deal-into-practices-2016/>>

g7+ (2016d). Strength in fragility: "We are writing our own history" – The emergence of the g7+ group from our own perspective. Available at < <http://g7plus.org/resources/strength-in-fragility-we-are-writing-our-own-history/>>

g7+ (2018). Newsletter, June. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/project/june-2018-g7-newsletter/>>

g7+. g7+ Policy Note on Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/our-work/peer-learning-and-cooperation/>>

g7+. 7 Things to Know About Fragile-to-fragile (F2f) Cooperation. Available at < <http://g7plus.org/our-work/peer-learning-and-cooperation/>>

g7+. g7+ SDG Report 2018, partial draft.

Galtung, Johan (2011). Peace, Positive and Negative. In Christie, Daniel J. (ed). The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology, First Edition. Wiley-Blackwell

GTZ (2006). Prácticas sensibles a los conflictos y la paz: Contribuciones conceptuales y ejemplos de aplicación.

Hauck, Volker; Galeazzi, Greta; Vanheukelom, Jan (2013). The EU's state building contracts: Courageous assistance to fragile states, but how effective in the end? (ECDPM Briefing Note 60). Maastricht: ECDPM.

Hearn, Sarah. 2016. Independent Review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States for the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University.

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011). A Political Strategy to Secure International Acceptance of the PSGs. Meeting of the Steering Group. Nairobi, IDPS.

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011). A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. Available at [https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer\\_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the\\_new\\_deal.pdf](https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf)

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2014) New Deal Monitoring Report. Available at [https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer\\_public/bd/e3/bde37bb3-abd0-4faa-9a85-c4eaa438a32b/ndmr14.pdf](https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/bd/e3/bde37bb3-abd0-4faa-9a85-c4eaa438a32b/ndmr14.pdf).

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2017). The Use of Country Systems and the New Deal: The State of Play in 2017.

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Realisation of the SDGs in Countries Affected by Conflict and Fragility: The Role of the New Deal. Conceptual Note.

Jones, Harry (2011). A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Available at <<https://www.odi.org/resources/docs/6453.pdf>>

Martins, N., Leigh, C., Stewart, J., Andersson, D. (2014). Natural Resources in g7+ Countries. g7+ Secretariat. Available at < <http://g7plus.org/resources/natural-resource-management-publication-2015/>>

Mayar, Habib Ur Rehman (2014). The Journey Towards Resilience Continues: g7+ Priorities to Confront Ebola, Implement the New Deal and Influence the Post-2015 Agenda. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 9:3, 122-126

Mayar, Habib (2018). Sustaining peace and shared prosperity: The question of fragile states. Global Social Policy, Vol. 18(2) 222–227

Mathews, R. (2006) The 9/11 Factor and Failed States -Food for Thought Notes. In: Pureza, J. M., et al. (eds.) Peacebuilding and Failed States. Some Theoretical Notes Coimbra, Oficina do Centro de Estudos Sociais, Laboratório Associado, Universidade de Coimbra (CES), pp. 14-21.



Muggah, Robert; Campbell, Ivan; Hamann, Eduarda; Diniz, Gustavo; Motta, Marina (2013). A promoção da paz no contexto pós-2015: o papel das potências emergentes. Nota Estratégica 7. Igarapé and Safeworld. Available at <[https://igarape.org.br/pdf/promocao\\_da\\_paz.pdf](https://igarape.org.br/pdf/promocao_da_paz.pdf)>

OECD (2016). States of fragility. Available at <<http://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2016-9789264267213-en.htm>>

van Veen, Erwin and Dudouet, Véronique (2017). Hitting the target, but missing the point? Assessing donor support for inclusive and legitimate politics in fragile societies. OECD. Available at <[https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/Hitting\\_the\\_target.pdf](https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/Hitting_the_target.pdf)>

OECD (2018a). States of fragility. Available at <<http://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2018-9789264302075-en.htm>>

OECD (2018b). Development Co-operation report 2018 – Joining forces to leave no one behind. Available at <<https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-co-operation-report-2018-20747721.htm>>

