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Brazilian Health and Agricultural Cooperation in Angola: An overview

João Moura M. da Fonseca; Paulo Luiz M. L. Esteves;
Geovana Zoccal Gomes.



BRICS Policy Center Centro de Estudos e Pesquisas - BRICS



SSC
South-South Cooperation

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List of Acronyms

ABC Agência Brasileira de Cooperação; Brazilian Cooperation Agency

ADRA Acção para Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente; Action for Rural Development and Environment

Apex-Brasil Agência de Promoção da Exportação e Investimento; Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency

AU União Africana; African Union

BNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social; Brazilian Development Bank

BRICS Brazil Russia India China and South Africa

CERESAN Centro de Referência em Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional; Reference Centre for Food and Nutrition Security

CFPC Centro de Formação Profissional do Cazenga; Cazenga Center for Professional Training

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

CONSEA Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional; Brazil's National Food and Nutrition Security Council

CPLP Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa; Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries.

CSFS Centre for Studies in Food Security of the Ryerson University

DAC OECD Development Assistance Committee

DTI South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry

Embrapa Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária; Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation

ENSP Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública; Brazil's National School of Public Health

EPSJV Escola Politécnica em Saúde Joaquim Venâncio; Joaquim Venâncio Polytechnic School of Health

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola; National Liberation Front of Angola

Fiocruz Fundação Oswaldo Cruz; Oswaldo Cruz Foundation

FOCAC Fórum de Cooperação China-África; Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

GDP Gross domestic product

GNI Gross National Income

GoA Government of Angola

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDA International Development Association

IDA/MINADER Instituto do Desenvolvimento Agrário do Ministério da Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural; Angola's Institute of Agricultural Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

IFC International Finance Corporation

IFI International Financial Institutions

IIA Instituto de Investigação Agronómica; Angola's Agricultural Research Institute

IIV Instituto de Investigação Veterinária; Angola's Veterinary Research Institute

IMF International Monetary Found

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

LoCs Lines of Credit

MDA Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário; Brazil's Ministry of Agrarian Development

MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

MINCO Ministério do Comércio; Angola's Ministry of Trade

MPLA Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola; People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola

NDB BRICS New Development Bank

NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa's Development

ODA Official Development Assistance

OPEC Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries

SADC Southern African Development Community

SBI State Bank of India

SENAI Serviço Nacional de Treinamento Industrial; Brazil's National Service for Industrial Training

SENAR Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural; Brazil's National Service for Rural Apprenticeship

SSC South-South Cooperation

TCTP Third Country Training Program

UFRRJ Universidade Feredal Rural do Rio de Janeiro; Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro

UN United Nations

UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verifications Missions

UNDAF-Angola United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Angola

UNICAMP Universidade Estadual de Campinas; University of Campinas

UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola; National Union of Total Independence of Angola

UTF Unilateral Trust Fund

WBG World Bank Group

List of tables, figures and boxes

Table 1 Angola's National Development Plan 2013-2017: objectives and priorities for the agricultural and health sectors

Table 2 UNDAF 2009-2013: Support areas and outcomes

Table 3 Projects in health and agriculture sector financed by the first credit line of China Exim Bank to Angola, under the first framework agreement (2004-2007)

Table 4 Brazilian transnational companies in Angola

Table 5 CPLP's Strategic Axes and structuring networks and Brazilian SSC projects in Angola and Mozambique

Table 6 PROFORSA's Initial Budget

Table 7 Agreements of cooperation signed between Brazil and Angola

Table 8 Protocols signed between Brazil and Angola

Box 1 Angola, the IMF and China's 2004 oil-backed loan

Box 2 World Bank's Angolan trajectory since the end of the Civil War

Box 3 Perceptions from Angola on the New Development Bank

Figure 1 Brazilian infrastructure projects in Angola



Summary

Introduction	9
2. Contextual Analysis	10
2.1 From colonization to the present	10
2.2 State-society relations and traditional development cooperation in Angola	12
2.3 The presence of Russia, India, China and South Africa in Angola	17
2.3.1 Russia	18
2.3.2 India.....	19
2.3.3 China	20
2.3.4 South Africa	21
3. Brazil-Angola development relations	21
3.1 Brazilian development cooperation in the health sector	24
3.1.1. PROFORSA	27
3.2 Brazilian development cooperation in the agricultural sector	29
4. Final considerations	32

Executive Summary

After two research visits to Mozambique during the months of October and November of 2013, a scoping mission was carried out in Angola from the 7th to the 17th of September 2014. In total, 20 people were interviewed in Luanda, including representatives from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, academia, civil society, and the national government, in addition to representatives of the Brazilian government. The objective of this research report is to synthesize key findings, contextual information and analysis required for understanding Brazil's engagement in Angola, as well as basic information on projects being executed by Brazil within the sectors of agriculture and public health. The report draws on a variety of secondary literature, including the discussion papers commissioned in India, South Africa and China. In contrast with the Mozambican case, very little on Brazilian development cooperation in Angola seems to have been produced by other research projects. This highlights the importance of the present undertaking.

Sumário Executivo

Após duas pesquisas de campo conduzidas em Moçambique durante os meses de outubro e novembro de 2013, uma missão de avaliação foi conduzida em Angola entre os dias 7 e 17 de setembro de 2014. No total, 20 pessoas foram entrevistadas em Luanda, incluindo representantes de agências doadoras multilaterais e bilaterais, academia, sociedade civil e governo nacional, além de representantes do governo brasileiro. O objetivo desse relatório de pesquisa é sintetizar as principais descobertas, informação contextual e análise necessária para a compreensão do engajamento brasileiro em Angola, bem como informação básica acerca dos projetos que estão sendo executados pela cooperação brasileira nos setores de agricultura e saúde pública. O relatório se desenha a partir de uma série de literatura secundária, que inclui os discussion papers comissionados dos consultores do projeto na Índia, África do Sul e China. Em contraste com o caso de Moçambique, muito pouco da cooperação brasileira em Angola parece ter sido produzido por outros projetos de pesquisa, o que ressalta a importância da atual missão.

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Introduction

The Brazil-SSC project aims to analyse Brazilian development cooperation practices in Africa within the broader context of the BRICS' growing presence on the continent. The project investigates the impacts of Brazil's role in the fields of agriculture and public health, on both Brazilian cooperation agents and on a variety of local stakeholders. Geographically, the project focuses on two countries where Brazil has been rapidly expanding its engagement and cooperation programmes: Angola and Mozambique.

After two research visits to Mozambique during the months of October and November of 2013, a scoping mission was carried out in Angola from the 7th to the 17th of September 2014. In the case of Angola, the research team opted for condensing its field research efforts into one visit. This has enabled more time for analysis and processing of data collected, as well as opportunities to conduct additional interviews in Brazil.

In total, 20 people were interviewed in Luanda, including representatives from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, academia, civil society, and the national government, in addition to representatives of the Brazilian government. Due to the sensitive content of the interviews, it was agreed that no interviewee or institution would be directly identified.

The objective of this research report is to synthesize key findings, contextual information and analysis required for understanding Brazil's engagement in Angola, as well as basic information on projects being executed by Brazil within the sectors of agriculture and public health. The report draws on a variety of secondary literature, including the discussion papers commissioned in India, South Africa and China. In contrast with the Mozambican case, very little on Brazilian development cooperation in Angola seems to have been produced by other research projects. This highlights the importance of the present undertaking. Information gathered, including additional interviews with implementing and coordinating institutions in Brazil, will also feed into deeper analysis in future publications.

This report is structured as follows: the second section presents a contextual analysis, going through Angola's historical trajectory, and state-society relations in the country in light of traditional development

cooperation, as well as provides snapshots of relations between Angola and Russia, India, China and South Africa; Brazilian relations are discussed in the third section, which contextualizes subsections on health cooperation and a case study of the PROFORSA project; the fourth and final section provides concluding remarks on issues pertaining to BRICS, international development cooperation and Brazilian South-South cooperation informed by field research conducted both in Mozambique and Angola.

2. Contextual Analysis

2.1 From colonization to the present¹

The first Western contact with the region known today as Angola² occurred in 1482, when Portuguese navigator Diogo Cão reached the mouth of the Congo River. After the arrival of the Portuguese in the Americas in the 1500s, the region became an important piece within Portugal's mercantilist system, providing slaves³ that served as labour for sugarcane and coffee plantations, as well as mining and other economic activities in Brazil. By 1700, Angola was considered Portugal's most important colony in Africa. The region's political administration was based on a mix of indigenous and Portuguese institutions. For instance, each military commander headed a presidio, which was in turn divided into chiefdoms, whose rulers paid tributes to military commanders⁴.

Expenses related to wars waged in Europe, together with the instability of the Portugal's government, resulted in relatively small Portuguese investment in Angola. Rebellions occurred throughout the XVII and XVIII centuries, but it was only in the late XIX century that a small nationalist movement was born in Angola, fuelled by voices of educated mestiços (people of mixed Angolan and Portuguese origin). Many in Angola hoped that the transition from a Monarchy to a Republic in Portugal in 1910 would lead to more education, investment and equality in the country. However, German notions of racial superiority increasingly influenced Portuguese ideas.