Phillips, Ann L. (2018). The New Deal has failed. What must be done?. Impulse 07-08/2016. FriEnt. Available at <<https://www.frient.de/news/details/news/the-new-deal-has-failed-what-must-be-done/>>

Phillips, Ann L. Liberia's New Deal and the Ebola Crisis (draft)

Republic of Sierra Leone (2012). Fragility Assessment. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/resources/sierra-leone-fragility-assessment/>>

Republic of South Sudan (2012). Fragility Assessment. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/resources/south-sudan-fragility-assessment-report/>>

Ribeiro Pereira, Laura (2014). What's Peace Got To Do With It? Advocating Peace in the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Perspective - FES New York.

Rocha de Siqueira, Isabel (2014). Measuring and Managing 'State Fragility': The Production of Statistics by the World Bank, Timor-Leste and the g7+. Third World Quarterly, 35 (2), 268-283

Rocha de Siqueira, Isabel (2016). Development by Trial and Error: The Authority of Good Enough Numbers. International Political Sociology, 11 (2).

Rocha de Siqueira, Isabel (2017). Managing State Fragility: Conflict, Quantification and Power. New York: Routledge.

Rocha de Siqueira, Isabel (2019). The Case for South-South Cooperation on Peace and Development. United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and BRICS Policy Center. Available at <<https://www.unsouthsouth.org/2019/03/18/the-case-for-south-south-cooperation-on-peace-and-development-2019/>>

Rosenthal, Gert (2017). Assessing the Reform of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture: Progress and Problems, Two Years On. Briefing 47, Future United Nations Development System, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, CUNY Graduate Center.

Saferworld (2017). Goal 16 is about peace, not hard security. Available at <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/740-goal-16-is-about-peaceful-change-not-hard-security>

Stewart, P. (2011) *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

UK Department for International Development (DfID) (2005). *Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states*.

United Nations (2008). *United Nations Juridical Yearbook*. Available at <<http://legal.un.org/unjuridicalyearbook/volumes/2008/>>

United Nations (2015). *The Millennium Development Goals report*. Available at <[https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015\\_MDG\\_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20\(July%201\).pdf](https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf)>

United Nations Development Programme. *SDG 16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions*. Available at <<https://open.undp.org/sdg/16/Peace,%20justice,%20and%20strong%20institutions>>

United Nations Development Programme (2018). *What does it mean to leave no one behind? A UNDP discussion paper and framework for implementation*. Available at <<https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/what-does-it-mean-to-leave-no-one-behind-.html>>

United Nations Economic and Social Council (2010). 'Report of Brazil, Morocco and South Africa on Member States' concerns with indicators released by the United Nations agencies, (E/CN.3/2011/16), 7 December 2010.

United Nations General Assembly (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015. [without reference to a Main Committee (A/70/L.1)] 70/1. *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. Available at <[https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A\\_RES\\_70\\_1\\_E.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf)>

United National General Assembly (2017). A/71/PV.77. Official records of Seventy-first session, 77th plenary meeting. Thursday, 20 April 2017, 10 a.m.

United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the g7+ (2017). *South-South in Action - Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation: Voluntarism, Cooperation and Solidarity*. Available at <<http://g7plus.org/resources/south-south-in-action-fragile-to-fragile-cooperation-2017/>>

United Nations Secretary-General (2018). *The Secretary-General's strategy for financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2018-2021)*. Available at <[https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SG-Financing-Strategy\\_Sep2018.pdf](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SG-Financing-Strategy_Sep2018.pdf)>

United Nations Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel of eminent persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Available at  
<<https://www.un.org/sg/en/management/hlppost2015.shtml>>

US Agency for International Development (USAID) (2005). Fragile States Strategy

World Bank. Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence. Available at  
<<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview>>.

World Bank (2017). IDA18 - Additions to IDA Resources: Eighteenth Replenishment Towards 2030: Investing in Growth, Resilience and Opportunity.

World Bank (2013). IDA 17 - IDA's Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, IDA Resource Mobilization Department, Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships, pp. i-ii.