Repression became particularly brutal under the government of Norton de Matos, appointed in 1921 as the high commissioner of Angola. Administrative and legal reforms were implanted in order to disband and suppress aspects associated with African, non-Portuguese identity. The Republic in Portugal was overthrown in 1926. By the time Salazar became the Minister of Colonies, he was already acting as a dictator. Salazar promoted policies aimed at economic integration with Portugal, which were tainted by institutionalized social and ethnic disparities. Despite censorship and repressive educational and social policies, African leaders emerged in Angola after the Second World War. The Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola - MPLA) was created in 1956 seeking independence under a Marxist-Leninist ideology, and was supported by both the Soviet Union and Cuba. The Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Liberation Front of Angola- FNLA) was created in 1962 after a merge between União das Populações de Angola (Union of Angolan Peoples) e Partido Democrático de Angola (Democratic Party of Angola), and received support from the United States through its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Actions for independence ensued as Portuguese repression increased. In 1966, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union

1 Main sources used to develop the historical segments include Durost Fish (2002) and UNESCO et al. (2010).

2 The name comes from the word used to designate the leader of the Ndongo people – ngola – who ruled over the region around the Kwanza River.

3 By the 1530s, more than 5000 slaves were being shipped yearly across the Atlantic.

4 Important officials such as the chief justice and the military commander were not paid salaries by Portugal, and earned their income from the slave trade and by siphoning government revenue.

of Total Independence of Angola- UNITA), headed by Jonas Savimbi and supported by China, joined the independence struggle.

Though granted independence after Portugal's Carnation Revolution in 1974, disagreements between nationalist movements resulted in a civil war. MPLA managed to convert itself into the dominant political party, promoting economic reforms based on Marxist-Leninist ideas. José Eduardo dos Santos was appointed president in 1979, upon the death of Agostinho Neto. Subsequent attempts to achieve peace between MPLA and UNITA did not last.

Angola's civil war ended with the killing of Savimbi, UNITA's leader, by government troops in 2002. The civil war resulted in at least 500 thousand Angolan deaths, and more than one third of Angola's population displaced (Polgreen, 2003). While the death of its leader left UNITA in disarray (Cauvin, 2002), opposition frequently sprouted within the government, and the threat of a new civil war was always on the horizon of Santo's administration. Such political considerations played an important role in guiding the government's domestic and international engagement. According to the World Bank (2005), the postwar budget "reflect[ed] political choices still concerned with the prevalence of a wartime budget."

Distrust and conspiracies⁵ were ingrained in Angola's political system, and the administration attempted to resolve internal disputes and guarantee its position by expanding the role of the state rather than reducing it (Power, 2011). When Angola turned to traditional donors for reconstruction funds after the civil war, it was faced with various conditionalities. These included, for example, the setting-up of a monitoring facility to assess performance during three semesters before being eligible to receive financial support. The government was not willing to compromise its influence over policy formulation and implementation in exchange for assistance. Consequently, International Financial Institutions (IFI) did not make available the vast quantities of funds needed for reconstruction and development. As will be further developed in the following section, the reluctance of donors to participate in Angola's donor conference, a priority initiative for the government after the end of the civil war, continues to be a source of resentment for the government of Angola (GoA).

Angola's increased oil production and discovery of new oil fields, rising oil prices in the international market, and China's "go out" policy aligned to boost the intensification of relations between the two countries. In seeking to rebuild the country's war-torn infrastructure, Angola has since invested heavily in its partnership with China. In exchange for guaranteed oil supplies, Angola has tapped into multi-billion dollar Chinese credit lines. Meanwhile, Angola overtook Saudi Arabia as the largest supplier of oil to China both in 2006 and 2010, and has become China's largest trade partner in Africa, with bilateral trade reaching US\$ 24.6 billion in 2010 (Power, 2011). The deepening of these relations between finance-hungry Angola and oil-starved China has enabled Angola's government to carry on its development policies without promoting broad institutional reforms required by donors and IFIs in other African countries, such as Mozambique and Uganda (Girod, 2008).

Due to its recognized oil wealth, there have been many recent attempts by emerging and traditional powers to engage Angola as a strategic partner. In 2009, the then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton visited the country weeks after a visit from Russian President Dimitri Medvedev. At the time, Angola held the presidency of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Other BRICS countries have been making similar efforts, as exemplified by the fact that Angola was chosen by South Africa's President Jacob Zuma as the destination of his first state visit since taking office in May 2009 (Power, 2011).

⁵ As exemplified by the wide restructuring of the security apparatus after Miala, the foreign intelligence chief for dos Santos, was sacked in 2006 for conducting "activities against the president" (Jornal de Angola 2007 apud Girod 2008).

Despite its impressive economic growth in the last decade, 30.6% of Angolans live below the national poverty line⁶. Wealth is unequally distributed among its 20.8 million citizens (2012), with economic growth benefits concentrated within the top 5% of the population and 0.18% of the country's territory (CEIC, 2010). Angola's gini coefficient is 0.586, one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2012). Notwithstanding the harsh circumstances intimately linked with more than 25 years of civil war, Angola is today a functioning state that is not dependent on foreign aid. Paradoxically, the same war that destroyed the region's infrastructure, killed at least half a million people, and displaced four million, also enabled the development of a sense of national identity and the acceptance of the State, facilitating large-scale indigenous capital accumulation (Malaquias, 2007).

2.2 State-society relations and traditional development cooperation in Angola

Vast fluxes of development cooperation provided by United Nations agencies, bilateral donors, INGOs and religious organizations shifted towards Angola during the civil war. Those were primarily geared towards emergency and humanitarian objectives, and often got to places virtually unreachable by government actors. The availability of funds enabled a mix of international and national civil society organizations to emerge and grow in Angola. Besides providing funding, international agencies played a significant role in facilitating safe mobility of development workers within war zones⁷.

After the end of the war, the organization of a donors' conference, aimed at raising and aligning funds, as well establishing commitments for reconstruction of Angola's infrastructure and economy, represented one of the national government's priority initiatives. The inability of the IMF and the GoA to reach agreement over issues related to governance and transparency, and irreconcilable sets of statistics, were obstacles to the realization of the conference⁸. With no substantial concessions from each side, the conference was repeatedly delayed over the years, never actually taking place. Additionally, the GoA never got the "seal of approval that could then make them eligible for debt rescheduling through the "Paris Club"(Brautigam, 2009, p. 274). According to more than one informant, many of GoA's senior members to this day exhibited resentment against Northern donors for "not helping Angola when it needed it"⁹. It was at that time that Southern countries, particularly China, began to consolidate their foothold in Angola. One informant pointed out that, when trying to discuss China-Angola relations, more than once he heard from senior officials at the GoA that "when you are drowning, you don't care about who is throwing you the life jacket".

6 National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys. Source: World Bank website. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/AO?display=graph>. Access on: Feb. 21st, 2014.

7 Interview carried out in Luanda in September 2014.

8 See No donors' conference for Angola on horizon (2003). Available at: afrol.com/html/News2003/ang006_donors.htm. Access on: Oct. 6 2014.

9 Interview carried out in Luanda in September 2014.

Box 1 - Angola, the IMF and China's 2004 oil-backed loan

The oil-backed loan that China provided to Angola in 2004 is often depicted as an alternative that enabled the African country to dismiss reforms supported by the IMF, which, allegedly, would have led to greater governance in Angola, if implemented. With some nuances, this also represented the view of most interviewees. Brautigam convincingly argues, however, that the Chinese government did not do anything that Western banks such as BNP Paribas, Commerzbank, Societ e G en erale, Barclays or Standard Chartered were not doing before or after the Chinese deal. The difference was that Chinese conditions were significantly more favorable to Angola, including smaller interest rates and larger grace and repayment periods. Moreover, Angolans later managed to pay their debts with revenue from the booming oil industry, increasing their transparency in the meantime (Brautigam, 2009, p.273-277).

Many civil society organizations disappeared with the retraction of traditional development cooperation in Angola following the end of the civil war. Not only were they fund-starved, but they also had to cope with rising costs and more strict government regulations. This trend was particularly evident in Luanda, where significant numbers of people had moved in search of security during the conflict years¹⁰. Due to especially high costs in Luanda, some NGOs also relocated their headquarters to Benguela. More manageable direct expenses came at significant operational costs and difficulties, since Luanda remained the country's administrative centre.

Additionally, Angolan interviewees often pointed out the regulatory framework pertaining to associations, including the law of associations – “Lei n. 14/91 de 11 de Maio”¹¹ – as another driver of the reduction in the number of civil society organizations during the post-War years. Related obstacles which some sources mentioned included the difficulties in receiving foreign funds, as well as the substantial limitations to institutional autonomy imposed on organizations registered as “associations of general interest”. As a result, most interviewees characterized Angolan civil society as small, with capacity concentrated in a handful of organizations, and non-independent, with many of the more vocal organizations being linked to MPLA, the ruling party. However, the same interviewees pointed out significant progress in the past 3-5 years, due to parallel positive developments in democratic governance and transparency.

The GoA is increasingly active within the region, and plays important roles in regional bodies such as the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The document Angola 2025 establishes the country's long-term vision, being carried out in the medium-term through the National Development Plan 2013-2017, the first national development plan elaborated under the new Angolan Constitution (2010). The Plan defines the following six broad national objectives: 1) preserving national unity and cohesion; 2) securing the basic principles necessary for development¹²; 3) improving quality of life; 4) engaging youth in active life; 5) strengthening private sector development; and 6) promoting the competitive insertion of Angola in the international context.

¹⁰ Interview carried out in Luanda in September 2014.

¹¹ Available at: http://www.rjcplp.org/sections/informacao/anexos/legislacao-angola/outra-legislacao-angola/lei-das-associacoes/downloadFile/file/Lei_das_Associacoes.pdf?nocache=1365699390.02. Access on: 10 October 14, 2014.

¹² Defined as the preservation of macroeconomic stability, promotion of national population policy, promotion of an active employment and national human resource valorization policy, increasing productivity and transforming, diversifying and modernizing the country's economic structure.