World Bank (2016). IDA 18 – Special Theme: Fragility, Conflict and Violence, IDA Resource Mobilization Department (DFiRM).

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). Available at  
<<https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>>

Accra Agenda for Actions (2008). Available at  
<<https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>>



# Annex I – List of informants

Agostinho Bernardo	São Tomé e Príncipe focal point	22/06/2019
Amanda Lucey	Consultant at UN Office of Counter-Terrorism	07/06/2019
Anne-Lise Klause	Consultant	19/06/2019
Antonio Co	Guinea-Bissau focal point	11/06/2019
Armand Borrey	Ministre Provincial Honoraire du Plan Budget,Mines,Industrie et Portefeuille dans la Province Orientale Directeur de Cabinet du Ministre National du Plan	18/06/2019
Cecilia Milesi	Consultant /former UNOSSC	18/06/2019
Christian Lotz	Head of Resident's Coordinator office, South Sudan	05/06/2019
Cyriaque Miburo	Burundi focal point	19/06/2019
Donata Garrasi	former IDPS	28/05/2019
Emmanuel Williams	Liberia focal point	13/06/2019
Farz Abdallah	Comoros focal point	21/06/2019
Gary Milante	Former World Bank (FCV), now at SIPRI	18/06/2019
Habib Mayar	Deputy General Secretary	22/05/2019
Helder da Costa	General Secretary, g7+	29/05/2019
Herman Kakule Mukululuki	DRC focal point	10/06/2019
Iriana Ximenes	Timor-Leste focal point	22/06/2019
Muhammad Mustafa Mastoor	Minister of Economy, Afghanistan	17/06/2019
Mustakim Waid	Somalia focal point	18/06/2019
Paul Okumu	African Civil Society Platform and Member of CSSPS	18/06/2019
Peter Van Sluijs	CSPPS/IDPS	15/06/2019
Sarah Cliffe	Former World Bank, UN and now at NYU	19/06/2019
Siafa Hage	former IDPS	13/06/2019

# Annex II – Questionnaire

## **QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWEES** (also offered in Portuguese and French)

### **General questions about the g7+'s role and influence:**

- 1) In your view, what were the main achievements, failures or limitations of IDPS? And of the g7+ in that context?
- 2) What were the agendas that the g7+ were most effective in influencing and what do you attribute their success to (especially since 2015 but not only)?
- 3) Where was the group least effective in their advocacy and action and what would the main factors for this be, in your view?
- 4) In your view what are the key partners the g7+ should prioritize in terms of network?
- 5) What are, in your opinion, the key agendas for fragile countries and how should their representatives act towards them – which entry points and opportunities do you see or anticipate, for instance?
- 6) What would be, on the contrary, the no go areas or possible political pitfalls, if any?
- 7) What would be the place for the g7+ in the current international development scenario?

### **Specific questions (please relate to your country's experience, if applicable):**

- 8) How best can the g7+ serve its member countries?
- 9) What are the actual and the potential contributions of F2F, in your opinion?
- 10) What does the New Deal or elements of it represent for fragile countries all over the world? In your view, should it be boosted? If yes, how would you suggest this be done?
- 11) What are the internal strengths and weaknesses of the g7+ as a group, in your view?
- 12) How can the latter best be addressed?

# Annex III – Terms of Reference



## Terms of Reference

### Independent Review of the g7+

The g7+, an intergovernmental association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict, wishes to contract an evaluator or team of evaluators to undertake an independent review of its activities since its establishment in 2010. These Terms of Reference provide relevant background information, describe the aims and scope of the independent review, and provide additional information on the deliverables, schedule, budget and other matters.

#### Rationale

The g7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development. The g7+ group of countries was established in 2010 to give a collective voice to conflict-affected states, and a platform for learning and support between member countries. It promotes country-owned and country-led planning mechanisms and recommends major changes in the way international partners engage in conflict-affected environments.

The group is currently comprised of 20 countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome e Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo and Yemen.