Table 1 - Angola's National Development Plan 2013-2017: objectives and priorities for the agricultural and health sectors

Agriculture	
Objective	Priorities
To promote integrated and sustainable development of the agrarian sector, taking as reference the full development of the productive potential of natural resources and the competitiveness of the sector, aiming to ensure food security and domestic supply, as well as to take advantage of opportunities related to the international and regional markets	1. To develop a competitive agriculture, based on the reorientation of family production to the market and development of the business sector
	2. To rehabilitate and expand support infrastructure for agricultural and livestock production
	3. To promote associative and business-like practices under the framework of integrated strategies aimed at developing the ranks of agricultural production
	4. To reach self-sufficiency in basic food products
	5. To develop crops with prospects of profitability and tradition in the territory, aiming to promote an increase in producers' income and national exports
	6. To reduce imports and contribute to the diversification of economic activity
	7. To promote irrigation practices in order to increase agriculture's productivity and competitiveness as means to effectively mitigate the effects of climate change
	8. To strengthen the system of agrarian investigation as means for scientific, technological and technical development
	9. To promote job creation and significantly contribute for the increase in income of family agriculture and for the development of the business sector

Health	
Objective	Priorities
To sustainably promote Angolan population's sanitary state, guarantee the population's longevity, supporting less favoured social groups and contributing to the fight against poverty	1. To increase life expectancy at birth
	2. To improve the Human Development Index and the Millennium Development Goals
	3. To reduce maternal, child and youth mortality, as well as morbidity and mortality under the national nosology framework
	4. To improve the organization, management and functioning of the National Health System, through directing necessary funds and adopting norms and procedures aimed at improving the efficiency and quality of NHS' response
	5. To improve health care services in the areas of promotion, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, reinforcing the articulation between primary care and hospital care.
	6. To participate in the transformation of social determinants of health and promote national and international partnerships aimed at reducing maternal and child mortality and strengthening the programmes of fight against major endemics
	7. To improve health care services in the areas of promotion, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, reinforcing the articulation between primary care and hospital care.
	8. To adequate human resources to objectives and goals, and adopt new health technologies
	9. To develop the capacity of individuals, families and communities for the promotion and protection of health
	10. To monitor and assess the performance of the sector through SIS and special studies

The National Development Plan 2013-2017 reveals a robust, modernist conception of development, with significant emphasis placed on economic growth. However, despite the substantial growth rates of Angola in the last few years, social indicators remain generally low. Life expectancy at birth in Angola (51 years) is below the average for sub-Saharan Africa, and 36.6% of the population still lives below the national poverty line¹³.

This context points to both the potential and challenges for development cooperation. While it is safe to assume that development cooperation funds will continue to play a marginal role in the country's Gross National Income – the current total of US\$ 200 million of net ODA (2011) encompasses less than 0.3% of the country's GNI – it could also play an important role in improving social indicators as well as reducing poverty and inequality.

Among DAC-donors, the United States is by far the largest in terms of gross ODA (totalling approximately US\$ 63 million between 2010-2011). European Union institutions (US\$ 26 million), Japan (US\$ 25 million), South Korea¹⁴ (US\$ 18 million) and Portugal (US\$ 18 million) are also significant donors. Donor's ODA is primarily directed to Angola's social sectors, particularly education, health and population¹⁵.

As with civil society organizations and official donors, budgets of United Nations agencies in Angola were significantly reduced over the past decade, which contributed to a redefinition of scope of action in light of the GoA's demands and needs. As shown in Table 3, UN agencies' efforts are concentrated in the GoA's institutional and human capital development, particularly through the provision of targeted technical assistance.

Initiatives of UN agencies are based on the UN Development Assistance Framework in Angola (UNDAF-Angola). UNDAF-Angola aims to harmonize and integrate the UN system at a country level. The new UNDAF has not yet come to fruition. UNDAF 2009-2013 prioritizes 4 support areas, highlighted by outcome in Table 3. The World Bank Group (WBG) has similarly redefined its strategic engagement in Angola. Following a decade of ill-established relations with the GoA, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) have released in August 2013 a joint country partnership strategy for 2014-2016 (see box 2).

¹³ Source: World Bank Data. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/angola>. Access on: Mar. 10th 2014.

¹⁴ It is noteworthy that, although a DAC member, South Korea considers itself a South-South provider.

¹⁵ According to the OECD, population sector activities typically include population/development policies, census work, vital registration, migration data, demographic research/analysis, reproductive health research, as well as other unspecified population activities. Available at: <http://goo.gl/ssbC3A>. Access on: 15 Feb. 2015.

Table 2 - UNDAF 2009-2013: Support areas and outcomes

Support area 1: Governance, Justice and Data for Development	UNDAF outcome 1: National Institutions responded to the needs of the whole population, including the poor and most vulnerable and at the same time national and local public institutions were strengthened, as well as community engagement, civic participation towards social cohesion, national reconciliation and the empowerment of women
Support area 2: Social Sectors	UNDAF outcome 2: Increased and more equitable access to integrated social services at national and sub-national levels with emphasis on MDGs
Support area 3: HIV & AIDS	UNDAF outcome 3: Strengthened national institutional and technical response to HIV and AIDS to accelerate progress towards universal access to prevention, treatment, care and support as a step on the road to the achievement to the MDGs by 2015, and to eradicate stigma and discrimination, and to meet the epidemic's multigenerational challenge
Support area 4: Sustainable Economic Development	UNDAF outcome 4: National and decentralized institutions strengthened integrated rural development guaranteeing food security based on environmental protection of natural resources and the management and adaptation to climate change

Box 2 – World Bank’s Angolan trajectory since the end of the Civil War.

Given the situation of political instability, the World Bank only kept two drivers and two administrative officers working during the last years of the Angolan civil war. The Bank’s institutional engagement in Angola was renewed with an Interim Strategy Note that accounted for the period of 2003-2005, focused on macroeconomic stability programmes and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts. Many interviewees mentioned that the GoA nurtured some frustration with the World Bank during the first half of the 2000s, mainly due to the perception that the international institution had not pushed strongly enough for the organization of a donor’s conference, as it was expected by the national government. Subsequent attempts, supported by the World Bank, to constitute a formal development partners’ coordination structure in Angola were allegedly watered down by the Ministry of Planning. Two other Interim Strategy Notes were developed for 2005-2007 and 2007-2009. With significant socioeconomic improvements enabled by the development of the extractive industries in Angola, the World Bank decided to formalize a clearer country strategy for the following years. The initial idea was to have an integrated strategy for both the World Bank and the African Development Bank. According to an informant, both the reduced volume of funds and the fact that Angola’s Ministry of Planning and Territory Development preferred the two institutions to have separate plans contributed to consecutive delays in the finalization of the strategy. Another informant pointed out that the World Bank, after conducting an assessment of the credit situation in Angola, also ended up agreeing with the idea of having one country partnership strategy for the World Bank Group, which came into effect in August 2013, accounting for the period 2014-2016. Guided by the principle of promotion of synergetic partnerships, as well as an emphasis on knowledge building rather than direct financial support, the current country partnership strategy is focused on building human and institutional capacity, supporting national economic diversification in an integrated manner, and enhancing the quality of service delivery and deepening social protection.

As it has appeared in the World Bank's Country Partnership Strategy 2014-2016, the general perception among interviewees was that the GoA has been maintaining a "strong record of own-management of its development agenda" (p.18). As such, both bilateral and multilateral development partners, with few niche-related exceptions, have to play by the GoA's rules if they wish to participate in development policy formulation and implementation. This is in many ways a result of GoA's not so "new-found sense of political and economic leverage" (Corkin, 2008), which has been intrinsically linked with the development of the oil and extractive industries in the country. Moreover, the oil and extractive industries have attracted both traditional and emerging powers willing to take part in the expansion of these economic sectors. Even though the GoA is still highly dependent on natural resources and international commodities prices, when compared to other settings, such as Mozambique, oil and natural resources dependency has distinctive effects on how the actors posit themselves within the development field. Hence, while aid dependency in Mozambique has been contributing to limiting national ownership, oil dependency in Angola has enabled the Government to take over its development agenda, despite the negative short and medium-term effects on wealth concentration and democratic consolidation. Furthermore, as discussed below, the growing emerging powers' foothold in Angola has enhanced the GoA's capacity to carry out development policies and programs.¹⁶

2.3 The presence of Russia, India, China and South Africa in Angola

While Angola has historically maintained relations with each one of the BRICS countries, the nature of those relations has become increasingly strategic over the past decade. Despite the fact that, as previously argued, the Chinese deal was not the only one cut with the Angolan government during the difficult years that immediately followed the end of the protracted civil war, it became a critical source of support following Angola's decision to opt for development finance alternatives to Western aid. Recently, frustration with the International Financial Institutions (IFI) such as IMF and World Bank Group, led the BRICS to create the New Development Bank (NDB), officially established during the sixth BRICS Summit. The BRICS Bank, as it has been called, which is aimed particularly at supporting projects of its own members, may become an alternative to traditional IFIs in the future (Schablitzki, 2014).

Fluxes from emerging countries have expanded in volume and penetration, a dynamic that has occurred in tandem with the retraction of traditional development cooperation. Many interviewees pointed out that Angolan government officials have become skilful negotiators in the process, using the interest of an increasing number of countries in Angola as leverage for stronger bargaining positions. The subsections below provide snapshots of Angola's bilateral ties with Russia, India, China and South Africa. Angola-Brazil relations are explored separately in section 3, as they represent an important background for Brazilian development cooperation in the country.