The collective mission of the g7+ is to support member countries achieve transitions towards resilience and next stages of development, by engaging with actors at both the national and international level. Drawing on shared experiences, the g7+ group of countries comes together to form one united voice to advocate for country-led and country-owned peacebuilding and Statebuilding processes to address conflict and fragility. In doing so, we envisage the development of capable, accountable and resilient states that respond to the expectations and needs of the populations.

The g7+ was formed in response to a gap identified by conflict-affected states in the delivery of international development cooperation. Despite generous assistance from development partners, the effectiveness of the assistance has not been significant. Having learned difficult lessons through the experience of conflict or disaster, and seeking to transition to the next stage of development, our members recognized that conflict-affected states are best positioned to learn from one another about these hard-won experiences and collectively advocate for contextually tailored development policies for our countries. To this end, on 10 April 2010 in Dili, Timor-Leste, the inaugural meeting of the g7+

was held, during which members expressed the will to establish the group as an international organization and continue meeting and sharing experiences.

The group's vision for peacebuilding and Statebuilding was recognized and set out in the Dili Declaration (April 2010). The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, agreed in 2011 by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, of which the g7+ is a critical constituency in partnership with development partners, then became the most prominent call for a step-change in international assistance to countries affected by conflict and fragility. Both of these documents remain crucial reference points for the activity of the g7+ along with the g7+ Charter, which was discussed and endorsed at the Ministerial meeting that took place in Lome, Togo, in 2014, and subsequently ratified by several Member States.

The g7+ Charter establishes the purpose of the g7+ as follows:

1. Facilitate the sharing of lessons learned and good practices for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding among conflict or post-conflict affected states in order to further the shared goals of stability, peace, good governance based on nationally led democratic principles, economic growth and sustainable development following the principles of Volunteerism, Solidarity and Cooperation on the path to resilience;
2. Promote co-operation amongst Member States which is country-owned and country-led through the provision of advice and sharing of lessons learned;
3. Advocate aid management policies founded on the principles of effective engagement in development tailored to the contexts of the Member States and respecting national ownership, transparency and accountability;
4. Promote good governance and effective institutions and to assist each other in development within our Member States in the sphere of politics, public administration, decentralization, natural resources, economics and finance; and
5. Promote stable and peaceful societies in order to transition to the next stage of development while recognizing national ownership and leadership.

Over the years, the g7+ has consistently engaged with multilateral organizations such as the World Bank Group, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, G20, the International Labour Organisation and the African Union in order to build momentum for reforms in the way in which the international community engages with conflict-affected states. It has taken part in and organized numerous international events, including on the side of the United Nations General Assembly and High-Level Political Forum. In the lead-up to the establishment of the Sustainable Development Goals, the g7+ played a central role in ensuring the inclusion of a Goal specifically concerned with peace, justice and effective institutions (SDG 16) in the post-2015 global development agenda.

Another crucial area of activity of the g7+ activity is Fragile-to-Fragile, or F2F, Cooperation. This is a form of cooperation which draws upon the resources and solidarity of countries affected by conflict and fragility, based on the principles of voluntarism, cooperation and solidarity. F2F cooperation

initiatives undertaken over the years have included technical and financial support to electoral processes in member countries, peer-learning initiatives in such domains as public financial management or natural resource management, and initiatives to support peace and reconciliation.

Today, the g7+ aims to build an ever stronger and more respected platform, working in concert with international development partners, the private sector, civil society, the media and people across countries, borders and regions, with a view to reforming international engagement and consolidating progress on the path to resilience and development.

In 2015, the Centre for International Cooperation, New York University, carried out an independent Review on the New Deal implemented by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. The report is now available at the IDPS website. One of the findings, in this independent review, stated that “the g7+ has become an increasingly influential constituency on the global stage. In view of the ongoing work of the g7+ at the country and the global level, it is high time to have a focused independent review on the advocacy work of the g7+ at the international arena, by taking into account the recognition from other well established organisations and institutions.