¹⁶ This contextual analysis does not imply, however, that Angola is achieving better development outcomes than aid dependent countries like Mozambique. Rather, the oil and natural resources dependency very often stresses the negative impacts of focusing on static comparative advantages and the consequent economic concentration around specific sectors.

Box 3 – Perceptions from Angola on the New Development Bank

Perceptions on the potential impact in Africa, and more particularly in Angola, of the NDB were mixed across interviewees. The variation seems to be related to the unavailability of credible information on the Bank's future operations, eligible projects, and finance modalities and credit conditions offered, as well as its sectorial and geographic priorities. Nonetheless, it seemed to be an issue followed closely by the private sector, government stakeholders, and representatives from DAC countries based in Luanda. One informant highlighted that, despite initial understandings that the Bank's capital would mainly be used to fund projects within the BRICS countries, it could prove easier to agree on funding projects in countries other than the members of the group, particularly in the African continent. In short, interviewees seemed to agree about the huge demand for long-term financing in Africa, particularly for infrastructure projects, though it was not clear to anyone how the NDB would impact the situation.

2.3.1 Russia

MPLA received support from the Soviet Union within the context of the Cold War and resistance movements in Angola. After the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia turned its foreign policy towards the West, and relations with Angola cooled significantly. However, during the civil war, the party had incurred US\$ 5 billion¹⁷ in debt from Russia, which was renegotiated in the mid-1990s.

The 2000s have seen the revitalization in bilateral relations, now driven by economic opportunities rather than political ideology. In aiming to preserve its domestic resources and avoid unnecessarily high extraction costs, Russia has been seeking raw materials overseas. Angola is a well-endowed country, as well as a potentially sizable market for Russian products (Alves, Arkhangelskaya and Shubin 2013). Frequent high-level exchanges have been occurring in the last decade, and actions to intensify the bilateral partnership, such as the establishment of an Angola–Russia Bilateral Commission for Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technological Cooperation (2014), have been undertaken.

Russia provides cooperation to Angola in a number of fields, including traditional areas such as defence, higher education, and health. Cooperation in defence involves mainly the training of Angolan military and security personnel. Cooperation in education comprises the granting of scholarships, joint scientific research between Angolan and Russian universities, and mutual recognition of degrees. Russia also supports many doctors and medical practitioners in Angola, currently amounting to around 340 health professionals. Other recent fields of cooperation have involved telecommunications and geology and mines (Alves, Arkhangelskaya and Shubin 2013).

According to a compilation made by the African Development Bank (2011), Angola features twice in the list of major investments made by Russian companies in Africa. Russia's Sinterz is investing in oil, gas, diamonds and copper exploration, and Alrosa in diamonds, mining and hydro-electricity. Russia's VTB also has significant operations in the banking sector in Angola (Alves, Arkhangelskaya and Shubin 2013).

¹⁷ This sum was significant. In 1996, the year when the debt repayment deal was signed, it amounted to two thirds of Angola's GDP. Angola was then still struggling with the civil war, and Russia was in great need of capital. The signed agreement cut down the debt to US\$ 1.5 billion. The renegotiation involved corrupt agreements and intermediaries, resulting in a case later dubbed the "Angolagate." For a detailed account see Deception in High Places: The Corrupt Angola-Russia Debt Deal (2013).

2.3.2 India

Following the end of the Second World War, India began to support decolonization movements and provide humanitarian aid to Angola. Medical assistance was provided during the independency war through the Indian Red Cross Society. In parallel, a number of Angolan students received training from the Ministry of External Affairs' Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) since the 1970s¹⁸.

However, it was only during the mid-1980s that bilateral relations with Angola gained substantial shape, with the development of agreements on trade, technical, scientific and cultural cooperation between the two countries (Chaturvedi, 2014). Discussions are ongoing in regards to agreements for the Promotion and Protection of Investments and the creation of a Bilateral Commission for Cultural, Technical, Scientific and Economic Cooperation.¹⁹

After the independence, India supported MPLA and participated in all three United Nations Angola Verifications Missions (UNAVEM I, II and III) in Angola from 1989-1997. In the end of the 1990s, finance was the largest modality of Indian cooperation. The country has often extended Lines of Credit (LoCs) to Angola, financing especially infrastructural and agricultural development. Additionally, since 2005 the State Bank of India (SBI) has been operating in Angola, with a representative office in Luanda, offering LoCs for procurement of plants and equipment from Indian suppliers²⁰.

India's support for the rehabilitation of Angola's railway system is the largest official Indian project in the country. This support comes in the form of a credit line (initially of US\$40 million), training and equipment.²¹ There has been a growing relation of trade and investment between the two countries, essentially related to the also growing importance of the oil sector in Angola. Comparing data from 2000 and 2012, total trade (India's import from Angola and export to Angola) increased from US\$15.16 billion to US\$7,646.33 billion.

Almost 99% of the total India's imports from Angola are in the oil sector. Today's Indian energy needs are 30% met by oil, of which 70% is imported. Analysis of Indian growth indicates that by 2025 India will need to import 90% of its needs for crude oil and gas. Angola is among the top five main exporters to India of that sector (Taylor, 2014). Pharmaceuticals also play an important role in India's exports to Angola, having increased its volume, during the years 2009 to 2013, from US\$27.53 million to US\$57.74million. The largest segment of those consists of antibiotics and vitamins (Chaturvedi, 2014).

Bilateral trade amounted to around US\$ 1.8 billion in 2008-2009²². Indian tractors, transport vehicles, and other agricultural machinery and implements comprise an important parcel of India's exports to Angola. Top commodity exports to Angola are meatpacking and production, petroleum-derived products, and transport equipment, whereas the country's top imports from Angola are crude oil, iron and steel, and copper and copper-based articles²³.

18 Available at: http://www.indembangola.org/angolaeconomic_commercial.html. Access on: Mar. 11th 2014. For more information on ITEC, see Taylor, 2014.

19 Available at: http://www.indembangola.org/angola_political.html/. Access on: Mar. 11th 2014.

20 For information on the India's credit operations and also other institutional framework for cooperation, see: Chaturvedi, 2012.

21 Available at: http://www.indembangola.org/rites_projects.html. Access on: Mar. 11th 2014.

22 Available at: http://www.indembangola.org/angolaeconomic_commercial.html. Access on: Mar. 11th 2014.

23 Available at: http://www.indembangola.org/angolaeconomic_commercial.html. Access on: Mar. 11th 2014.

2.3.3 China

China already had a diplomatic foothold in the African continent after the Second World War. Throughout the period of Angola's National Liberation War period (1960-1975), Chinese presence consisted largely of politically and ideologically oriented assistance, supporting the three major liberation movements: MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA. After independence from Portugal, the country was embroiled in a civil war between the ruling MPLA and the rebel UNITA. At that time, to counter the support MPLA had from USSR, China supported both UNITA and FNLA along with the United States (Zhou and He, 2014).

The last 50 years in Angola has seen Chinese presence become progressively a combination of aid, trade and investment. While official relations between China and Angola were established in 1983, when China finally recognized Angola as a sovereign country, the partnership between the two countries intensified significantly after the end of the civil war in 2002. FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) and the Macau Forum, established in the early 2000s, became important platforms for the development of bilateral relations between Angola and China.²⁴

In 2004, China offered through its Exim Bank a credit line worth US\$ 4 billion, which later increased to US\$ 10 billion, aimed to support the post-civil war reconstruction efforts.²⁵ In the year 2006, Angola became China's largest trade partner in Africa. By 2011, bilateral trade between the two countries amounted to more than US\$ 277 billion, of which the largest part consisted of crude oil (Zhou and He, 2014).

According to some reports, the same credit line made US\$ 15 billion available to the GOA in 2011.²⁶ Additionally, according to Strange et al. (2013)²⁷, China has provided a total of approximately US\$ 4.2 billion in official development funds, the majority of which has been directed to civil construction and infrastructure development²⁸.

Angola was China's main oil supplier in 2006 and 2010. The Asian country also receives approximately 40% of the country's exports, and is its second largest source of imports. Many argue that the opportunity to access Chinese credit using oil as a guarantee also prompted Angola to interrupt negotiations with the IMF in 2003, which could have increased transparency in its oil sector²⁹. Furthermore, China has shown both capacity and interest in meeting Angola's large infrastructural demand. In the beginning of 2012, 56 Chinese companies were registered in Angola, of which most part is state-owned companies in construction and contract sectors (Zhou and He, 2014).

While the oil trade predominantly dominates Chinese relations with Angola, it is noteworthy that crude oil amounts to 95% of Angola's exports to other countries. Similarly, China announced in 2009 a 1 billion US\$ fund for agriculture investment in Angola, from the China Development Bank. China has been recently diversifying its cooperation engagement. As noted in a joint communiqué of the strategic partnership signed by the two countries in 2010, infrastructure, agriculture, health, industry, urbanization, energy and mineral resources represent priorities for both governments (Zhou and He, 2014).

24 For more on FOCAC and Macau Forum, see: Zhou and He (2014) and Taylor (2014).

25 <http://bricspolicycenter.org/homolog/arquivos/apresentacaocorkin.pdf>

26 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16092634>

27 STRANGE, Austin et al. (2013) and POWER, Marcus (2011).

28 This goes to show how numbers related to Chinese presence in Angola are frequently inconsistent across sources, and have to be analysed with a degree of scepticism.

29 See box 1;

Table 3 - Projects in health and agriculture sector financed by the first credit line of China Exim Bank to Angola, under the first framework agreement (2004-2007)

Sector	Number of Contracts	Total value (US\$)
Health	10	249.905.925.42
Agriculture	4	203,760,172

Source: Elaborated by the authors. Zhou and He, 2014.

Cooperation in the health sector between China and Angola is not as well established as the one in agriculture. The first Chinese medical team arrived in Angola in 2009. Since then, China has expanded significantly its health cooperation, which now not only includes direct medical assistance, but also grants funds for the construction of hospitals and donation of medical devices and pharmaceutical products.

2.3.4 South Africa

During the civil war, the apartheid regime in South Africa supported UNITA, countering MPLA support for the liberation movement in present day Namibia during South Africa's Border War. Support to UNITA was withdrawn in 1988, as soon as the independence of Namibia was recognized by South Africa. In the mid-1990s, South Africa was among the partners encouraging Angola's peace process, having agreed to help Angola to develop extractive capacities for its oil and diamond resources (Fish; Fish, 2002).

Bilateral trade between South Africa and Angola amounted to US\$ 2.3 billion in 2009 (Adebajo, 2012), and by 2012 Angola had become South Africa's largest trade partner (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2013). In 2012, around 18%³⁰ of South Africa's crude oil demand was met by Angola, translating roughly into 90,000 barrels per day.

Their development cooperation is usually promoted via the Angola-South Africa Joint Commission for Cooperation. To date, over 22 bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding have been signed, covering areas such as trade and industry, energy, science and technology, sports, arts and culture, mining, tourism, defense, etc. (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2013). South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has also been playing a key role in strengthening the bilateral partnership with Angola. In 2012, DTI signed a technical cooperation agreement with the Angola's Industrial Development Institute for support of infrastructure development.³¹

3. Brazil-Angola development relations

Relations between the regions that would, eventually, become Brazil and Angola date back to the XVII century. Both were Portuguese colonies and the second provided slaves to the first. Brazil was the first Western nation to recognize Angola as a sovereign country, in 1975, a fact that is regularly remembered by Angolan senior officials in mid and high-level meetings. The Brazilian embassy to Angola was formally created in the same year.

³⁰ Available at: <http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/south-africas-oil-imports-angola-ghana-nigeria>. Access on: Mar. 11th 2014.


³¹ Available at: <http://www.southafrica.info/news/international/angola-230712.htm#.Ux7xC-eSwbQ>. Access on: Mar. 11th 2014.

Brazil's national development bank (BNDES) funds several projects carried out by Brazilian companies in Angola, particularly in the infrastructure sector. Banks such as Caixa Econômica Federal, Banco do Brasil and Bradesco are also present in the country. Like China, the Brazilian government also uses commodities and raw material as credit guarantees (Garcia et al., 2013).

Angola is the main target of Brazilian investments in Africa. Currently, Brazil ranks 4th in Angola's top import countries and 19th as Angola's top export destinations (Waldersee, 2015). For Brazil, trade with Angola represents 0.4% of its total foreign trade. According to APEX, Brazil has been benefiting significantly from Angola's growth. Bilateral trade between Brazil and Angola grew significantly between 2000 and 2010, reaching an all-time high in 2008 of US\$ 4.21 billion. Brazil's leading export sectors to Angola in 2010 were production and packing of meat and fish (23.7%) and the manufacturing and refining of sugar (13.0%). Main Brazilian imports from Angola in the same year were oil and natural gas (73.7%) and oil-derived products (25.9%)³². From 2009-2013, Brazilian exports to Angola were reduced by 4.6% and imports increased by 427.6%, which indicates a transformation of the trade balance in favour of Angola.³³

Angola is also a relevant destination for Brazilian private companies' investment. In fact, Angola concentrates the highest number of Brazilian Small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa. Furthermore, BNDES has disbursed US\$ 2.8 billion for private investments in Africa since 2007, of which Angola has received 96% (Waldersee, 2015). Table 4 presents some of the main projects carried out by Brazilian transnational companies in Angola.

Figure 1: Brazilian infrastructure projects in Angola



Source: The authors, Waldersee, 2015

32 Available at: <http://www2.apexbrasil.com.br/exportar-produtos-brasileiros/inteligencia-de-mercado/estudos-sobre-paises/perfil-e-oportunidades-comerciais--angola--2012>. Access on: Nov. 15th 2014.

33 Available at: <http://www.brasilglobalnet.gov.br/ARQUIVOS/IndicadoresEconomicos/INDAngola.pdf>. Access on: Dec. 18th 2014.

Table 4: Brazilian transnational companies in Angola

Company	Present since	Sector	Activities
Petrobrás	1980	Energy / Oil&Gas	Exploration of petroleum and biofuels. Partner in 6 petroleum blocks and operator in 4. Since June 2013, Petrobras acts in a joint venture with BTG Pactual Bank (50% each) worth US\$1.5 million for oil and gas exploration in several African countries, including Angola.
Vale	2005	Mining	Joint venture with Genius for mineral excavation (primarily nickel and copper) and research.
Andrade Guterres	2005	Construction / Infrastructure	Works in partnership with Zagope Construções e Engenharia, a Portuguese subsidiary, to gain access to EU finances. It has constructed various roads and the express highway between Luanda and Viana to the International Airport of Luanda. Renovation of the International Airport of Lubango. Extended contracts for rehabilitation of Container Terminal in Luanda Port in 2011.
Camargo Corrêa	2005	Construction / Infrastructure	Construction of Uige-Maquela road. Partners with Escom, a Portuguese firm, and Gema, an Angolan firm, in constructing a cement factory in Benguela.
Odebrecht	1984	Construction / Infrastructure / Agriculture / Energy / Retail/ Real State	Holds 25 contracts in the country in real estate, biofuels, minerals, agribusiness, and energy. Highlighted examples: Construction of Capanda Hydroelectric Dam in Malange. Hydroelectric project in Cambambe. Owns 40% of Biocom, Angolan bioenergy firm (ethanol), and 20% of Sonangol. SENAI does training programs for Biocom, for example. Runs Nosso Super supermarket chain in joint venture with Angolan government, with 37 shops in the country. An agribusiness project that may be highlighted is the Farm Pungo a Ndongo (or Pungo Andongo). Odebrecht is responsible for the management of agroindustrial production, construction of factories and capacity building. Embrapa-Africa participated in experiments with varieties of corn, black beans, rice and soy.
Engevix	2005	Energy	Works in partnership with Angolan group Genius. Environmental engineering, electricity generation and distribution, involved in Cambambe hydroelectric project in Cuanza Norte.
Fidens	2009	Construction / Infrastructure	Construction of runways at Catoca airport, Luanda Sul.
Asperbras	2007	Real State / Infrastructure	Involved in Special Economic Zones in Viana, Catete, Huambo, Negage, M'Banza Congo. Construction of real estate and residential condominiums, irrigation systems, and commercial vehicles.
Queiroz Galvão	2005	Real State / Infrastructure	Real estate, roadwork construction and renovation.
Stefanini	2004	ICTs	Technology and information industries

Source: Vieitas e Aboim (n.d.); Institutional websites

Brazil's development cooperation with Angola dates back to the civil war period, focused then on professional development and vocational training. Inaugurated in 1998 with support from Brazil's SENAI (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial- National Service for Industrial Training), the CFPC (Centro de Formação Profissional do Cazenga – Cazenga Center for Professional Training), located on the outskirts of Luanda, trains around 2,500 professionals yearly. Today cooperation sectors range from sports to fire fighting³⁴. Embrapa and Fiocruz also respectively implement agricultural and health projects in the country.

In 2012, Angola occupied the 5th position in terms of volume of technical cooperation received from Brazil, and it received the least when compared to other developing countries in the Community of

34 Information available at: http://luanda.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/cooperacao_tecnica_e_cientifica.xml.

Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). According to Brazilian informants, Brazil's bilateral cooperation with Angola would be characterized by low performance, allegedly related with factors such as difficulties in dialogue with Angolan counterparts, low decision-making power of executing agencies, and high rates of turnover among local coordinators.

3.1 Brazilian development cooperation in the health sector

Brazilian-Angolan development cooperation in the health sector begun in 1996 when ABC organized a mission with health experts to discuss prospective projects in strategic areas already defined within the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries (CPLP). Since then, governments from Portuguese speaking countries in Africa, Angola included, have demanded support for their own national health systems. During the 1990's the emphasis was on training and capacity building. After ten years, CPLP health ministries were able to set up a strategic plan (2009-2012) for the health sector. The strategic plan had as its main objective strengthening national health systems in order to assure universal access to quality health services³⁵. The plan encompassed seven strategic axes and four structuring networks. Besides the structuring networks established within CPLP's health plan, Brazilian Health Ministry and FIOCRUZ expanded to African countries the Human Milk Bank Network. Table 4 presents CPLP's strategic axes, and a comparison between Angola and Mozambique, both in terms of projects developed with Brazilian agencies in these two countries, and their participation within the structuring networks.

Table 5: CPLP's Strategic Axes and structuring networks and Brazilian SSC projects in Angola and Mozambique

CPLP's strategic axes (SA) and structuring networks (SN)	Brazilian SSC projects within CPLP's Strategic Axes		Engagement in Structuring Networks	
	Angola	Mozambique	Angola	Mozambique
SA1 - Training and development of health workforce	X	X		
SA2 - information and communication in health		X		
SA3 - research in health		X		
SA4 - development of the health-industrial complex		X		
SA5 - epidemiological surveillance and monitoring of health situation		X		
SA6 - emergencies and natural disasters				
SA7 - promotion and protection of health	X	X		

35 For more information, see: <http://www.cplp.org/id-1787.aspx>. Access on: Feb. 10th 2015.

SN1 - national health institutes				x
SN2 - national schools of public health			x	x
SN3 - health technical schools			x	x
SN4 - technical centres of installation and maintenance of equipment				x

Source: The authors, Buss et al. 2011

According to a document provided by the Embassy of Brazil in Luanda, referring to July 2013, there were only two bilateral cooperation projects being executed in Angola in the area of health. These projects are also the only ones listed as being under execution on the ABC website. A summary description of each is provided in two tables below.