### **Aims and scope of the Independent Review**

This Independent Review is commissioned by the g7+ Secretariat, which is the permanent body of the g7+ charged with acting as secretary to the Ministerial Forum, advising and supporting the Chair, and organizing Ministerial meetings, technical meetings and other activities of the g7+ group. The g7+ Secretariat has its headquarters in Dili, Timor-Leste, and a recently-established European hub in Lisbon, Portugal. The consultant’s primary focal point while undertaking this Independent Review will be the Deputy General Secretary of the g7+ or other person(s) indicated by him.

The aims of the Independent Review are to systematically and independently review the various areas of activity of the g7+ since its inception and to evaluate the actions and initiatives of the group in light of the g7+ Charter, the Dili Declaration, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, and other relevant guiding documents. This shall include, without being limited to, the following matters and domains:

1. Global policy and advocacy initiatives of the g7+;
2. Fragile-to fragile cooperation initiatives;
3. Implementation of the New Deal at the country level;
4. Ministerial meetings and setting of strategic objectives;
5. Day-to-day activity of the Secretariat, including coordination and communication with the Chair and Deputy Chair, and coordination and communication with the Member States, including the network of Focal Points;
6. External communication and outreach;

7. Funding, staffing and mobilisation of technical and financial assistance;
8. Current and potential role of the Eminent Person and Advisory Council;
9. Institutional consolidation of the g7+, including with regard to its relationship with other multilateral organizations like the United Nations.

In each of these and in other areas deemed relevant in consultation with the g7+ Secretariat, the consultant responsible for undertaking the Independent Review will assess the actual activity of the g7+ in light of the aims of the organization as established in the Charter and other relevant documents, with a view to highlighting the main achievements, identifying shortcomings and putting forth recommendations that will contribute to strengthening the g7+ and its global impact. The ultimate aim is to provide well-substantiated answers to the following questions:

1. What has the g7+ achieved vis-à-vis its objectives?
2. What impact has the g7+ had in influencing global policy and in supporting Member States in the transition to resilience?
3. What have the main strengths and shortcomings of the activity of the g7+ been?
4. What steps can be taken to enhance its impact and the pursuit of its aims?

The key deliverable (final report) in which these answers will be presented shall be aimed primarily to an internal audience (Ministerial Forum, Chair, Deputy Chair, g7+ Secretariat and Member States). A version of the final report without references to confidential or strictly internal matters shall also be prepared for external stakeholders. The precise scope of the two versions of the report shall be discussed and agreed between the consultant and the g7+ Secretariat.

## **Methodology**

The Independent Review will be based on a desk review of relevant literature and documentation (documents provided by the g7+ Secretariat as well as external documents of relevance to the g7+), along with interviews with internal and external stakeholders (including, without being limited to, the Chair, Deputy Chair, Eminent Person, General Secretary, Deputy General Secretary, other g7+ Secretariat staff, former Chairs, Focal Points, members of Member State governments, representatives of donors and other organisations with which the g7+ has partnered, and other experts). Some of these interviews can be organised remotely, but some amount of travelling is expected to be required. The g7+ Secretariat will strive to make its staff available within reason and to provide the consultant with access to the relevant documentation and contact lists.

## **Guiding Principles**

In undertaking this Independent Review, the consultant is expected to abide by rigorous ethical standards, including with respect to anonymity of responses except when otherwise expressly

permitted by the interviewee, and respect for the confidentiality of the data and information provided except as may be explicitly agreed.



# Annex IV: Taking Stock of Fragility Assessments

\* Common indicators between South Sudan's and Sierra Leone's Fragility Assessments, which present the same structure. \*\* indicate those that are listed in Timor-Leste's assessments. The indicators on bold are listed in the 2016 g7+ list of SDGs indicators. (our elaboration.)