Project	Implementing Institutions	Indicators	Funds (US\$)
<p>Code: BRA/04/044-S230</p> <p>Name: Pilot Project in Sickle Cell Disease</p> <p>Objective: To reduce morbidity and mortality related to sickle cell disease in Angola</p> <p>Project signing date: 06/23/2010</p>	<p>Brazil Ministério da Saúde do Brasil</p> <p>Counterparts Hospital Pediátrico David Bernardino</p>	<p>Brazilian professionals directly involved: 15</p> <p>Direct beneficiaries: 26</p> <p>Outputs: hospital doctors and nurses build capacity to diagnose and treat sickle cell disease</p>	<p>ABC: US\$ 242.831,00</p> <p>Counterparts: MS US\$17.000,00</p> <p>HPDB US\$38.000,00</p> <p>Total: US\$ 291.014,00</p>
	<p>Summary description</p> <p>Sickle cell disease is the most common inherited disease in the world, with high rates of morbidity and mortality. Red blood cells of people affected by sickle cell disease take the shape of a sickle, instead of a rounded one, which causes the shortening of the average life of cells, obstruction of blood vessels, episodes of pain, organ damage and chronic anaemia. While sickle cell disease is still incurable, many of its manifestations and complications are amenable to treatment and prevention, ensuring survival and better quality of life for those who have contracted it.</p> <p>The project aims to support the reduction of morbidity and mortality from sickle cell disease in Angola by contributing to the consolidation of public policies to fight the disease, and deployment of neonatal laboratory screening and diagnostic imaging. It also targets the development of technical capacity related to basic disease treatment and restoration of bone damage resulting from sickle cell disease.</p>		
	<p>Observations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Despite the full collaboration of involved Brazilian health workers, recurrent problems related to dialogue with Angolan counterparts have led to several delays and inconsistencies in project execution. The project may have been finalized in 2013 without complete implementation of activities. This was, however, not clear from the exchanges made with Brazil's Ministry of Health in September 2014. 		

Project	Implementing Institutions	Indicators	Funds (US\$)
<p>Code: BRA/04/044-S242</p> <p>Name: Capacity Development for Angola's Health System – Phase 2</p> <p>Objective: Strengthening the capacity of public health training in Angola in the scientific, technological and educational fields, including communication and information</p> <p>Project signing date: 06/23/2010</p>	<p>Brazil FIOCRUZ</p> <p>Counterparts Ministério da Saúde de Angola</p>	<p>Brazilian professionals directly involved: 40</p> <p>Direct beneficiaries: 11</p> <p>Outputs: 15 professionals from Angola's Ministry of Health trained to obtain Masters' degrees in Public Health; Public health library supported with the donation of books; Follow-up cooperation actions designed</p>	<p>ABC: US\$ 437.000,00 Counterparts: Fiocruz: US\$ 156.200,00 HAS: US\$ 314.000,00 Total: US\$ 907.200,00</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Summary Description</p> <p>Angola's Ministry of Health has been working on identifying needs and investment priorities in public health. Among the priority areas, three different components, seen as complementary, were defined: the installation of a National School of Public Health in Angola, the strengthening of technical schools for health practitioners, and reinforcement of the National Public Health Institute.</p> <p>The cooperation project with FIOCRUZ aims to strengthen the capacity of training in public health in Angola in the scientific, technological and educational fields, including communication and information. The actions undertaken by the project aim to support the Ministry of Health in the training of professionals to work in teaching, research and technical cooperation in Angola's Public Health School. The project also targets the structuring of a network of health libraries in Angola, the restructuring of technical health schools, and the strengthening of Angola's National Public Health Institute.</p>			
<p style="text-align: center;">Observations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project's first phase faced significant implementing difficulties, including incomplete/delayed activities linked to the Master's in Public Health. However, Fiocruz made great efforts to finalize the project, enabling 30 Angolan professionals to obtain a Master's in Public Health. • The Master's in Public Health course was deemed very successful and important by the GoA, and subsequently manifested interest in supporting a second edition of the project. 			

Despite the “under execution” status attributed to the projects, correspondence exchanged with Brazil’s Ministry of Health in September 2014 on the sickle cell disease project noted that there was several inconsistencies in project execution, insinuating that the project had been finalized without partners having completed previously agreed activities. Fiocruz’s project also seems to have been finalized, though no involved Angolan party in Luanda was available for comment.

Additionally, it is not unlikely that, as in many other countries, technical cooperation projects under negotiation in Angola were stopped due to the severe budget cuts of both Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. The following subsection discusses specifically Proforsa, Brazil’s most well-known health project in Angola, highlighting its successes and challenges.

3.1.1. PROFORSA

PROFORSA was a 3-year triangular cooperation initiative involving Brazil, Japan and Angola aimed at strengthening individual, institutional and systemic capacity in the Angolan health sector. It was found to be the most well known among Brazil's health cooperation projects in Angola, although specific knowledge about the project varied significantly across health stakeholders. This section describes PROFORSA and points out challenges observed by professionals involved.

The origins of PROFORSA are related to the intersection between UNICAMP's cooperation – ongoing since 2004 in the area of capacity development for Angolan tertiary health workers – and JICA's efforts to develop capacity at Hospital Josina Machel in Luanda. JICA's project involved both the infrastructural rehabilitation of the Hospital, and targeted health trainings activities for employees. Japan's bilateral agency engaged Brazilian teams to carry out trainings, including through its Third Country Training Program (JICA-TCTP), due to the extensive benefits related to improved communication in the Portuguese language. Additionally, the coordinator of UNICAMP's referred cooperation programme was a Brazilian infectious disease specialist of Japanese descent, a factor that appeared in interviews as an enabler of further approximation between JICA and Brazilian counterparts.

Both formal and informal assessments of such initiatives highlighted access to and quality of primary health care as key issues to be addressed in improving Angola's health system and indicators. These issues manifested themselves in the vast number of unnecessary referrals of patients to central hospitals, which, consequently, overloaded central parts of Angola's health system. This overarching diagnosis served as basis for the design of PROFORSA.

Table 6 - PROFORSA's initial budget

Country	Share (US\$ / %)	
Brazil	970,415	24%
Japan	2,500,000	61%
Angola	630,000	15%
Total	4,100,415	100%

With the formulation of PROFORSA as a triangular cooperation project in 2011, Fiocruz, through Escola Politécnica em Saúde Joaquim Venâncio (EPSJV/Fiocruz) and Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública (ENSP), became the lead institution in the project's primary health component. The project targeted capacity development at four health reference centres³⁶ in Luanda, chosen due to their strategic location and high number of referrals to central hospitals. The tertiary component, led by UNICAMP, particularly through Hospital Sumaré in Brazil, and JICA, focused on improving the organization of hospital services and nursing care, in areas such as neonatal and women's health, at both Hospital Josina Machel and Maternidade Lucrecia Paim.

Given that PROFORSA identified primary care and health management as the main issues to be addressed, a capacity development programme divided in 10 modules, as well as a course for specialization in management of primary health units, was developed and implemented during the 3 years of the project. During the SSC project team's visit to Luanda, PROFORSA's Angolan counterparts were implementing recommendations that responded to participatory assessments conducted during PROFORSA's execution. Interviews pointed out that these recommendations have been generally well accepted, pertaining to 36 The health centers in Samba, Ingobota, Rangel and Ilha. According to interviews, JICA had also previously donated equipment to those same health centers.

basic structural issues such as the integration of registry and record systems of clinical processes. In fact, the need for integration was reemphasized by 2010 decree issued by Angola's Ministry of Health. However, informants pointed out that the decree hadn't been implemented systematically, due in part to lack of capacity and understanding by health workers who were supposed to implement those changes about the fundamental issues at hand.

In that sense, PROFORSA was a jointly developed structuring project. The project strived to provide capacity and knowledge needed for the implementation of basic public policies across the entire health sector, including through trainings on management and organization of health and clinical process records. Its design was guided by a consensual diagnosis of systemic yet context-specific issues within Angola's health system, which had already been identified and, sometimes, targeted by public policies shown to be largely ineffective.

According to interviewees, the models of management and processes implemented were guided by decrees issued by Angola's Ministry of Health, which were regularly discussed with regulatory authorities such as the National Directorate of Public Health and the Provincial Directorate of Health of Luanda. "On the job" training with key managers was also conducted in Brazil. The informants frequently stressed that all information used as evidence for diagnosis and implementation of solutions was locally collected. Altogether, such practices would guarantee the project's national ownership and context sensitivity.

One of the informants emphasized how Fiocruz had been very apt in promoting understanding of basic issues related to Angola's health system among sectorial stakeholders. The same informant criticized other top-down initiatives, including the ones implemented through private health consultancy firms, some of which were from Brazil, which would impose new management rules, directives and practices without discussion with health workers. The same was said to be true in relation to PROFORSA's tertiary health component. While a management system had recently been implanted in Hospital Josina Machel by a health consultancy, UNICAMP and JICA found it necessary to develop a simpler management system, discussing it with health workers at the Hospital. During project execution, some emerging demands were met with specific activities proposed and led by JICA, one of which included the "caderno de saúde materno-infantil". This might have led to significant divergences between the Brazilian and Angolan counterparts, as highlighted below in the discussion of the project's challenges.