	How long did it take?	How many people or institutions were involved?	Methods	Who funded?	Who facilitated the activities?	Which institutions produced the data for the indicators?	Common indicators*
<b>South Sudan 2012</b>	"a multi-day assessment workshop" (August 2012) and "two-day validation workshop in November 2012"	The "multi-day assessment workshop brought together 100 participants, including HE the Vice President, as well as ministers, advisors and representatives from central and 10 state governments, civil society, academia and international partners". The workshop was "attended by more than 50 stakeholders"	"In addition to consultations, the assessment also drew on relevant literature and quantitative data, where available, to illustrate and validate perceptions."	It was "carried out with support from the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF), Denmark, the g7+ Secretariat, the ODI Budget Strengthening Initiative, UNDP, and the World Bank"	Not specified ("a consultant worked with Government and partners to formulate a draft assessment report, and helped develop a first menu of indicators to situate South Sudan on the fragility spectrum")	Both national (i.e. NBS/Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; National Crime Statistics; Ministry of Finance and Econ. Planning; High Frequency Survey) and international (i.e. UN).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ <b>Diversity in representation in key-decision making bodies</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Perception of representation (and its effectiveness) in government</li> </ul> </li> <li>→ Participation in elections and political processes**</li> <li>→ Level of satisfaction with the quality of the election process                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Violent deaths per 100,000 population</li> </ul> </li> <li>→ <b>Number of IDPs plus refugees due to conflict**</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ % trust in customary justice system, % trust in formal justice system</li> </ul> </li> <li>→ Awareness of legal and human rights                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ <b>Access to transport networks and energy**</b></li> </ul> </li> <li>→ Income inequality among regions (Gini coefficient)</li> <li>→ <b>Level of employment (by</b></li> </ul>
<b>Sierra Leone 2012</b>	"one week of intensive workshops"	"Over fifty representatives from government ministries and agencies, regional governance bodies throughout Sierra Leone, parliamentarians and civil society groups"	Not specified.	It was "carried out with support from the g7+ Secretariat, ODI's Budget Strengthening Initiative, DFID and UNDP".	Not specified.	Both national (i.e. Sierra Leone National Elections Commission; Sierra Leone Police; Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs; and others) and international (i.e. UN agencies; WB; IMF, WHO; AfDB; and others).	

<b>Timor Leste 2013</b>	2 months (July-August 2012)	<p>"41 institutions include State Institutions, Development Partners, Civil Societies Organization, Local Authorities from two selected districts and Universities" (including: Ministries of Justice; State Administration; Petroleum and Mineral Resource; Agriculture; Tourism, Commerce and Industry)</p>	<p>"Data collection methods used on this assessment was: interviews with relevant stakeholders, group discussions in each PSG and desk study."</p>	Not specified.	<p>Fragility Assessment Team at Ministry of Finance (also "support from Australian Government and UNDP, who have seconded one of their Timorese staff to support the team and also UNMIT's Department of Social Economic and World Bank's consultant who provided support in defining the country indicators")</p>	Does not relate indicators with possible sources.	<p><b>youth, gender, region)**</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Existence and enforcement of regulatory framework for natural resource management</li> <li>→ State monopoly and capacity to collect and administer tax, customs and fees across its territory**</li> <li>→ Tax revenue as share of GDP</li> <li>→ Quality of public financial management and internal and public oversight mechanisms</li> </ul>
<b>Timor Leste 2015</b>	6 months	<p>"The qualitative data collection process involved community dialogue conducted in 13 municipalities with between 16-30 participants in each discussion. In total 320 participants gave their thoughts and perspectives through dialogue."</p>	<p>"interviews with key actors in line-ministries and directorates" + "accessing statistics, policy documents and program reports to compile complete data on each indicator"</p>	Timor Leste Government and g7+ Secretariat	<p>Activities were "led by the Department Partnership Management Unit (DPMU) under the Ministry of Finance (MoF) along with key line-ministries and the Fragility Assessment Taskforce team (PSG Coordinators) with technical support from the g7+ Secretariat (as capacity building of g7+ member countries). The Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD) was the contributing agency representing the civil society."</p>	Does not relate indicators with possible sources., but the sources cited throughout the text are mainly national (i.e. laws, ministerial reports, National Statistics Directorate (NDS) and so on), but also include international ones (such as the g7+ and UNDP).	

[g7plus.org](http://g7plus.org)

[bricspolicycenter.org](http://bricspolicycenter.org)