Besides issues related to management, participatory recommendations also highlighted poor signage at health care facilities. A task force of Angolan participants in the PROFORSA project was set up to propose changes to external and internal signage, which were brought to the Provincial Directorate of Health of Luanda for approval. During the visit of the SSC researcher to Luanda, signage changes had already been approved and were being implemented in the city.

While interviews pointed to the potentially significant and sustainable impact of gains from PROFORSA, many of the respondents also had a sizable stake in its success. Nonetheless, interviews exposed substantial challenges in the execution of PROFORSA. While interconnected, for analytical purposes, challenges may be understood in terms of three categories, related to: 1) implementation, 2) financing, and 3) political/cultural context.

Implementation challenges highlighted in interviews were mainly related to delays in the institutionalization of recommendations, attributed both to infrastructural issues that had to be overcome (e.g. creating an area for the storage and management of records in primary health units) and the lack of human resources required to carry out the transformations envisaged. There were reports of complaints, which were allegedly solved over the course of the project, related to inadequacies of the course venues

at the beginning of the project, such as lack of ventilation and electricity, which hindered learning. Finally, there appeared to be significant inconsistencies in activities that should have been implemented by Brazil's Ministry of Health, including the monitoring and evaluation of PROFORSA. Further research is required to understand the specific causes of such inconsistencies.

Financial problems were related to the Brazilian counterparts, more specifically the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. With budget cuts in Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which significantly affected ABC's work and projects, there had to be a restructuring of responsibility for PROFORSA's third year project expenses. Most cuts were absorbed by JICA, while a smaller yet significant amount was allegedly absorbed by Angola's Ministry of Health. Interviewees reported significant discontent from JICA's contributions followed by this financial rearrangement. While it did not affect the project in the end, one can extrapolate that many similar projects may not have succeeded without a triangular, developed country partner to absorb such budget cuts.

The political/cultural challenges highlighted by interviewees were related to the striking differences in professional practices among the Brazilian, Japanese and Angolan counterparts. While JICA seemed to emphasize thorough planning of activities, with a somewhat rigid schedule, Fiocruz stressed the importance of getting a common diagnosis of the situations with partners. Naturally, the challenges that arise in the alignment of expectations and practices may also be seen as an opportunity for mutual institutional learning. As expected, such related problems were reportedly less obstructive towards the end of project implementation.

Finally, there were significant divergences around the "caderno de saúde materno-infantil", which was designed based on Japan's experience. Despite contrary recommendations from the World Health Organization, Angola recommends that every baby be breast fed, including those with HIV-positive mothers. According to the GoA, this was required to mitigate the poor nutritional situation and high rates of under-five mortality in Angola. Both Brazil and Japan recommend artificial feeding when mothers are known to be HIV-positive. According to one interviewee, Brazil's Ministry of Health and ABC decided not to participate after knowing that the "caderno de saúde materno-infantil" would include Angola's breastfeeding recommendation. According to another interviewee, the Brazilian government did not participate in the development of the tracking tool due to the perception that it would not meet Angola's current needs, particularly in light of mother literacy issues in the country. Additionally, while a similar tool is implemented in parts of Brazil, the instrument has yet to consolidate itself as a successful national experience. The government of Brazil typically only provides technical cooperation in areas where a particular experience is shown to be successful domestically over a considerable period of time. Paradoxically, the "caderno de saúde materno-infantil" was pointed out by many health stakeholders not directly involved in the triangular cooperation project as PROFORSA's main result, which may be explained by the many consultations that occurred during its formulation.

3.2 Brazilian development cooperation in the agricultural sector

As discussed above, Angola has been a relevant destination for Brazilian private investments. In the agricultural sector, the Pungo Andongo farm, with 36,000 hectare located in the Malanje Province, is one of the highlights in Embrapa-Africa's engagement in Angola. The farm is an agribusiness project where Odebrecht is the main actor responsible for the construction and operationalization of maize flour and animal feed plants, capacity building and the management of the agroindustrial production. Under the

project, Odebrecht signed, in 2007, an agreement with Embrapa-Africa to give technical support in the experiments with maize, beans, rice and soybeans. Interviews with Angolan civil society evaluates the participation of the Brazilian private sector in Angola’s agriculture sector as positive and the Pungo Andongo farm as an example of the development that can come from learning with the Brazilian experience.

In terms of technical cooperation within the field of agriculture, according to a document provided by the Embassy of Brazil in Luanda, referring to July 2013, there was only one bilateral project being executed in Angola. A summary description of the project is provided in the table below.

Project	Implementing Institutions	Indicators	Funds (US\$)
<p>2 - Code: BRA/04/044-S232</p> <p>Name: Support for Rural Professional Training and Social Promotion in Angola.</p> <p>Objective: Institutional strengthening of rural vocational training area in Angola and technical levelling of IDA’s agricultural sciences professionals.</p> <p>Project signing date: 23/06/2010</p>	<p>Brazil Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural (SENAR)</p> <p>Counterparts Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário - Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (IDA/MINADER)</p>	<p>Brazilian professionals directly involved: 7</p> <p>Direct beneficiaries: 95</p> <p>Outputs: IDA’s professionals trained in rural vocational training methodology and occupational area for large annual crops - grain production (maize, beans, sunflower, peanut, sesame, soy, wheat, rice) in the following areas: management and cultivation, plant health, and post-harvest management.</p>	<p>ABC: US\$ 289.145,00 Counterparts: SENAR US\$23.225,60 IDA US\$15.400,00 Total: US\$ 327.800,00</p>
<p>Summary description</p> <p>In Angola, the majority of those working in agriculture are subsistence farmers. The agricultural sector is characterized by the use low technology, hand tools, and is dependent on food imports.</p> <p>The country has a great need for development of actions aimed at the reorganization and revitalization of the rural productive sector, particularly in regards to a complete rural Vocational Training Programme and Social Promotion through the methodological training of industry professionals and professionalization of farmers. In this sense, the project aims to meet the need for strengthening technical staff in rural professionalization actions, through training and exchange of knowledge in the areas of rural professional training and social promotion.</p>			
<p>Observations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As recurrent in projects implemented in Angola, lacking communication results in significant delays to project execution. However, directly involved teams in both Brazil and Angola were found to be active and participatory, reducing project delays and facilitating project implementation. 			

Source: ABC, 2013.

Agricultural projects listed as being under execution on the ABC website also include a course on sustainable production of vegetables, enabled by a triangular partnership ABC, JICA and Embrapa. The project is aimed at bettering the food security of Portuguese-speaking African countries through the improvement of vegetable production enabled by knowledge and capacity development.

Interviews with Brasília and Luanda-based agricultural stakeholders also pointed out to the existence

of other co-operation initiatives with the participation of Brazilian public servants in Angola's agricultural and food security sectors. One of them fits in the grey area of Brazilian official co-operation, and it concerns institutional support to Angola's agricultural research and innovation system. Brazilian informants contacted consider it a sui generis international cooperation project for Embrapa, possibly because it will depend on the mobilization of consultants for significant part of the activities envisaged. One of the informants pointed out that the project will be mainly funded by the Government of Angola through the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Unilateral Trust Fund (UTF), and will not involve technology transfer or validation assessments.

According to an extract published in the Government of Brazil's official diary, the project's global budget is US\$ 3,071,140. Angola's counterparts are Instituto de Investigação Agronómica (IIA) and Instituto de Investigação Veterinária (IIV), both located in Huambo, a province in Angola's Midwest. In the first phase, the project's main objective is to facilitate a programmatic alignment between both institutes, also enabling better articulation between research, diffusion activities and technology transfer. This includes, for example, support to the elaboration of a strategic management and human resources plan for the institutions.

Informants also mentioned the project "Building Capacity in Food Security in Brazil and Angola", a partnership led by the Centre for Studies in Food Security (CSFS) of the Ryerson University in Canada, and the Reference Centre for Food and Nutrition Security (Centro de Referência em Segurança Alimentar e nutricional – CERESAN) of the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRRJ). The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was supporting the 6-year project which started in 2004. Its main goal was to catalyse international collaboration among Portuguese speaking countries in food security education. The project encompasses capacity building activities throughout the design of online courses offered, in Portuguese, to students in Brazil and Angola, and also workshops and seminars.

Two other initiatives within the field of food security are noteworthy, though they may not be classified as an official technical cooperation. The first initiative is aimed at supporting the creation of multi-sectorial and participatory mechanisms for the management of food and nutrition security issues in Angola. While not an official development cooperation initiative, in the sense that it does not stem from a formal commitment of the Government of Brazil, this initiative is due to the central role of Brazilian professionals involved with Brazil's National Food and Nutrition Security Council (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional – CONSEA). Created more than 10 years ago, CONSEA is the main institutional apparatus for articulation of government and civil society in regards to guiding principles and structuring initiatives related to food and nutrition security in Brazil. Though of consultative nature, CONSEA has significant influence over public policies in this field, and is linked directly to the highest levels of the executive branch in Brazil.

According to Brazilian informants involved in the initiative, their participation came as a request from FAO's headquarters in Rome. The initiative was related to FAO's first official strategic objective – help eliminate hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition. FAO hired a Brazilian consultant to conduct the project, together with the involvement of Embrapa and the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) in this process. The main governmental counterpart in Angola is the Ministry of Agriculture, through the Cabinet of Food Security, currently headed by Mr. David Tunga. The NGO Action for Rural Development and Environment (Acção para Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente – ADRA), which was one of the Angolan organizations to participate in the already mentioned co-operation project between Brazil, Canada and Angola, is the main actor responsible for the dialogue with Angolan civil society. This initiative started in 2013, with a meeting in Angola, where the parts involved elaborated the initial work plan. Throughout 2014 some meetings took place, although without the participation of the Brazilian agencies.

While most of the preparatory work appears to have been finalized, the mechanism is yet to be formalized. According to one informant, the process has been deflated in the last few months, and will hardly reach any level of relevance in food security policies in Angola comparable to that of CONSEA in Brazil. Another informant pointed out that one of the problems with the mechanism in process of consolidation is that it is currently linked to the Ministry of Trade (MINCO)³⁷. According to the same informant, the change of institutional affiliation would have “transformed the vertical process into a horizontal one”, alluding to the fact that the mechanism is now less capable of influencing public policies designed by line ministries.

The second initiative is the establishment of the Zero Hunger Africa (Fome Zero África), in 2013, at African Union’s meeting in Addis Ababa – Ethiopia. The programme is a partnership between the African Union, the Brazilian Instituto Lula and FAO, under the scope of the Declaration on Renewed Partnership for Unified Approach to End Hunger in Africa. The principal aim of the programme is to eliminate hunger and poverty by 2025 and it has other 5 goals before that, including reducing hunger by 40% by 2017 in countries of full implementation of the programme and reducing, within 10 years, the need of external food aid to provide access to food all year round. Part of the resources for the programme comes from the Africa Solidarity Trust Fund for Food Security (launched in 2012 during the FAO Africa Regional Conference), to which many African countries contribute, including Angola. Interviews showed that the main concern about the implementation of the programme in Angola is the capacity to adapt the Brazilian Zero Hunger programme to the Angolan domestic context.

4. Final considerations

Economic and political dependence tend to be associated with higher vulnerability and lower resiliency. While tapping on their respective comparative advantages, as well as the country’s natural and developed resource endowments, governments frequently strive to improve the sustainability of their socioeconomic systems by mitigating dependency-related risks. Yet, dependency on different resources, institutions or foreign aid, also has diverse implications to formulation, ownership and implementation of national development policies. In that sense, administrating dependencies is an important aspect of the management of development, particularly for governments of developing countries.

Angola’s socioeconomic trajectory since the late 1990s shows GoA’s prioritization of the extractive and oil industries over the attraction of foreign aid. Strict political conditionalities attached to North-South cooperation, as well the knowledge of extensive natural resources in Angola, contributed to GoA’s decision. In contrast, the Government of Mozambique had to rely on substantial amounts of foreign aid to promote the country’s development. While situated in distinct geographical locations, Mozambique and Angola shared a similar Portuguese colonial past. However, oil and aid dependency, coupled with significant differences in historical trajectories, led to diverse state, society and market relations in the two Lusophone countries.

Oil and aid dependency in Angola and Mozambique seem to have different implications for the management of national development policy. While the positives and negatives of both are debatable, it is interesting to assess such dependencies against the Paris aid principles – ownership, alignment, harmonization, measurements of results, and mutual accountability –, which should in principle guide global North-South development cooperation. While this issue will be further assessed in a consolidated

³⁷ According to local informants, this development was due to the fact that Mrs. Rosa Escórcio Pacavira de Matos, who previously spearheaded the process as Secretary for Social Issues of the President of the Republic, became the head of MINCO.

report, which will constitute the bulk of content reviewed at the validation workshops, some preliminary comments are fitting.

The project's field research indicates that development cooperation is better harmonized, aligned and results-based managed in the Angolan context. While mutual accountability – as well as democratic accountability – seem to be more advanced in Mozambique, accountability from the Government of Mozambique towards North-South donors seem to be stronger than from the Government to its citizens. This in turn is related to ownership in both countries. It is unclear to what extent the Government of Mozambique and its citizens, rather than North-South donors, “own” the country's development agenda. In contrast, the GoA clearly “owns”, for better or worse, its development agenda, even though ownership in Angola could be described as top-down rather than bottom-up.

On the one hand, this is related to the absolute and relative size of development cooperation in relation to the Angola's budget and GDP, both of which cannot be dissociated from the GoA's choice to pursue economic development centred on the extractive sector since the beginning of the 2000s. On the other hand, the contrast is also related to the structure of the aid system and aid dependence in Mozambique, which is intrinsically linked to the ways in which political conditionalities attached to aid were imposed in the country since the 1990s.

The increasing engagement of the BRICS countries in Angola and Mozambique has been certainly impacting oil and aid dependency in complex ways. Field research and interviews enabled the collection of significant evidence indicating the erosion of political conditionalities from North-South cooperation in connection to the BRICS in Mozambique, which, coupled with the discovery of massive reserves of gas and the development of the extraction sector, creates the possibility of future approximation with Angola's development paradigm.

When attention is devoted to Brazilian health and agricultural cooperation in Angola and Mozambique, similarities and differences between Brazil's South-South and North-South cooperation seem to be largely maintained, in spite of the different country settings. As is the case of North-South cooperation, Brazilian development cooperation is much smaller in volume and number of projects in Angola. However, Brazil's most recent and important projects in both countries are either based on Brazilian domestic experiences, or emphasize a “structuring” dimension. Additionally, issues linked with Brazil's lacking development cooperation system consistently appear across projects in both countries. Similarly to what was shown by the project's research in Mozambique, institutions such as Embrapa and Fiocruz also seem to be projecting their particular settings, sectorial systems and policy choices through their development projects in Angola. This move must be seen not only in light of Brazil's government more general foreign policy, but also as a way to strengthen their particular institutional positions and principles that underlie their work within international and domestic fields. This further points out to the need of advancing bottom-up and top-down research agendas with regards to Brazilian South-South cooperation, analysing not only the role of ABC in Brazil's development cooperation system, but also the stakes that each implementing agent holds while engaging in South-South cooperation.

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Table 5 - Agreements of cooperation signed between Brazil and Angola

Agreements	Date of Conclusion
Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Agreement	11/6/80
Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement	11/6/80
Cooperation Agreement in the Communication field (Additional Protocol to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	20/10/1983
Agreement on the Suppression of Visa in Diplomatic and Service Passports	31/05/1999
Agreement on the Suppression of Visa in Diplomatic, Special and Service Passports (in the CPLP scope)	07/17/2000
Agreement to support the Development of the School for All National Program (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	8/1/02
Agreement to implement the Reorganization, Institutional Strengthening and the Methodological Innovation of Rural Extension as a Sustainable Rural Development Strategy in Angola project. (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	11/3/03
Agreement to implement the Institutional Strengthening Project of Angola's Agronomic and Veterinarian Research Institute. (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	11/3/03
Agreement to implement the Environmental Education Strengthening Project in Angola (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	11/3/03
Agreement on Labour, Employment and Vocational Training fields (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	11/3/03
Agreement to implement the project of Social Inclusion through Sports Practice (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	01/19/2005
Agreement to implement the Capacity Building Project of the Republic of Angola's Health System (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	7/9/07
Agreement to implement the scholar Training in Public Health Project in Angola (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	7/9/07
Agreement to implement the School for All Project (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	10/18/2007
Agreement to implement the Capacity Building Project for the Elaboration of the Curricular Reform Proposal (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	10/18/2007
Agreement to Implement the Program of Prevention and Control of Malaria Support Project (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	10/18/2007
Agreement to implement the Preservation of Angola's Memory and Audiovisual Production Strengthening Project (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	07/17/2008
Agreement to implement the Preservation of Angola's Memory and Audiovisual Production Strengthening Project (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	07/17/2008
Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Angola and The Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil concerning the area of tourism.	04/17/2009
Source: http://mercadofoco.apexbrasil.com.br/angola/informacoes-estrategicas/acordos-bilaterais . Translated by Authors.	

Agreements	Date of Conclusion
Agreement to Implement the Sickle Cell Disease Pilot Project (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	06/23/2010
Agreement to Implement the Capacity Building in Technical Assistance and Agrarian extension for Angolan Technicians Project (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	06/23/2010
Agreement to Implement the Support Project for Rural Vocational Training and Social Promotion in Angola (Complementary adjustment to the Agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation)	06/23/2010
Agreement to Implement the Support Project to Implement the Health Plant Service and Technical Capacity Building for Phytosanitary Inspection (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	06/23/2010
Agreement to Implement the Support Project for National Agrarian Research System of Angola (Complementary adjustment to the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement)	06/23/2010
Agreement for Cooperation between the Federative Republic of Brazil and Republic of Angola Concerning the Area of Defence	06/23/2010
Agreement for Cooperation between the Federative Republic of Brazil and Republic of Angola Concerning the Non Higher Education and Academic Training	06/23/2010
Agreement for Cooperation between the Federative Republic of Brazil and Republic of Angola Concerning the Higher Education and Staff Training	06/23/2010
Source: http://mercadofoco.apexbrasil.com.br/angola/informacoes-estrategicas/acordos-bilaterais . Translated by Authors.	

Table 6 - Protocols signed between Brazil and Angola

Protocols	Date of Conclusion
Area of Education Development	9/10/91
Technical Coordination in the Security and Public Order Domain	11/14/2000
Technical Cooperation in the Area of Environment	11/3/03
Technical Cooperation in the Area of Agriculture and Livestock	11/3/03
Technical Cooperation to support the local Administration Training Institute	11/3/03
Strengthening to the Environmental Education in Angola	11/3/03
Technical Cooperation in the Domain of Petroleum	11/4/03
Technical Cooperation in the Area of Public Administration	5/3/05
Source: http://mercadofoco.apexbrasil.com.br/angola/informacoes-estrategicas/acordos-bilaterais . Translated by Authors.	

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